

THE
LONDON QUARTERLY
REVIEW.

JULY, 1885.

ART. I.—GEORGE ELIOT.

George Eliot's Life as Related in her Letters and Journals.
Arranged and Edited by her husband, J. W. Cross.
Three vols. Edinburgh and London: William Blackwood
& Sons. 1885.

THE age in which we live is ever, sphinx-like, propounding riddles to us, some of which are indeed of such terrible import, that our doom may well be spiritual death if we fail to read them aright; but others, less momentous, are interesting through their difficulty, and among the latter we shall not find many more subtly elusive or more unyielding to any obvious solution than the problem offered by the character and opinions of George Eliot. Her massive intelligence, laborious acquirements, and soaring ambition co-existed with a "shy, shrinking," ultra-feminine nature, that required constant cherishing and encouragement; her habitually authoritative utterance, "of solemn tenour and deep organ-tone," contrasts strangely with the nebulously vague philosophy enunciated in so majestic a fashion; her reverence for all deeply-felt religion seems incongruous in one who either had no discernible religion of her own, or whose religion was too purely intuitive and too objectless to be formulated in any language comprehensible by man. Her habit of enforcing and illustrating, with all the skill of a consummate word-artist, the sacredness of duty

[No. CXXVIII.]—NEW SERIES, VOL. IV. NO. II.

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and the miserable penalties of wrong-doing, becomes perplexing when we find the austere moralist setting at naught, in her own person, the one sacred bond with which all the natural duties and ties she so glorified are inseparably connected, and choosing for herself a position which involved the violation of a great fundamental moral law. It may be held doubtful even whether the world will really be the better for the existence of this gifted and, in many respects, admirable woman; and whether much of her work may not prove rather to be a dissolving and demoralizing agent, than an active force for good, as she undoubtedly hoped it would be. We may not find the key to this problem in the volumes before us; but some reconciliation of the many apparent contradictions in George Eliot's character they will furnish; one of our perplexities may even serve as a key to unlock another.

Mr. Cross has performed his arduous task as biographer with rare modesty, tact, and ability. He has effaced himself indeed as much as possible, and has virtually constructed an autobiography of George Eliot from her letters and journals, keeping faithfully within the lines laid down in the following passage of his preface:—

“By arranging the letters and journals so as to form a connected whole, keeping the order of their dates, and with the least possible interruption of comment, I have endeavoured to combine a narrative of day-to-day life with the play of light and shade, which only letters, written in various moods can give, and without which no portrait can be a good one. I do not know that the particular method in which I have treated the letters has ever been adopted before. Each letter has been pruned of everything that seemed irrelevant to my purpose—of everything that I thought my wife would have wished to be omitted. Every sentence that remains adds, in my judgment, something (however small it may be) to the means of forming a conclusion about her character.”

The book, compiled with such delicate care, was waited for with a kind of enthusiastic curiosity by the numerous admirers of the great novelist; but to very many it has been an unmistakable disappointment. People looked for rich mellow humour, for vivid word-painting, for dramatic presentation of character, for all the wit and wisdom, the mirth and the pathos of their favourite writer's best work; and they find the

most delightful of these qualities chiefly conspicuous by their absence. Even the "racy, original, and nervous English," justly admired by Bulwer Lytton in her first great work, is replaced in the *Letters* by the statelier style, *apprêté* and self-conscious, which predominates throughout large tracts of *Daniel Deronda*. It is a curious fact—almost unique, we should think, in literary history—that her ease, familiarity, and naturalness as a writer are reserved almost exclusively for her published work, and are lacking to her intimate correspondence.

In this connection it is worthy of remark that the person who of all others best knew and most admired the mental powers of Mary Ann Evans, and to whose impulsion it was due that she adventured into the untried field of novel-writing, was very doubtful whether her effort would possess the quality of "dramatic representation," and was agreeably surprised to find that she "could write dialogue"—a faculty without which all her "wit, description, and philosophy" would remain ineffective in fiction. Other friends who had known Miss Evans many years, who were familiar with her written style, and believed themselves acquainted with her inmost thoughts, failed entirely to divine her under the mask of "George Eliot," and were filled with astonishment when the mask was lifted. It is, therefore, evident that one part of her complex being found its only expression in her novels, that certain undivided faculties of her mind were brought into play by that kind of work, and by that alone.

There have been found readers of these volumes who complain that we learn in them but little of the novelist, and next to nothing of the history of each novel; a somewhat unjust complaint, since abundant hints as to these matters are scattered throughout, some obvious enough, and others just obscure enough to make it a stimulating effort of intelligence to seize them. But were it not so, we need not deplore that the biographer has attempted to show us "the other side of the moon"—the woman, not the writer—and to reveal to us its hidden charm of "silent silver lights and darks undreamed of." There is unhappily a shadow as of eclipse brooding over this fair unfamiliar disk. Not one of George Eliot's heart-

saddening romances leaves such a weight of quiet hopeless gloom on the reader's mind as does this faithful history of a gifted being whose gifts did not bring her much happiness, and whose conduct offers more than one painful enigma.

Mr. Cross, in the graceful sketch of George Eliot's youth which he has prefixed to the *Letters*, indicates not doubtfully the source of her best and happiest inspirations. They were drawn from her memories of the first twenty-one years of her existence, spent amid the green fields of Warwickshire and within the farmhouse at Griff—that "charming red-brick, ivy-covered house"—that "warm little nest where her affections were fledged." Like her own Maggie Tulliver, the girl had her book-hunger and her precocious ambitions, her passionate thwarted longings and intense affections; like her too, she had her religionisms, put on like a garment, and doffed in later years as easily as they had been assumed. Her father, Robert Evans, the noble artisan who raised himself to positions of great trust and power by sheer force of character and ability, and from whom she doubtless inherited much of her masculine intelligence and her singular tenacity, exercised a strong influence upon his favourite child. His graphic stories of his early life not only furnished her memory with a gallery of vivid pictures, but gave a certain ineffaceable tone and colour to her whole habit of thought. A "strong latent conservative bias" is found underlying all her sympathy with modern innovations and innovators; for Robert Evans had learned, during our long struggle with revolutionary France, to regard the "teachers of revolutionary doctrine" as "a variable mixture of the fool and the scoundrel," and to hold that "the welfare of the nation lay with a strong government which could maintain order." He was conservative in religion too, a sturdily upright, faithfully pious Churchman, and we shall not err much in considering that here lies the secret of the loving veneration with which his daughter continued to regard all honest belief, even after long years of hopeless unbelief on her own part. She has refrained from making any one of her fictitious characters an exact portrait of this beloved parent, but "there are things about her father"—to use her brother's phrase—in more than

one of her books; and a shadow of Robert Evans clings about both *Adam Bede* and *Caleb Garth*.

Her "pale, energetic mother"—delicate in health, kind of heart, epigrammatic in talk, full of restless household activity, and apt to be slightly disquieted by the unusual ways and tastes of her bookish, freakish youngest-born—passed away when the girl was only sixteen, and does not appear to have influenced her very strongly; yet we may guess that from her was derived that gift of keen humorous observation, and that faculty of compressing into crisp, biting phrases much satiric wisdom, which helped largely to win popularity for George Eliot's serious and weighty performances.

But Miss Evans possessed some traits of character that cannot, any more than her genius, be referred to heredity or environment; and one peculiarity that did much toward the shaping of her destiny does not seem to have been derived directly from either parent. Ardently affectionate, and always coveting the approval of those she herself admired, she showed in early life a surprising pliability in conforming herself to the opinions of her most esteemed friends, and in modelling herself after their image; she really seems to have had, as she herself judged, a good deal of the chameleon about her. Her first girlish friendship was not for any schoolfellow of her own age, but for Miss Lewis, the "principal governess" in the school at Nuneaton to which Mary Ann Evans was sent when about nine years old; with this lady she long maintained a correspondence. Miss Lewis was an ardent Evangelical Churchwoman, and her admiring young friend did not fail to embrace Evangelical views accordingly. From the age of thirteen to that of sixteen she was under the care of the Miss Franklins, the pious, highly educated daughters of a Baptist minister, and mistresses of a girls' school at Coventry. Miss Evans, while under the sway of these ladies, whom she loved and admired, "adopted their religious views with intense eagerness and conviction," and tried to put them in practice in her home life, when the death of her mother and the marriage of her elder sister left her the house-mistress at Griff.

There was little bliss for her, with her "full passionate nature

and hungry intellect," in the seclusion of the remote farmhouse and in its round of household duties unrelieved by any social variety; and there is little brightness of any sort in the strangely formal and dreary letters written at this period. They are hard reading, and rather exasperating reading too, for they betray that the writer was compelling her mind into what she deemed the right position, and using the ordinary language of piety from a sense of duty and propriety only. There is no ring of reality in her devout ejaculations, her lavish use of Scripture phrase, her long-drawn disquisitions as to the lawfulness of this or that pleasure. She was unconsciously mimicking the objects of her young admiration, and that seems to have been all. We may regret the gloomy form in which religion was presented to her: her childhood terrified by the image of "an offended Deity in the sky, who was angry when she wanted too much plum-cake;" her girlhood shut out from the heavenly vision of the Almighty Father by hard Predestinarian logic. "I was then a strong Calvinist," she wrote, in speaking of her brief intercourse with her aunt by marriage, Mrs. Samuel Evans, the little dark-eyed, vivacious, zealous female evangelist who suggested the beautiful character of Dinah Morris, and whose life was swayed by a "spirit of love" unknown at that time to her gifted niece. But in truth, Miss Evans's religion was never a living thing; the fervent glow of true conviction is utterly lacking to its expression. It was no part of herself; and hence the amazing ease and rapidity with which it fell off from her, when her removal with her father, in 1841, to the immediate neighbourhood of Coventry, brought about a total change in her environment. We need not attribute her transformation from a gloomily-pious Evangelical into a "crude freethinker" wholly and solely to the agency of her neighbours at Rosehill—the Brays and the Hennells—with whom she was soon intimate; it is hinted to us that her views had already become a little unsettled in the course of her solitary reading. We cannot but suspect that hers was not only an artificial, but a very ill-instructed piety, when we find that to the study of Isaac Taylor's *Ancient Christianity* is attributed this "unsettling" of her opinions. That graphic portraiture of the Pre-Nicene Church, showing it all marred and stained

with human imperfection, and scarred by its fierce struggles with surrounding heathenry and devilry, is more apt to awaken in a well-informed thinker a reverent admiration of the mighty in-dwelling Truth, which lived and triumphed amid such obstructions, than to minister doubts of the Divine origin of that Truth. A certain shallowness, very strangely associated with the keenness of Miss Evans's intellect, here betrays itself, and is still more manifest in the unquestioning, unreasoning submissiveness with which she conformed to the views of her new friends. A few days seem to have sufficed to work a really tremendous change in her opinions. The "chameleon-like nature" assumed the colour of its changed surroundings with wonderfully prompt docility, and so complete was the transformation that it never seems to have occurred to her that arguments against her new opinions were worthy even to be looked at, much less inquired into. She took her unbelief very much on trust, as she had taken her former belief.

Mr. and Mrs. Bray and the Hennell family, "friends who called forth her interest and stimulated her powers in no common degree," could by no stretch of the term be described as Christians, and would probably have disclaimed the title. Mr. Charles Hennell had published, in 1838, *An Inquiry Concerning the Origin of Christianity*, which had the doubtful advantage of meeting with high approval from Strauss, who pronounced that the author, quite unwittingly and by a kind of divination, had hit on the very track which the masters of German unbelief were also pursuing, having "educated entirely from himself those elevated views which the learned German of our day appropriates as the fruit of the religious and scientific advancement of his nation." Miss Evans adopted the teachings of this book with a kind of enthusiasm. "I have read the *Inquiry* again," she writes in 1847, "with more than interest—with delight and high admiration. . . . Mr. Hennell ought to be one of the happiest of men that he has done such a life's work. . . . The book is full of wit to me. It gives me that exquisite kind of laughter which comes from the gratification of the reasoning faculties;" and she proceeds to adduce in proof one or two passages in which no ordinary mortal could perceive much wit (they are very

indifferent specimens of reasoning), and which in many would move tears rather than laughter, could they be deemed at all conclusive against the truth they assail—that anchor of the World's Hope—the Resurrection of Christ.

We need no further evidence how empty and unreal had been the Christianity of George Eliot's youth. It had ministered no joy to her, but anxiety only; it had been a code of hard requirement and restraint, made formidable by association with the "susceptibility to terror," the "quivering fear" of her imaginative childhood. Her exaggerated language, when speaking of having been "racked and stretched on the wretched giant's bed of dogmas," seems to hint also at past suffering in the endeavour to fit herself into the inexorable iron frame of Calvinist theology. There is no mistaking the arid, joyless character of her religion. She knew nothing of the believer's "joy in the Lord;" she was more intimately acquainted with what she justly calls "the true ground of fear" to those who hold the doctrine of Election—"the doubt whether the signs of God's choice are present in the soul." Thus when a scheme was presented to her which seemed to prove that this burdensome creed had no sanction from reason, she flung it off eagerly, and accepted the Gospel of Negation as good tidings indeed.

There were after-moments in which she was aware of a certain loss accompanying the enfranchisement from dogma. Her first literary enterprise, begun under the influence of her new friends, was the translation into English of Strauss's *Leben Jesu*. She performed it excellently, rendering "word for word, thought for thought, sentence for sentence," yet maintaining a clear, easy, and flowing English style. She found it a "soul-stupefying labour," from its difficulty and magnitude, and an often-quoted passage in a letter of Mrs. Bray's seems to show that it was morally painful, too, upon occasions. "Miss Evans says she is Strauss-sick—it makes her ill dissecting the beautiful story of the crucifixion, and only the sight of the Christ image and picture makes her endure it." But the suffering was purely æsthetic, like the remedy she sought for it; it was no spiritual loss which she soothed by contemplating her "ivory image of the crucified

Christ." The lost faith was beautiful, even as the sculptured ivory was beautiful, through the grandeur of the embodied idea. Her sense of this beauty did not lessen as years went on. "What pitiable people those are who feel no poetry in Christianity!" she wrote while fresh from hearing the *Messiah* on the Christmas Eve of 1862—at which date she was busy on *Romola*,—"Surely the acme of poetry hitherto is the conception of the suffering Messiah, and the final triumph, 'He shall reign for ever and for ever.' The Prometheus is a very imperfect foreshadowing of that symbol wrought out in the long history of the Jewish and Christian ages." It had been sad indeed to hold so loftily poetic a creed as a total falsehood; better consider it as a "symbol" of some transcendent but quite human truth; and so George Eliot consoled herself for her loss of belief in the historic Christ, after the fashion she has indicated in the words of the Jewess Mirah—*à propos* of the mythical self-devotion of Bouddha in giving himself as food to a famished tigress—"If people have thought what is the most beautiful and the best thing, it must be true. It is always there;" and so Mirah's creator pleased herself with the belief that the idea of the Christ, having once entered into the thought of the world, must remain there as an everlasting power of good, though we should have no "satisfactory basis for the history of the Man Jesus;" as if any idea could retain its potency when it was proved to rest on myth and error. Little power has the idea of self-sacrifice in the Bouddha myth over any mind that holds the story to be impossible and ridiculous; and as little power would be wielded by the far more majestic idea embodied in the most sublime and pathetic image known to human thought—that of the Man of Sorrows wounded for our transgressions and bruised for our iniquities—if the world were once persuaded that His sacrifice was unreal and His suffering unhistoric.

It is difficult for those who know anything of human nature to accept another article of George Eliot's "meliorist" creed, and to believe that the race as it advances in intelligence will be withheld from evil courses by altruistic considerations; that mere average men will have heroism enough to choose self-denial instead of self-indulgence, when convinced that certain

attractive but immoral lines of conduct will prove injurious to the human community. A mightier force is needed for such work ; that "expulsive power of a new affection," which alone can drive out the herd of selfish and sensual impulses, and which can only be inspired by a Person worthy of the highest love.

With such thin visionary opinions and hopes, however, George Eliot strove to content herself unto the last ; and she seems to have felt surprise when the meagre food failed to satisfy her friends—witness the painful letter addressed to Lady Ponsonby, as lately as 1874, in which she betrays a real incapacity for understanding the deprivation of a soul that had reluctantly cast away a genuine belief. The consideration of such facts as these tends to convince us that her splendidly endowed nature was curiously defective on one side, being marred by such deficiency of perception in things spiritual as can only be likened to physical colour-blindness. Her singular keenness of insight as to the meannesses and weaknesses of humanity, her terrible faculty of unmasking secret baseness of thought and motive, and showing us the unholy heart of man in its true hideousness, is no enviable gift in itself, save for artistic purposes, and ill compensates her lack of the higher vision.

Important changes in outward circumstances supervened on her inward change, and helped to render it permanent by keeping her in the midst of the same influences that had determined it. Her father died in 1849, after a prolonged illness, during which his daughter tended him with untiring love. Though she had been very near to abandoning him in the first heat of her zeal for her new opinions, there was no one to whom she was so bound by deep affection ; and she was to know but one heavier loss. His death was not only a great grief, but it made it necessary for his daughter to decide on a new path in life. In her desolation the friends who had so unhappily influenced her did not fail her. They took her with them to France and Switzerland ; and there she chose to settle herself for a time, and to wear off the first sharpness of sorrow amid new scenes and new faces, at Geneva. The climate, the scenery, the society, all suited the delicately constituted fasti-

dious sufferer. "I am becoming passionately attached," she says, "to the mountains, the lake, the streets, my own room, and above all, the dear people among whom I live." She formed friendly relations indeed with these kind people, but her English correspondents retained their supreme power over her. Delightful as it was to be "among people who exhibit no meannesses, no worldlinesses," she began to long after home scenes and society, which her fancy idealized somewhat while she remained at a distance from them. A haunting disbelief in her own capacity for inspiring real affection—a self-distrust that ran through her nature—made her hungry for repeated assurances of the regard in whose reality she found it so difficult to put faith. Home disappointed her when, after eight months' absence, she returned to it; she had forgotten its greyness and coldness; but she found a refuge from these in the home of the Brays, where she remained as a cherished inmate many months, leaving it only to accept an important literary employment.

Her long toil in the translation of Strauss had received very inadequate pecuniary reward, but was to serve her in other ways; one who had performed such a task was approved as an excellent workman. She was at first employed as a writer for the *Westminster Review*, and then as assistant-editor of that organ of "advanced" thought. In this position she was "thrown in contact with Mr. Lewes, who was to exercise so paramount an influence over all her future, with Mr. Herbert Spencer, and with a number of other writers" whose views harmonized sufficiently with those of Lewes and of Spencer to admit of their working together. Miss Evans retained her assistant-editorship for a considerable time, but resigned it shortly before taking the most decisive and the most regrettable step of her life. Her intimate friendship with Mr. Lewes deepened into strong mutual affection, and culminated in their entering into a union that never was, and never could be, legalized.

That this step was regarded with deep dismay and disapproval by even the most "advanced" of Miss Evans's female friends is made evident by one or two of her own letters; *pièces justificatives* from which we may have to quote.

But, whatever the dismay caused by such moral defalcation in the unknown Mary Ann Evans, it was less than that which at a later period disturbed the minds of many when it was first made manifest to them that the lofty moralist to whose teaching they had bowed in admiration had so fallen—into such a “pit of ink” that even repentant tears would fail to wash out all her stain ; while there was no show of any repentance.

At first sight nothing appears more startling than the contradiction between Mary Ann Evans's conduct and George Eliot's writings, even on this point of morals. There was nothing in George Eliot's character of the defiant spirit that delights in running counter to established rule. She entertained an unusually exalted idea of the stringency of duty ; she prized highly the “moral wealth which it has been the work of ages to produce.” Very sensitive, very affectionate, very impressible, her nature knew no stronger need than the desire for approbation, for admiration even, especially from those she loved ; and many passages in her writings show the keenest appreciation of the suffering inflicted by the scorn of society on those who have broken its laws.

The figure of a woman under a social ban recurs rather frequently in George Eliot's vigorous representations of English life. There is a kind of cruelty in more than one of these pictures ; little sympathy softens the hard lines, bitten in with sharpest satiric acid, in which the victims of their own wrongdoing are portrayed ; while the suffering inflicted by the scorn of society on a certain class of sinners is so vividly depicted, that one would say this writer was herself too exquisitely susceptible of the suffering and too scornful of the sin ever to have exposed herself to the one or to have fallen into the other. But the scorn is really bestowed more on the fallen individual than on the sinful passions that led to the fall, while the guilty feeling itself is described far too glowingly, with too much luxury of circumstance. Let the over-abundant detail in the story of Maggie Tulliver's temptation, all sensuous as it is, be noticed ; let the handling of the ill-starred Hetty and her fate in *Adam Bede* be contrasted with Sir Walter Scott's delicate and skilful management of a similar character and similar incidents in *The Heart of Mid-*

lothian—full of pity, but absolutely free from the oppressive suggestiveness of the scenes in *Adam*; and it must be recognized that there was a certain taint in George Eliot's imagination, and that her perception sometimes failed her with regard to moral propriety, as it had done with regard to spiritual truth. There is something very noticeable too in her tendency to hover and circle about evil-doings more or less allied to her own great error; few of her fictions are quite free from such an element; yet the vice is never directly defended, or, indeed, represented as other than pernicious. Something of an unquiet conscience shows itself thus; but it is the only indication presented of any dissatisfaction with her own conduct or with the position in which it had placed her; unless we reckon as a more subtle indication of the same sort the constant ostentatious care with which, in her letters, she parades her perfect complacency with both.

Writing to Miss Sara Hennell, many months after taking the final fatal step, Miss Evans expresses surprise that any "unworldly, unsuperstitious person" should deem her relation to Mr. Lewes immoral. The word *unsuperstitious* is worthy of notice. Having completely renounced her belief in the Almighty Lawgiver and Sovereign Judge of the earth, the law of marriage—once revealed in Eden, and stamped with tenfold solemnity by the words of Christ—could have for her no higher authority than that of any other human arrangement intended to secure the highest ultimate good; when it appeared no longer to subserve such an end, but to hinder it, why not set it aside? There is a significant passage in Mr. Cross's first volume, extracted not without design from a letter of Miss Evans, written some years before she first saw Mr. Lewes. Referring to the lately published novel of *Jane Eyre* she reprobates as "diabolical" the marriage-law to which Miss Brontë's heroine sacrifices her hopes of happiness. The case put in *Jane Eyre* is one of the extremest hardship; we are not asked to believe that there was equal misery involved in the "long tragedy" which unrolled itself before Miss Evans's eyes; but there are very few casuists—there has not been found a Christian casuist—who would dare to dissent from Miss Brontë's solution of the painful problem. Miss

Evans, however, did so dissent; and when the time came she logically acted out her own opinion.

From whatever motive, the secret of Mr. Lewes's domestic misery is well kept in these volumes; we are told, indeed, of a home broken up, of a life irretrievably spoiled; it has been left for other critics to hint that he was anything but a blameless sufferer. It is not, however, on *his* conduct that we have to pronounce. "A long tragedy," says one of George Eliot's ablest apologists, "unrolled itself before her; her pity, affection, and gratitude were subjected to a strong appeal," and we are asked to believe that in yielding to this appeal she acted with real disinterestedness, and made no sacrifice of principle to passion; a plea which she herself put forward as opportunity served. "She held herself under all the responsibilities of a married woman;" she neither desired nor approved "light and easily broken ties;" she and Mr. Lewes worked hard for others as well as themselves; she deemed her conduct altogether worthy of approval by the "unworldly and unsuperstitious;" she could "conceive no consequences which would make her regret the past." The view thus put before us, painful as it is, distressing us with the spectacle of a great and rich nature gone blindly and hopelessly astray, is yet that which we would prefer to take, were it possible. But there is another side to the medal; and motives much less lofty than the impulse to generous self-sacrifice for the benefit of a fellow-creature had doubtless a large share in determining her action.

Miss Evans was a solitary, hard-worked writer on the staff of the *Westminster Review*; she had no real home; such literary eminence as she had gained was rather undesirable than otherwise. A woman who, when still young, had made herself conspicuous chiefly as the translator of two such unpopular and formidable heresiarchs as Strauss and Feuerbach, and who had no influential connections, would not easily make her way into society; indeed, her open and avowed unbelief would close against her almost every circle in which she might have found a woman's natural destiny; yet she was so constituted that happiness was impossible for her with that destiny unfulfilled. Domestic life, a sphere of domestic activity

and bliss, were quite as essential to her enjoyment as was the stimulus of intellectual society; and, with all her mental audacity, she needed more than most women to be guided and upheld by masculine strength; she had as little individual enterprise as the shallowest and simplest of her sex. By closing with Mr. Lewes's proposals she obtained at once the affectionate and the intellectual companionship she needed; a home of which she was the cherished centre was again opened to her; and during the rest of her life she was surrounded with constant fostering care—a care which the development of her splendid powers enabled her to reward by no means inadequately. It is not, therefore, surprising to find that she and Mr. Lewes remained steadily faithful to a compact which secured unmistakable advantages to each; nor is it very evident that their entering into this compact involved extraordinary self-sacrifice on either side, since, as it has been rather brutally, but not untruly, said, she had no social position to lose, and he had forfeited already whatever position he had once had.

Thus viewed, Miss Evans's conduct appears neither lofty nor admirable; but it is in harmony with the special weakness of her character, as unfolded even in this last eulogistic memorial, however at variance it may be with the teaching she zealously strove to inculcate in her writings. Nothing but the living faith which had never been hers could have saved her from sinking under a temptation so cunningly adapted to her nature. Her steady defence of her position is nowise surprising; it was essential to her comfort to think well of her own conduct; and she herself has told us how a wrong action when once committed is sure to be viewed by the offender through the "lens of apologetic ingenuity."

Henceforward, no receding was possible to her, no change in religious or in moral opinion; otherwise the position that perfectly satisfied her must have been not only renounced, but condemned. "The second half of existence is but the consequence of the first."

In all Mr. Cross's three volumes there is nothing more agreeable than the correspondence, extending from 1857 to 1878, between Mr. John Blackwood and the great author who

first offered herself anonymously as a contributor to "Maga" through the agency of Mr. Lewes. There is some approach to the ease and freedom of George Eliot's best writing for the press in her letters to the "editor who seemed to have been created in pre-established harmony with the organization of a susceptible contributor." It is not suggested at every turn that the writer lies under a heavy necessity to be magnanimous and tolerant, to moralize and philosophize, and set an edifying example; there is, in short, a pleasing absence of the sleepless self-consciousness which pervades the correspondence with personal friends; and in its stead we find an almost gay frankness and reasonableness, a mingled modesty and independence that might not unfairly be called manly.

These letters cover that actively productive period of George Eliot's life, which will of necessity have most interest for her admirers, and which was as nearly as possible co-extensive with her union with Mr. Lewes. "It had always been a vague dream of mine that some time or other I should write a novel"—she says when relating "how she came to write fiction"—"but I never went any further towards the actual writing of the novel than the introductory chapter describing a Staffordshire village and the life of the neighbouring farmhouses; and as the years passed on I lost any hope that I should ever be able to write a novel, just as I desponded about everything else in my future life." But under the influence of another mind, little prone to despondency, she was induced to pluck up heart, and make the attempt seriously. The title of an imagined story, which visited her in "a dreamy doze," was pronounced "a capital title;" and that most touching transcript from real life, which we know under the name of *The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos Barton*, was the first result of her new impulse and inspiration.

Mr. Blackwood, to whom *Amos Barton* was offered when completed, received it with cordial appreciation. It is curious, however, to find him hitting in George Eliot's first story the defect which shows so much more prominently in her last great romance—"the error of trying to explain the characters of the actors by description, instead of allowing them to evolve in the action of the story." Readers of

Daniel Deronda have some reason to sigh over the famous author's forgetfulness of this excellent hinted counsel. Another defect, not literary but spiritual, seems to have been rather felt than seen by George Eliot's first critic. His letters betray some apprehension of the aloofness of her attitude towards religion. The first reading of *Amos Barton* impressed him with "the want of some softening touch" in "the amusing reminiscences of childhood in church;" he found the author's clergymen, "with one exception, not very attractive specimens of the body;" and the first instalment of *Janet's Repentance* aroused greater uneasiness, and made it necessary for the author to define and defend her position and her intentions. Her defence has much more than a temporary interest, showing as it does that from the first she took the same high ground as an artist, and hoped to exercise the same beneficent influence, as at the much later date when she described her function as that of the "æsthetic teacher—rousing the nobler emotions, which make mankind desire the social right." The simpler words in which she avowed her wish "not to be offensive, but to touch every heart among her readers with nothing but loving humour, with tenderness, with belief in goodness," are informed by the same thought. It was with truth that she pointed out how in the little drama of *Janet's Repentance* the reader's sympathy was enlisted on the right side—with morality and religion, as against irreligion and immorality; it was with justice that she claimed to paint her characters as she *saw* them, or not at all, and upheld the realistic truth of her pictures of English religious history. Her defence was complete; and yet Mr. Blackwood's intuitive distrust was just. George Eliot, with all her genuine sympathy with religious feeling, regarded the common religious manifestations of poor humanity as from a superior height; and her half-compassionate tone betrays her mental position, in spite of her admirable skill in reproducing the language of devout emotion. Her dramatic faculty indeed is likeliest that of a mighty actress, so thoroughly possessed by the part she is playing as to weep true tears, and burn with living blushes, in the tragedy or the love-scene. The pleadings and the prayers of Dinah Morris

were "written with hot tears as they surged up" in the writer's own mind; they are far more vivid and vital than the pious platitudes Miss Evans had herself discoursed in early youth; but she distinctly refers to them as an instance of "Truth in art."

This great impersonator had many other parts in her repertory, and did not sustain the character of the saintly Dinah more skilfully than that of the keen-witted, caustic Mrs. Poyser with whom she was "very sorry to part," and whose dialogue she was conscious of writing "with heightening gusto" as she drew near the end. It did not please her to have Mrs. Poyser's sayings set down as "remembered proverbs," they were all "from her own mint." But in her own person, George Eliot resembled one heroine as little as the other; her speech was weighty and serious, "full of high sentence," with as little of epigrammatic sparkle in it as of religious ardour. There is but one of her many female characters in whom something of the author's own personality can be fairly traced; and this one is no Dinah.

The *Scenes of Clerical Life*, though the work of a beginner, show little of the 'prentice hand; it is doubtful if their author ever did work that was better of its kind. "I had meant," she says, "to carry on the series, and especially I longed to tell the story of the *Clerical Tutor*, but my annoyance at Blackwood's want of sympathy in the first part" (of *Janet's Repentance*), "though he came round to admiration at the third part, determined me to close the series."

The untold story of the *Clerical Tutor* affects us with the same kind of bootless longing, which every lover of Chaucer has shared with Milton, on coming to the point where breaks off the charming, eternally incomplete *Squire's Tale*, which even Spenser himself could not finish appropriately. But this story, though one which George Eliot "longed to tell," would hardly have equalled in grandeur or in truth the larger theme to which she turned on breaking off the "clerical" series. Her own account of the genesis of *Adam Bede* is a precious bit of literary history, the more so since we have no similar revelation as to the production of her other romances.

The prison scene between Dinah and Hetty—suggested, as is well known, by a real experience of Mrs. Samuel Evans—was the nucleus round which the whole fiction collected. Taking this scene as the basis of the story, George Eliot resolved to blend with it “other recollections of her aunt, with some points in her father’s early life and character,” and hence the two striking figures of Dinah and Adam, who however are in no sense portraits either of Elizabeth or of Robert Evans. “The problem of construction that remained was to make the unhappy girl one of the chief *dramatis personæ*, and connect her with the hero,” and having solved this problem, the author began her work, keeping the prison scene in view as the climax. “Everything else grew out of the characters and their mutual relations.” Dinah’s ultimate relation to Adam, though not originally the author’s own idea, was held in view by her from “the end of the third chapter,” and was not therefore a patched-on happy ending, as some have supposed. There is something very charming in George Eliot’s evident delight in this book and its success—a delight which not many of her writings awakened in her, and which she was not long allowed to enjoy in peace.

Motives of convenience had led Miss Evans to prefer writing under a pseudonym. Her secret was well kept and cleverly managed, and there was much amusement for her in the wild guesses ventured at her identity. Charles Dickens divined the woman’s hand, and one of Miss Evans’s female friends identified the writer with joyous certainty; but these two stood alone in their sagacity. The secrecy so fruitful in mirth-moving mistakes could not, however, be maintained when a rival claimant to the honours of “George Eliot” was put forward in the person of an unprosperous Mr. Liggins, of literary proclivities, whom certain wise men of Warwickshire regarded as the only possible author of *Adam Bede*, and who was not proof against the temptation of masquerading in that character. This Liggins mystification occupies a rather undue space in the correspondence, since its only importance to us now lies in its having compelled the great author to confession of her identity.

“While I would willingly, if it were possible—which it clearly

is not—retain my incognito as long as I live, I can suffer no one to bear my arms on his shield," she wrote; and her firm action in the spirit of these words disposed of the myth in due season, and brought her forth from her obscurity into the "fierce light" of that fame which in her case, as in so many others, has proved to be "half disface, and counter-changed with darkness." It is easy to understand why she should have preferred the incognito. Her personal example was not such as could add greater weight to her ethical teaching, which she yet desired to make as impressive as possible. This desire is so manifest as a constant anxious prepossession, that we can well understand how one just and impartial critic has been led to the conclusion that she hoped by her writings to counteract and to expiate any evil influence exerted by her conduct as an individual.

The *Mill on the Floss* was completed under occasional moods of deep discouragement. But when the book had appeared she was quite equal to defending it in principle and in detail. Agreeing with Sir Edward Lytton, that "the tragedy was not adequately prepared," she protested against his condemnation of the heroine in her love entanglement; nor could she understand why her critics should see so much cruel satirical intention in the other portraits she had introduced. The recognized fact that there is very much of the autobiographic in the delineation of Maggie at once explains George Eliot's inability to see her moral defect so painfully as did others, and justifies her artistic presentation of this character, "essentially noble, but liable to great errors." She knew, better than her critics, how such a nature would be acted on by given circumstances.

"My stories grow in me like plants," she wrote while the *Mill on the Floss* was yet uncompleted. Last in that group of her tales as to which we can accept this saying in its fulness comes the charming idyl of *Silas Marner*; it is last also of those whose history we have recorded by the author herself in conscious utterance. It "unfolded itself from the merest millet seed of thought" (the recollection of a linen-weaver, with a bag on his back, seen in the writer's early childhood), and quickly became an imperious inspiration, thrusting itself between her and the long-meditated, painfully achieved *Romola*. The spon-

taneous grace of *Silas Marner*, and its clear unity of conception, are themselves eloquent of such an origin. It is hardly to be called sombre, though its author so esteemed it; it is the kindest exposition she ever gave of that text, so terrible sometimes in her hands—"Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap."

The production of *Romola* marks a new epoch in George Eliot's life as author and as woman. The amount of study and research by which she prepared herself for it, and the immense difficulty with which the actual work was done, are rather appalling to consider, and make it intelligible that she who began it as a young woman should have finished it an old woman. There is no mistaking the absence of youthful feeling and natural cheerfulness in her subsequent utterances; and there is a change in her method of work quite consistent with this loss. There is no falling off in power; *Romola* itself presents us, in the figure of Tito, with a picture of moral degeneration drawn with a remorseless force that George Eliot even never surpassed; but this romance and its successors, deliberately planned for the setting forth of certain moral problems, and the expounding of certain theories of life, have no longer the air of natural beautiful growth like that of tree or flower; but appear as stately architectural constructions; and three out of the four are marred by the always futile attempt to portray ideal characters. *Romola*, *Felix Holt*, *Daniel Deronda*, have too little of the breath of life; they are such human beings as George Eliot desired to see, such as she believed might be; but we may fairly doubt if their author ever met anything like them in flesh and blood.

The charming Dorothea of *Middlemarch* is redeemed from this impossible perfection by her impulsive errors and her faults of temper, very forgivable as these are, and appeals to the heart as the statuesque, too faultless *Romola* never does. "It is so exactly like life," people say sadly of the mournful lesson taught in *Middlemarch*—that wonderful tale of high aims ignobly frustrated, of beneficent powers wasted, of incompleteness and defeat. Happily *all* life is not like this. Many of us can summon from the chambers of memory, the images of noble natures surmounting the hindrances born of their own

errors, and rising to greater heights of achievement even through their victorious struggles with wretched circumstances that seemed fitted to clog the wings of aspiration and fetter every lofty hope. But these victors were Christians. The path George Eliot had chosen did not lead her among such moral heroes; the disillusionings of maturer life were compensated to her by no such inspiring spectacle; and hence much of the otherwise inexplicable sadness of her later work.

So singular is the change in religious tone, that some kindly readers have supposed the first group of stories to be written before George Eliot had renounced Christianity. It was not so; but the air and colour, the characters and incidents of those tales belonged to the fresh youthful days—days as yet of Christian faith and fellowship—which the writer's mind reflected like a magic mirror. The visions of her dawn gave place, in her second period, to the uncheerful philosophies of her middle life, to darker shapes that she had met in her larger experience; the weight of her function as æsthetic teacher lay more heavily on her; and the result is not so delightful.

There is one point worth noting in connection with George Eliot's last great literary achievement, and that is the extraordinary success with which she performed the paradoxical feat of "turning her back on herself," when, having plunged deeply into Jewish literature by way of preparation for the writing of *Deronda*, she had become properly imbued with the spirit of her part as a sympathizing exponent of Jewish aspiration. In 1848, she revolted from "any assumption of superiority in the Jews;" their poetry was indeed supreme, "but much of their early mythology, and almost all their history, is utterly revolting. . . . Jesus is venerated and adored by us only for that wherein He transcended or resisted Judaism. . . . Everything specifically Jewish is of a low grade." In 1876, she could not decide whether the usual attitude of Christians towards Jews was "more impious or more stupid. . . . Towards the Hebrews we western people, who have been reared in Christianity, have a peculiar debt, and whether we acknowledge it or not, a peculiar thoroughness of fellowship in religious and moral sentiment."

People "hardly know that Christ was a Jew. And I find men, educated, supposing that Christ spoke Greek. . . . This deadness to the history which has prepared half our world for us lies very close to the worst kind of irreligion." It would hardly be possible to imagine a more complete change of mental attitude; but we must remember that the earlier deliverance was made in the first rashness of the writer's revolt against Biblical authority. Years had doubtless brought her "the philosophic mind," and a larger tolerance, though unhappily no higher faith came with it.

Lovers of George Eliot's prose cannot but regret the time and toil which these letters show us she wasted on the vain endeavour to make herself a poet. She had all necessary accomplishment, even to the ability of studying the great Greek masters in their own language; but the soul of the poet was never hers, or she would not have dreamed that the Positivist philosophy was a fitting theme for poetic handling. Her poetry answers in no one point to the celebrated Miltonic definition; it is not simple; it is not sensuous; it is not passionate. Even when she takes a subject from Boccaccio, the story loses its airy grace under her learned handling, and becomes incomprehensibly heavy, and all the technical perfection of her verse does not redeem it from the one unpardonable sin of wearisomeness.

A slowly-wrought, ominous change, not for the better, which is faintly perceptible in the romances of George Eliot's second period, is more clearly traceable in her later letters. The kind of hot-house atmosphere with which she was surrounded, the careful exclusion of every rough bracing breath of adverse criticism from that atmosphere, which was made over-heavy with sympathizing praise, did not, and could not, fail of its effect in disposing her to a mood of excessive complacency; and thus the very fostering care which has been accounted of such great advantage to a shy, diffident genius acted to the real injury of that genius, making its possessor heedless, and, indeed, unconscious, of very grave artistic errors. Another weightier influence was at work in a similar direction. Having lost all belief in the existence of the Omnipotent Guide of the soul, she had—as has been excellently, if sternly, said—made

herself her own God, in the sense of being her own Lawgiver, her own Redeemer; the work of controlling her faulty nature, of redeeming, of purifying it, was to be all her own; and, having long laboured at this tremendous task with satisfaction to herself and applause from others, she was apparently beginning to invest herself with other godlike attributes, a certain belief in her own excellence and infallibility betraying itself not very obscurely amid much careful moderation and anxious humility of expression. It is a spectacle full of melancholy to see her greatest errors thus avenging themselves in the way that would have been most intolerable to her had she suspected it; nor is it altogether matter of regret that this process of subtle degeneration was cut short by the hand of Providence before it had reached its lowest limit.

Her successive literary enterprises form the most noticeable events in her personal history, from 1854, when she resolved to share the fortunes of Mr. Lewes, up to 1878, when he died. During these four-and-twenty years her existence seems to have been overhung with a shadowy quiet, unbroken by violent joy or violent sorrow. "Buoyancy and exultation are out of the question when one has lived as long as I have," she wrote in the first flush of her success; and passionate woe seemed equally out of the question, until her greatest loss came on her. Then indeed she suffered with the full strength of the powerful nature she had so long disciplined, but had never overcome. The depth of her desolation can hardly be measured by those who have never known a *hopeless* sorrow. She had ministered sympathy to other mourners, but none could comfort her. What vision of re-union, what sense of mystic still unbroken companionship could be hers who had deliberately pronounced immortality "unbelievable," and who must have stood self-condemned as to her past, had she once re-admitted the Christian's hope? Perhaps, however, her sense of total irredeemable loss made it easier that she should find a second happiness; as she undoubtedly did when she contracted new matrimonial ties with one of the tenderest and faithfulest of her many friends.

She had been very fortunate both in winning and retaining friendship. Grave and reserved, and owing little of her charm

to personal beauty, she seems to have possessed an unusual attractiveness of her own, such as she attributed to one of her less prominent heroines—in whom she certainly did not intend to portray herself—"the charm of eye and lip" that reveal "delicate perception and fine judgment, and a heart awake to others;" the "suffused adorableness in a human frame where there is a mind to flash out comprehension and hands that can execute finely;" the faculty of raising not only "a continual expectation but a continual sense of fulfilment—the systole and diastole of blissful companionship." Attractiveness of this high order does not grow less with growing years, nor is the affection secured by it such as "burns soon to waste." "A day did the work of years" in winning for her the "life-long friendship" of Mr. Cross; that friendship so pure and constant, which easily transformed itself into the most unselfish conjugal devotion when the right time came. Her marriage with Mr. Cross, which took place in the May of 1880 at once brought her into the happiest relations with his family, and bridged over the gulf of silence which had divided her from her own. While it lasted their union seems to have been perfect; and the noble qualities of both parties would doubtless have kept it perfect, though it had endured more years than it did months, and to the farthest limit of mortal life. But the December of the same year closed over George Eliot's grave.

Mr. Cross, in the admirably written pages that convey his estimate of George Eliot and tell the story of her last days, dwells at length on her truly extraordinary acquirements, her rare modesty and self-distrust, her beautiful "distinctively feminine qualities," which, with her crowning gift of genius, made her companionship so high a boon that, having it, one might "possess the world without belonging to it;" but he gives us not the slightest hint that the immortal hope which had faded from her eyes in youth ever revealed itself to her anew, living or dying. We part from her memory with a sadness akin to that she herself felt and described as arising from the study of biography—"such deep sadness at the thought that the rare nature has gone for ever into darkness, and we can never know that our love and reverence can reach him, that I seem

to have gone through a personal sorrow when I shut the book and go to bed." Deeper sadness than this is ours as we close this record of the life that has "gone for ever into darkness" for us, though it arise from a different cause. We can but cherish the hope that the good in her work will prove more vital and lasting than the evil which through her religious and moral error is blended with it; and while deploring that error, with grief proportioned to the greatness of her gifts, we leave the mystery of this life—where it has ever been—in the keeping of the Righteous and Omniscient God.

ART. II.—THE HUGUENOT REFORMATION IN THE NORMAN ISLES.

1. *An Account of the Island of Jersey.* By the Rev. PHILIP FALLE. With Notes by the Rev. EDWARD DURELL, M.A. Jersey. 1837.
2. *A Constitutional History of Jersey.* By CHARLES LE QUESNE, Esq. London: Longman, Brown, Green, & Longmans. 1856.
3. *Chroniques de Jersey.* Publiées par ABRAHAM MOURANT. Jersey: Philippe Falle. 1858.
4. *Charles the Second in the Channel Islands.* By S. ELLIOTT HOSKINS, M.D., F.R.S. In 2 vols. London: Richard Bentley.
5. *The History of Guernsey.* By JONATHAN DUNCAN, Esq., B.A. London: Longman, Brown, Green, & Longmans. 1841.
6. *The History of Guernsey and its Bailiwick.* By FERDINAND BROCK TUPPER, Esq. Second Edition. Guernsey: Le Lièvre. 1876.
7. *Recueil d'Ordonnances de la Cour royale de l'Isle de Guernsey.* In 3 vols. Guernsey. 1852.
8. *La Normandie inconnue.* Par FRANÇOIS-VICTOR HUGO. Paris: Pagnerre. 1857.

9. *Histoire des Iles de la Manche.* Par PÉGOT-OGIER. Paris : E. Plon. 1881.
10. *L'Archipel de la Manche.* Par VICTOR HUGO. Paris : Calmann-Lévy. 1883.
11. *Tableaux historiques de la Civilisation à Jersey.* Par JOHN-PATRIARCHE AHIER. Jersey : C. Le Lièvre. 1852.
12. *Les Manuscrits de Philippe Le Geyt, sur la Constitution, les Lois et les Usages de Jersey.* 4 vols. Jersey : Ph. Falle. 1846.
13. *La Discipline ecclésiastique comme elle a été pratiquée depuis la Réformation de l'Eglise par les Ministres, Anciens et Diacres, des Isles de Guernezé, Jerzé, Serk et Aurigny.* Arrêtée par l'autorité et en la présence de Messieurs les Gouverneurs des dites Isles, au Synode tenu à Guernezé, le 28^e jour de Juin l'an 1576. (Manuscript kindly lent by the Rev. G. E. Lee, M.A., Rector of St. Peter's Port, Guernsey.)
14. *Registre des Actes et Affaires les plus mémorables qui ont été traitées et arrêtées es Consistoires tenus par le Ministre et par les Anciens de l'Eglise de Saint-André (Guernsey).* (Manuscript lent by the same.)

THE Channel Islands have a history of their own not wanting in interest and grandeur. It is the history of a small part of the Duchy of Normandy which, united to England by William the Conqueror, never forgot that it was Normandy that conquered England. The Norman-like tenacity with which, during centuries, that small people struggled for the preservation of their privileges and their language should claim the attention of historians, if history condescended to remember the little ones. It would be seen how a people counting only a few thousand souls maintained and even developed their political institutions and distinct parliaments under the power of the British Crown, whilst Ireland, with its millions of inhabitants, entirely failed in its struggles for Home Rule.

The beginnings of the Reformation in the Norman Isles have not yet been the object of any special study known to

us. They are still involved in a certain obscurity by reason of the absence of printed documents and the scarcity of manuscript chronicles. Yet with the help of such chronicles as are available, and of official acts, the physiognomy of events, not always sufficiently respected by local historians, may be recovered. One of these historians, Philip Falle, who wrote at the end of the seventeenth century, spoke of the Huguenot period of insular Protestantism with all the disdain of his High-Churchism. Raised from the humble rectorate of St. Saviour's, Jersey, to the rich prebend of Durham, he found it hard to forgive the French reformers who came into his native country to interrupt the so-called apostolic succession of bishops, and to put the Huguenot stamp on the religious institutions of the islands. Falle's high reputation amongst his countrymen gave his unjust prejudices a credit they did not deserve, and those who followed were not always careful to examine his assertions. Presbyterianism in the Norman Isles was vanquished, and to this day the conquerors alone have written its history. Is it astonishing if it reads like a *bulletin de victoire*?

In this article we shall relate, as far as our documents (many inedited) will permit, the origin, progress, and fall of Presbyterianism in the Channel Islands. It is the almost unknown history of a noble scion of French Protestantism—a forgotten chapter in the annals of the "Refuge."

The Norman Isles would probably never have been Protestant if Frenchmen had not brought them the Gospel. And the reasons are various. First, the English language was neither spoken nor understood in the sixteenth century, and communications with England were rare and difficult. Secondly, the islands were ecclesiastically connected with France, and formed a part of the diocese of Coutances in Normandy. Christianity in its Romish type was of French importation; so was it to be with Protestantism. The fierce persecution which the Huguenots endured from the Valois constrained them to seek places of refuge beyond the frontiers. The Norman Archipelago, by its geographical position and its language, was providentially prepared to become one of these places of refuge. Protestantism had taken a powerful hold of

Normandy, not only at Rouen, where a Huguenot was burned in 1528, and at Caen, where a friar preached the new doctrines publicly in 1531, but also in the Cotentin and the Bocage, where nobles threw open their castles to the preaching of the pure Gospel. The Reformed principles must have crossed the Channel by a slow and continuous process. The partial secularization of ecclesiastical property under Henry VIII. had greatly lowered the prestige of the clergy, who shone neither by their virtues nor their learning. And the people, tired of the clerical yoke, felt that peculiar uneasiness which precedes a great crisis.

The first official mention of French Protestants in these islands goes back to the year 1548, when the Royal Court of Jersey decided, by an Act preserved in the registers, to provide for the maintenance of Maistre Martin Langlois and Maistre Thomas Johanne, ministers come from France, "to preach the word of God to the people, purely and faithfully, according to the text of the Gospel." The rectors of the parishes (*curés*) who, as now, sat in the States of the islands, not only took part in this resolution, but promised to contribute personally towards their salary. Some no doubt were carried away by the movement, whilst others possibly were afraid of incurring the displeasure of the Duke of Somerset, then Governor of Jersey, if they did not aid the movement. The rector of St. Saviour's, who refused to renounce popery, was deprived of his living, and the rector of Grouville, being found faulty in his ministry, was publicly admonished by the Court.

In Guernsey the refugees were not at first welcomed by the local government. Several *Ordonnances*, such as were designed to render their residence in the island all but impossible, were enacted. For instance, those persons who had no regular means of existence were ordered to quit the island under pain of being publicly whipped. These severities did not, however, prevent a certain number of Huguenots from taking refuge there, and disseminating the Reformed principles. The only name amongst these Gospel pioneers known to us is Denis Le Vair, of the diocese of Bayeux. He had been a Romish priest: but, having embraced the new doctrines, he fled to Geneva, where he learnt bookselling, and became

one of those *porteballes* or *colporteurs* who, at the risk of their lives, introduced and distributed in France the Holy Scriptures, as well as religious tracts and the writings of the Reformers. He went to the Channel Islands to sell his books, which soon found eager readers in Guernsey, and the people, desiring to be instructed, asked the *colporteur* to act as their minister. Le Vair yielded to their entreaties, and without laying down his bale, he travelled over the island doing the work of an evangelist.

The first period of Protestantism in these islands was purely Presbyterian. Its ministers, its devotional books, its forms of worship, as yet in embryo, all came from France and Geneva. Naturally the representatives of the English Government could not see with great satisfaction the establishment of a form of worship different from that approved by the divines of Edward VI. So Sir Hugh Pawlet was sent over in the fourth year of the reign of Edward, as royal commissioner, to inquire into the state of the islands. The report he presented to the King described the inhabitants as won over to the Reformed doctrines. That was partly true. But it stated also that they were ready to accept whatever form of liturgy it should please his Majesty to order. This was going too far.

Nevertheless, the first edition of the Anglican Liturgy, or Service Book, as it was called, was translated into French, and sent to the young churches of the Channel Islands, together with an Order of the King in Council dated April 15, 1550, and thus worded:—

"Wee have beene informed at good length of your conformity, as well in all other things wherein the said Sir Hugh hath had conference with you, touching his commission, as alsoe in your earnest following and imbracing his Majestie's laws and proceedinges, in the order of divine service and ministration of the sacraments; for the which we give to you, on the behalfe of his Majestie, heartilie thankes, praying you, as you have well begun and proceeded, to continue in the same; and with all due reverence, devotion, quiet obedience, and unitie among you, to observe and use the service and other orders appertaininge to the same, and to the ministration of the sacraments, set forth in the book sent you presentlye."

Doubtless, the liturgy was adopted without much reluctance by the *curés* who had become Protestant, and had been left

in possession of their livings, but it is not so likely that the ministers from France and Geneva, who were accustomed to a simple form of worship, would submit to a ritual tainted, in their opinion, with Popery. Sir Hugh Pawlet himself, who now returned as Governor of Jersey, soon perceived that the Reformed principles could be strengthened in the islands only by appealing to the devotedness of these men, but that in order to obtain their services, a liturgy which they were loath to accept must not be forced upon them. He determined to do away with what remained of Popery. He confiscated, for the benefit of the Crown, the rents for masses, obits, luminaries, fraternities, &c.; he pulled down the statues and images adorning the interior of the churches, and even the crosses in the churchyards and on the public ways; he sold the chalices, crucifixes, censers, and other Church ornaments, as well as the bells, leaving only one bell for each church.

The Royal Court of Jersey did its best to second the Governor. By an Act dated March 20, 1552, Pierre Fallu was imprisoned because his wife Martha had brought her beads to church. But more powerful than all the decrees made by the Court, or the iconoclastic zeal of the Governor to advance the interests of the Reformation in Jersey, were the labours of the Huguenot preachers, Martin, Maret, Moulinos, Gérin, Baptiste, whose names alone have come down to us, with those already mentioned of Langlois and Johanne.

The death of Edward VI., and the accession of Mary the Catholic, suddenly brought to an end this first period of insular Protestantism. The Romish reaction swept over Great Britain like a hurricane, laying waste also the Norman Archipelago in its evil course. The ministers were obliged to leave the island precipitately, and to go back to France or Geneva, where they were followed by many from amongst their flocks, whose lives were in danger in their own country. Mass was again established, and the Catholic priests, who had changed their religion to retain their livings, once more said it in Latin. A few of these men had married and now found themselves encumbered with their wives and children.

In Jersey, the re-instating of the former incumbents was

not, however, all-sufficient to draw back the people to Romanism. If a part of the population did return to its old religious forms, the principal families of the island, such as de Carteret, de Soulemont, Lemprière, Gosselin, Hérault, Poingdestre, "ne voulurent jamais," says the chronicler, "assister à la messe ni aux idolâtries et superstitions des papistes, quelques menaces ou épouvantements qu'on leur seust faire." Their attachment to the Reformed faith was so earnest that in order to partake of the Lord's Supper, they did not shrink from crossing the sea and seeking some Reformed centre in Normandy—St. Lô, for instance, where an important church had been established.

The governor, Sir Hugh Pawlet, was still at his post, notwithstanding the change of sovereign and policy. Though outwardly gone back to Romanism, he still secretly favoured the Reformation, and he executed the rigorous orders issued concerning the new doctrines with great moderation. Strange to say, his own brother, John Pawlet, was the Catholic dean of the island, who encouraged the Popish reaction with all his might. The Royal Court took the opportunity of showing its independence with respect to the clergy by punishing with death a priest charged with adultery and infanticide. The dean tried in vain to protect Richard Averty (the guilty priest) from justice by pretending that he was subject to the ecclesiastical authority of the Bishop of Coutances. But his lifeless body hanging on Gallows Hill proclaimed that there were judges in Jersey who did their duty at the risk of displeasing Queen Mary.

It was different in Guernsey, where the Reformation did not advance so rapidly. The clergy and magistrates went back to Popery, and allowed themselves to be the docile instruments of Mary's persecuting policy. History has preserved a horrible account of the execution of three women, a mother and her two daughters, who became its victims. They were brought before the Ecclesiastical Court, composed of the dean and parish ministers, interrogated upon divers articles of the Catholic creed, and declared guilty of heresy by their judges, who, wishing to terrify the partisans of the Reformation, condemned them to be burned at St. Peter's

Port on July 18, 1556. They were first strangled, but the rope breaking, the poor women fell into the fire before dying. One of the daughters, Perrotine Massy, the wife of a pastor who had fled to escape persecution, being in the last stage of pregnancy, gave birth to a child, who was snatched from the flames, and on the barbarous command of the bailiff cast into them again to be burnt with its mother.

The Romish writers have vainly tried to contest the particulars of that shameful tragedy. Fox's "*Acts and Monuments*" give us the official documents corroborating them, as well as the petitions in which the bailiff, dean, and clergy of Guernsey "prayed the Queen's Majesty's pardon," when Elizabeth ascended the throne and public opinion demanded vengeance against the perpetrators of this crime. The Queen wishing to inaugurate a pacific policy, pardoned them; but the names of Bailiff Helier Gosselin, Dean Jacques Amy, and their assessors, are for ever pilloried in history.

The glorious end of another Guernsey martyr deserves mention, were it but to show how worthy were the ministers sent from France to the Channel Islands. Denis Le Vair, the colporteur alluded to before, was driven out of the island by the Catholic reaction, and went back to France, intending to take refuge in Geneva. But no sooner had he landed than he was arrested whilst trying to sell his books, taken first to Bayeux, and thence to Rouen, where he was condemned as a heretic to be burnt alive. Standing in the cart that was taking him to the place of execution, he preached to the crowd around him. But the officer in charge, exasperated at hearing him, cried to the executioner, "Cut out his tongue!" and the order was immediately obeyed. The monk who attended him endeavoured to put a small wooden cross in his tight-bound hands, but he refused to take it, and turned his back upon him, on which the monk cried to the people, "See, my friends, see the villain who will not have the cross!" They then led him in front of the church of Notre Dame, wishing, says Crespin the martyrologist, "to make the people believe" that he was doing penance to their saints, but turning his face away from their idols, Le Vair proclaimed by hands and eyes, and all signs to him possible, that one God alone must be worshipped." So

died this heroic evangelist of Guernsey, August 9, 1554. Thus Henry de Valois' satellites rivalled in cruelty those of the "Bloody Mary."

The accession of Elizabeth in 1558 put an end to the persecution, and gave an impetus to the Reformation, alike in England and the Channel Islands.

Amongst those who had fled from Guernsey to escape persecution was Guillaume de Beauvoir, whose family is noted in the history of that island, and who himself was for nine years its bailiff. He took refuge with his wife at Geneva where he resided some time, and became well known to Calvin and his friends. When again in his native isle, after Queen Mary's death, he wrote to Calvin asking him for a pastor, and "Nicolas Baudoin, ministre," was sent to the infant church of Guernsey, with a letter of recommendation addressed to Beauvoir by Calvin himself. The Reformer wrote :

"Because we have learnt that you want our aid to obtain a man who can edify, we cannot fail to do our duty. So we send you our brother, the bearer of the present letter, who has practically shown his zeal, and has had such frequent conversation with us that we doubt not his life will be in good example. His doctrine is pure, and as far as we can judge, whoever will be content to be taught in simplicity, and will become teachable, will certainly hear his preaching with profit. We do not ask you to receive him with humanity, trusting in your goodwill; but be pleased to make him feel that his labour is not in vain amongst you."

Nicolas Baudoin was worthy of Calvin's confidence. He established a church at St. Peter's Port, with elders and deacons, a consistory, and a discipline similar to the Reformed Churches on the Continent. For many years he had no other stipend than the voluntary contributions of the people, which were meagre enough; but an order in Council, dated 1563, put an end to that state of things, and allowed the minister a regular income on the Crown revenues of the island. Baudoin had as assistant, Adrien Saravia, a refugee of Spanish descent born in France, who later became Canon of Canterbury and one of the revisers of the Bible. They both met with much ill-will from the magistrates, whose sympathies were with the Romish religion, whilst the people themselves

were not always well inclined towards the evangelical doctrines. Saravia in 1565 wrote to William Cecil, afterwards Lord Burleigh, "If an ecclesiastic goes into the country, he is greeted with jeers and laughter, and often has dirt thrown at him. They are worse than Turks, and the jurats connive at all this."

In Jersey, where Protestantism had taken deeper root, its revival did not encounter so great difficulties. The rulers and the people were equally eager to put away the popish forms imposed upon them. An order of the Royal Court (May 26, 1562) commanded everybody to destroy all legends or missals that might be in their houses.

About 1563 a minister of Anjou, Guillaume Morise, *seigneur de la Ripaudière*, was called upon by the authorities to organize the Reformed Church in Jersey. That was a grand day when, in the old parish church of St. Heliers, cleared of its Popish ornaments, Pastor Morise "administered the Lord's supper according to the pure Gospel." Lieutenant Amyas Pawlet, son and assistant of the Governor, partook of it, as well as Helier de Carteret, *seigneur* of St. Ouen's, and most of the gentry in the island. With the consent of the States, La Ripaudière appointed elders and deacons to constitute the consistory of the Reformed church of St. Heliers, and to take care that a good discipline should be exercised.

But now came the question, would Queen Elizabeth, so jealous of her prerogatives in religious matters, be inclined to sanction this essay of nonconformity in a country within her realm? It might be feared she would consider it as an attempt at schism, or even a dangerous intrusion of Frenchmen and French ideas in a cluster of islands which, from their geographical position, had long been coveted by France. So it was decided that Helier de Carteret should be sent as deputy to the Queen in Council to state the case and ask the favour of Royal sanction.

Admitted to the Queen's audience, De Carteret told how the isles had, from time immemorial, been ecclesiastically bound to the diocese of Coutances, where the evangelical doctrines had now so widely spread that many important reformed churches had been established; in particular that of

St. Lô. He said that, "many learned ministers of good doctrine and pure life, and holy conversation, seeing that the superstitions, idolatries, and other abuses, were altogether rejected and abolished in the said islands, had taken refuge there in order to preach the Gospel in its purity." He went on to say how great a help these French ministers had been to the little flock who had no pastors amongst their compatriots, and who could neither get instructed nor edified by men unable to preach the Gospel in their own idiom. He pointed out clearly that if these ministers were not allowed to preach, and administer the sacraments, and read the common prayers, as in the Reformed Church, they would go back; and it would be to the islanders, continues the chronicler, "a great disturbance and drawback in their working for the glory of God and the salvation of poor souls."

The Queen, convinced by the arguments of Helier de Carteret, ordered her Council to write letters granting his request. The following letter respecting Jersey was addressed to the bailiff and jurats of that island:—

"Whereas the Queen's most excellent Majesty understandeth that the Isles of *Jersey* and *Guernsey* have anciently depended on the Diocese of Coutances, and that there be certain Churches in the same Diocese well reformed, agreeably throughout in doctrine as it is set forth in this Realm: Knowing therewith that you have a Minister who ever since his arrival in *Jersey*, hath used the like order of Preaching and Administration as in the said Reformed Churches, or as it is used in the French Church at London: Her Majesty, for diverse respects and considerations moving Her Highness, is well pleased to admit the same Order of Preaching and Administration to be continued at St. Heliers as hath been hitherto accustomed by the said Minister. Provided always, that the Residue of the Parishes in the said Isle shall diligently put apart all Superstitions used in the said Diocese, and so continue there the Order of Service ordained and set forth within this Realm, with the Injunctions necessary for that purpose; wherein you may not faile diligently to give your aide and assistance, as best may serve for the advancement of God's glory. And so fare you well.

"From Richmond, the 7th day August, anno 1565.

"N. BACON. WILL. NORTHAMP. R. LECESTER. CUL. CLYNTON.

"R. ROGERS. FR. KNOLS. WILLIAM CECIL."

It seems likely enough that the negotiator of the treaty

made mention only of the churches of St. Heliers and St. Peter's Port, fearing perhaps to ask too much, or more probably because those were the only two churches as yet completely organized. This supposition explains the restriction of the Queen's letter respecting the country churches. This restriction became of necessity a dead letter, and the insular churches, founded as they were by Reformed pastors, were necessarily after the Reformed model. The governors of the two islands, Sir Amyas Pawlet and Sir Thomas Leighton, supported the scheme with all their strength, not for the sake of popularity, or out of a mean view of self-interest in the suppression of the deaneries, as insinuates Falle the historian, but simply because, as politicians, they saw nothing better to protect the interests of the Reformation. The Presbyterian organization was ere long perfectly established. Each parish soon had its pastor, elders, and deacons, and each island its "colloquy," comprising ministers and elders, delegated by the different churches. The synod was the supreme body of the church, composed of ministers and laymen belonging to both "colloquies." It generally met once in two years in Jersey and Guernsey alternately. The first synod was held in Guernsey on the 28th of June, 1564, Dean John After being a member of it, but neither presiding nor having any more power or authority than the rest of the assembly. At the second synod, held in 1567, some of the members were deputed to attend the Bishop of Winchester. In the synod held on September 12, 1569, they ordered that the articles of that and former synods concerning church government should be drawn up in form, and presented to the Bishop. This attempt to combine episcopacy and Presbyterianism was inspired by a thought of conciliation, but the intrinsic logic of facts made it a failure. No mention is found of either bishop or dean in the ecclesiastical discipline issued in 1576, and revised in 1579. Jersey did not seek a successor to John Pawlet, the last Catholic dean, nor Guernsey to John After, the first Protestant dean.

The discipline was in principle similar to that of the Reformed Churches of France. The ecclesiastical offices instituted therein were as follows: The Pastors and doctors,

whose "office was teaching ;" the Elders, who "watched over the behaviour of Christ's fold ;" the Deacons, who "held and disposed of church property and charities." The church officers were "chosen by the ministers and elders, then presented to the governor or his lieutenant, after whose approbation their names were called before the people," and, if no opposition was raised, they were to enter upon their duties a fortnight afterwards.

Candidates for the ministry were, "if possible, to prove their knowledge of Greek and Hebrew." They were also to undergo a theological examination by the ministers, and explain the Scriptures in their presence. If the examination was judged satisfactory, they were sent to the churches who were in need of them "to preach the word of God three or four times, and that bare-headed." In case of approval, and of a calling to some church, another minister was deputed by the "colloquy" to instal and ordain them. With regard to "ministers sent to these isles, or having taken refuge there, who brought good witness from the places whence they came," they might be employed by churches wanting them, and they then received the hand of fellowship.

If ministers who were refugees wished to return to France, they were "to go only six months after asking leave, in order that the church be not without a pastor." It was the duty of a minister to visit "all the families of his flock at least once a year."

The office of an elder was not a sinecure. The Jersey Colloquy decided, in 1590, that he must visit the families, particularly before communion services, "to inquire if they behave Christianly, say prayers morning and evening, read the Scriptures, especially on Sundays between *les prêches* and after, and abstain from oaths, profane songs, and the scandalous observance of popish feasts.

The Lord's Supper was administered four times in the year, "the people sitting, which is most conformable to the primitive institution ; or standing, according to the custom of some churches, the men coming first and the women afterwards." To obtain admission, it was necessary "to be catechized by the minister, to know the Lord's Prayer, the Articles of Faith,

and the Ten Commandments, at least in substance, and to renounce the Pope, Mass, and all idolatry and superstition." The Consistory in all cases had the right to interdict the Lord's Supper to whoever did not conduct themselves in consistency with the Gospel; but the Synod alone could pronounce excommunication, which separated a man from the body of the Church, and sometimes even deprived him of public worship.

During prayers every one knelt, his head being uncovered. They also remained uncovered while the psalms were sung, the sacraments administered, and the text read by the minister. There were two services on the Sunday, and one or two on week-days. The churches were opened only for the hour of worship "to prevent all superstition," and were never to be used for profane purposes. The Discipline prescribed that "the magistrate be requested that no civil jurisdiction be held within their walls." The Synod, in agreement with the civil authorities, ordered the days of fasting or of thanksgiving, as the case might require.

This Discipline was not a dead letter. The Acts of the Colloquies and Consistories, which have been preserved, show that these assemblies were regular courts of morals, before which persons who behaved badly were brought and judged. Here are some instances. The Consistory of the rural parish of Saint Andrew, Guernsey, bring before this Court a man and a woman who quarrelled coming out of church. They are exhorted to be reconciled and to forgive one another, which they do, promising not to begin again. On another occasion, the accused will not repent, and forgets herself so far as to abuse the members of the Consistory. She is then expelled from the Lord's Supper (*retranchée de la cène*) for that quarter, until she shows some signs of repentance.

Besides quarrels and insults, which were the most frequent offences, the Consistories had also to deal with Sabbath-breakers, gamblers, blasphemers, people who were suspected of witchcraft, those who kept away from preaching and sacrament, or who "ran from parish to parish on Sundays," &c. Judging by the long list of disciplinarian acts furnished by the register of St. Andrew's, it might seem that the level of piety was

there very low, but on examination we find the names of the same offenders appearing constantly, and we discover that for the most part the subjects of complaint are not momentous. Moreover, it must be remembered that in those times the civil and the religious parish were not distinct, and that all the inhabitants, good and bad, were within the jurisdiction of religious authority.

Conflicts between the religious and civil authority were almost inevitable at a period when the limit between them was not clearly settled, and when governors and magistrates were generally members of the Synods, Colloquies, and Consistories. The Synod of 1567 encroached on the rights of the secular justice by enacting corporeal punishment for certain crimes; but the following one, better advised, decided that all crimes should first be judged by the civil magistrate, after which the Church too might apply a chastisement. It was also implied that consistories might not, in any case, impose pecuniary penalties.

The civil power, too, exercised jurisdiction over religious affairs. The courts in both islands issued a number of rules relating to Church affairs. Popery was rigorously prohibited. In 1566, the Court of Jersey sent Guillaume Fautrast to prison at the Castle for having attended Mass in Normandy, and for having brought to Jersey "un livre papistique et de l'eau bénite." The next year "all persons who were found *en pèlerinage* were to be fined sixty sols." Two years later, one Richard Girard was flogged through the town of St. Peter's Port, Guernsey, for upholding Mass. By an ordinance dated January 22, 1593, all strangers were ordered to profess the established religion within a given period, or quit the island.

Attendance at public worship was obligatory. The Guernsey Court condemned to the cage for three hours "those who were about the streets, on the beach, or in a tavern during preaching on Sundays." In 1576 several persons in Jersey were imprisoned in the Castle for not having been at Sacrament, and it was further ordered that they should not be liberated till they could repeat the Commandments and the Lord's Prayer, and soon after the Court ordered that all

persons not having communicated within a year and a day should be fined.

At the end of the sixteenth century, the Reformed Churches in the Channel Islands were easily supplied with pastors from among the refugees who fled from France before persecution, massacres, and civil wars. The *Chronique de Jersey* gives a list of 42 ministers and several nobles who took up their abode in Jersey in those troublous times. But from the beginning of the 17th century, the source from whence the insular churches drew their pastors became exhausted. Under the *régime* of the Edict of Nantes, ministers were not forced to flee from France; the refugees returned to their country, and now the vacant churches had the greatest difficulty to find ministers. In 1606 they were reduced to calling an Englishman to the parish of the Câtel; only £13 being granted him as salary until he was able to preach in French. He evidently made little progress, for in 1609 his parishioners would not keep him because they did not understand him. In consequence of this deficiency in the supply of pastors, the Colloquies encouraged "callings" amongst the natives. In Guernsey it was decided that the incomes of vacant churches should be employed for the maintenance of students, many of whom went over to study in France, especially at Saumur.

The churches of the Channel Islands were not always at peace with each other. Jersey had admitted into its pastoral body some ministers who had been censured by the Guernsey Colloquy. This gave rise to much lengthy correspondence and to bitter feeling, Cartwright and Snape, two heads of English Calvinism, who were chaplains to the Governors of Jersey and Guernsey, interposed in order to settle the question and reconcile the parties.

The accession of James I. to the English throne did not at first appear to affect the insular churches. Their privileges were confirmed by a formal act of the King, wherein it was stated that, having learned that the isles of Jersey and Guernsey, "parcel of our Dutchy of Normandy, had adopted the same ecclesiastical government as the Reformed Churches of the said Dutchy, he ordained that they should quietly enjoy

their liberty in the use of the ecclesiastical discipline there now established." This act was heartily welcomed by the friends of Presbyterianism, who were the immense majority of the population. The States of Jersey resolved that the Royal Ordinance should be published on the following Saturday, "that every person might give it obedience." The ministers were desired to transcribe it on the parish registers, and to read it from the pulpit.

The Royal Ordinance was not entirely spontaneous. It was the answer to a petition the Reformed party had drawn up and presented to the new king, demanding the confirmation of their privileges. James, to whom good words cost little, promised what they asked for, but was certain to take the first favourable opportunity of bringing into the pale of the Church of England those who had not yet adhered to it. If he had too precipitately done away with Presbyterianism in the Channel Islands, his Scotch subjects would have been alarmed; so he temporized in the interest of his policy.

From the first days of the Reformation Jersey had always had as governors members of the Pawlet family, all firm Presbyterians. In 1600, they were succeeded by the brilliant and unfortunate Sir Walter Raleigh, who was beheaded three years later for upholding the rights of Arabella Stuart to the Crown. Sir John Peyton next filled the place, and no sooner did he enter on his office than he announced his intention of keeping under his rule all the affairs of the Church as well as of the State, and of exercising all the rights which he considered as appertaining to his administration. Neal, the Puritan historian, asserts that Peyton had "secret instructions to root out the Geneva discipline and plant the English liturgy and ceremonies." However that may be, he acted as if he had such instructions.

By his patent, the Governor had all the benefices in the island. The Presbyterian discipline, although admitting his right of nominating ministers, practically reduced it to naught by reserving their presentation and ordination to the Colloquy. This was the point upon which the Governor and Colloquy came into conflict. The latter, in 1604, called Pastor Cosmes Brevin, of Sark, to preside over the parish of St. John's. The

Governor, in the name of his prerogative, protested strongly against this nomination, which, however, was maintained. He presented a memorial to the Crown, praying "for the avoydinge a presbyterial or popular jurisdiction in the Church as for the maintayninge of his Majesty's royal power and prerogative." In consequence of this complaint, commissioners were sent over from England to inquire into the state of things. But their presence only exasperated the disputes between the Presbyterians and the growing party favourable to the Church of England. That party chiefly consisted, first, of those who courted the governor and the king; secondly, of those who complained of the rigours of the discipline; and, thirdly, of those who were vexed at the perpetual meddling of the Ministers in civil matters. A number of magistrates were inclined to a change.

The living of St. Peter's becoming vacant in 1613, Sir John Peyton, without taking any advice, appointed Elias Messervy, a Jersey man, who had been episcopally ordained, and was determined not to subscribe to the Calvinistic discipline. The elders of that church, on their side, would not have him as their pastor, "if he did not submit as the others to the maintenance of peace and the union of the Churches." The Colloquy humbly requested that the case be referred to the next synod; but Sir John was immovable, and demanded obedience. The Colloquy, not daring to resist further, yielded.

Their weakness naturally gave fresh courage to their adversaries, who resolved to give the decisive blow. They sent another complaint to the King in Council, in which it was stated that the inhabitants generally were discontented with the discipline of their church, and preferred the Anglican form. Both parties were summoned to appear at Court. Messervy, the incumbent of St. Peter's, and Marrett, the Attorney-General, were deputed by the Anglican party, and David Bandinel, Thomas Olivier, Nicholas Essart, and Samuel de la Place, ministers, by the Presbyterians. De la Place was seduced by the hope of becoming first dean of the new church, and betrayed the cause he had promised to serve. The other three defended the rights of their party as best they could. But the debate was purely formal. The commissioners, one

of whom was Abbot the Archbishop of Canterbury, were all Churchmen who had determined beforehand to Anglicanize the Jersey Calvinists. The Archbishop declared to the deputies, "that for the restoration of peace and good order in the island, his Majesty found it necessary in the first place to revive the office of Dean, and would appoint to it one from among themselves, who should have instructions given to him by way of interim for his and their present conduct, till things could be more perfectly settled. That to attain to such settlement they were to go back to their respective charges, and confer with their brethren in the island about compiling a new body of canons and constitutions, as near in conformity to the Church of England as their laws and usages (from which his Majesty had no intention to derogate) would bear. That the liturgy which had formerly been translated into French for their use, should again be sent to them, yet without tying them to a strict observance of everything therein, his Majesty having so good an opinion of their judgment that he doubted not but the more they grew acquainted with the book the better they would like it."

The deputies of the Colloquy returned to Jersey, and had not much difficulty in persuading themselves and others that they must yield. An order of James I., dated June 14, 1618, charged the States (the political power) to nominate "three of the most grave and learned ministers there, out of which his Majesty may please to choose one for a dean." On the recommendation of the Governor and Archbishop of Canterbury, David Bandinel, one of those who were deputed to support the polity and discipline of Presbyterianism, was appointed. He was an Italian by birth and of noble extraction.

"He was," says Le Quesne, "a man of great ability, and took an important part in the affairs of the island; but his sudden change from Presbyterianism to Episcopacy does not denote consistency or principle; and his hostility to Sir Philip de Carteret, tinctured with the spirit of Italian revenge and cruelty, without a grain of generosity or Christian feeling, led him to espouse the cause of the Parliament against the Crown. His life was a very chequered one: he had to endure most severe trials, misfortunes, and calamities, and he died miserably, without the solace or consolation which a friend affords." *

* Le Quesne, *Constitutional History of Jersey*, p. 171.

Olivier, another of the Presbyterian deputies, was appointed sub-dean. As regards De la Place, disappointed at not receiving the promised deanery, he retired to Guernsey, where he became a determined supporter of Presbyterianism. The other ministers seem to have been won over with little trouble. They became Anglican clergymen; not one gave in his resignation.

The canons prepared by the ministers were submitted to the Governor, bailiff, and jurats, but did not meet with their approval. They deputed three jurats to urge their objections before the Lords of the Council. The Archbishop of Canterbury, with the Bishops of Lincoln and Winchester, were commissioned to examine into the matter, and they so modified the project as to render it acceptable to both parties. The canons were confirmed and approved by King James I. on June 30, 1623, and have to this day continued to be the ecclesiastical law of Jersey.

Presbyterianism continued in Guernsey forty years longer than in Jersey. The chief cause of this was that the governors of that island were opposed to the change on political grounds. One of them, the Earl of Danby, sent Charles I. a memorial explaining the reasons for not modifying the Discipline. It ended in these words:—

“I presume to add that the time itself is no way meet for this alteration, in the respect of the troubles in Jersey, under the new dean, which will make those of Guernsey the more averse.

“Lastly, there being many old ministers in Guernsey, if they die, we shall not know from whence to supply them with others, for out of France they will not come to us, and here we can find few or none.”*

The intensity of Presbyterian feeling in Guernsey was so great that the people embraced the cause of the Parliament against the King. The islands, being dependencies of the English Crown, though not under the jurisdiction of Parliament, had no political interest in the triumph of the latter. Their attitude brought upon the people great calamities; their commerce was ruined, and their ships were taken by Jersey pirates.

* Tupper, *History of Guernsey*, p. 226.

It was Charles II. who, by the Act of Uniformity, put an end to all resistance in Guernsey. The unpublished correspondence of the first dean of the island allows us briefly to relate here the circumstances of this crisis. This man, John de Saumarez, rector of St. Martin's, belonged to one of the high families of the island, and was cousin to the bailiff. He was an ardent royalist, and at the Restoration, without waiting the Act of Uniformity, he introduced the Liturgy in his parish, notwithstanding the opposition of his parishioners. His zeal was rewarded. An order from the King, dated July 15, 1662, and addressed to Lord Hatton, the governor, required that the Act of Uniformity should be enforced in Guernsey, and appointed John de Saumarez dean of that island and its dependencies, "from the good report," says the document, "we have had both of his sufficiency and abilities to discharge that office, and of his fidelity to us, and approved inclination to our church government." The royal order Saumarez brought from London with his nomination was received by the inhabitants of Guernsey with divided feelings. The Court readily enrolled the King's letter; but the pastors followed the example of the 2,000 ministers in England, and gave in their resignation. As for the people generally, they showed little favour to the alteration. They protested energetically against the sign of the cross in baptism, which was for a time omitted because they left off having their children baptized. The dean could not be seen in certain parts of the country without being insulted, and the churches in which he preached were almost empty. At the Vale there were only two communicants, and he wrote that "there were not ten persons in that parish who were conformed." When elections for constables and *vingteniers* took place, candidates most zealously opposed to the new views were elected. Religious conventicles were opened in several places, and presided over by ministers who had resigned, laymen, or even women; and they were yet held twenty years after the Restoration. On August 30, 1681, the dean, writing to the bailiff, said: "You do well to suppress conventicles; that will prevent complaints being made against our island."

The man in whom opposition to Anglicanism was personified

was Thomas Le Marchant, the minister of St. Sampson and the Vale, a distinguished scholar, who wrote a remarkable work on Norman laws and customs. "This excellent man," says Tupper, "who was greatly in advance of his age, after taking his degrees at Cambridge, passed some years at the academy of Caen, where he enjoyed the friendship of the learned Bochart and Huet, who corresponded with him on his return to Guernsey." He was one of the first to resign his benefice. Around him gathered all those who preferred the austerity of Calvinistic worship to Anglicanism, and the government of an elected assembly to that of a man alone. He engaged in a very unequal conflict with Saumarez, who had the political power on his side. Le Marchant was obliged to find security for 1,000 "écus" for good behaviour. Nor did his trials end there. We find by the correspondence of the dean that he not only imprisoned him in Cornet Castle, but later obtained of the governor his incarceration in the Tower of London, which he quitted only in 1667, "on his entering into recognizance of £1,000 that he shall not at any time presume to go to the island of Guernsey."

To make the people submit to the Royal Order, the Guernsey Court, at the instigation of the dean, issued a decree which obliged every person exercising an office, whether civil or military, to partake of the Lord's Supper according to the form of the Church of England. This of course was but following out the legislation and policy of the English King and Parliament. King Charles II. personally interposed by addressing letters to the Court encouraging them to complete the work begun "for the suppression of all such stubborn opposers of conformity and true religion."

The dean, John de Saumarez, died in 1699, at Windsor, where he held a canonry. His epitaph says of him: "*Ecclesiae Anglicanae cultor sincerus et in praedicta insula (Guernsey) instaurator.*" But it is wisely silent about the nature of the means employed by him to restore episcopacy in his country. At his death the contest was not yet at an end. "As recently as 1755," says Duncan, "the dean was obliged to have recourse to the civil power to enforce the reading of the

Litany, and to this day the surplice is not used in the parish churches, although it has been introduced of late years into some of the chapels of ease." * Since 1841, when Duncan wrote, the surplice has been generally adopted.

If by degrees the remaining vestiges of Presbyterianism tend to disappear, something of the Presbyterian spirit survives in both islands. Is it not, indeed, probable, that to such a feeling is due the great success of Methodism, which, appearing a century back, has drawn within its orbit nearly one-half of the population ?

ART. III.—PESSIMISM.

Philosophy of the Unconscious. BY EDUARD VON HARTMANN.
Authorized translation by WILLIAM CHATTERTON COUPLAND,
M.A., B.Sc. In three volumes. London: Trübner & Co.
1884.

THE translator of Hartmann's *Philosophy of the Unconscious* reminds us that this work belongs to a class "all but unrepresented in our literature," and he evidently regards its advent in English dress as one of the most hopeful signs of the times. We sincerely trust that Mr. Coupland's enthusiasm for Hartmann has made him much too sanguine in this matter. Hitherto, at least, the English people have had a reputation for sound practical sense, and, moreover, they are seldom willing to give a very hearty reception to systems calculated to undermine religion and morality. A writer who professes to teach the Philosophy of the Unconscious, who bases the whole fabric of his pretentious system on the alleged existence, purposive activity, and world-organizing genius of a somewhat, of which personality is no attribute ; who declares in his preface that "Christianity is no longer a vital factor of our developing civilization," that it has "already traversed all its phases," and must soon give place to a theory of life in which "The Unconscious" is the directive energy, and

* *History of Guernsey*, p. 350.

Pessimism the practical outcome, can hardly expect, for many days to come, to gain the ear of any considerable number of the thinking people of this country. It would, indeed, be a dark outlook for our "civilization" if such views of life became either popular or wide-spread; but such a catastrophe we do not dread. Hartmann's system of philosophy (?) is doomed to perish; what is in itself essentially irrational cannot permanently lay hold of the reason of men, nor can it establish itself as a possible theory of the universe. But while we have no reason to fear the ultimate triumph, or even the temporary popularity, of this new philosophy, we may not so readily dismiss from our thoughts the Pessimism to which it leads, and of which it professes to be the rational basis and intellectual justification. As Professor Flint reminds us, Hartmann and his school have the merit of "distinctly raising a question of enormous importance, which has been strangely overlooked even by philosophy; and further, theirs is neither an inconsistent nor an unreasonable answer to that question, certain widely prevalent principles being pre-supposed." This is really the crucial point in the whole discussion raised by Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and the Pessimistic school. So long as we hold to the old faith, even in its most attenuated form, so long, in short, as we remain in any sense *Theists*, Pessimism is impossible. If, on the contrary, men begin to believe that Christianity has done its work, and that Christian ideas are no longer vital forces in modern life, the theory of the Pessimists as to the practical worth of life—we do not say their philosophy of "the Unconscious"—is no longer to be regarded as irrational. Nor has this theory been altogether without its influence upon English thought. Men like Dr. Maudsley, whose contributions to mental science have been examined in this REVIEW, owe much to the writings of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. Those who are dissatisfied with Materialism, and who refuse to accept Christian Theism, may for a time take refuge in the "Philosophy of the Unconscious," but it can only be for a time. Unless Reason ceases to play any part in speculative inquiry, this pretended explanation of existence must be rejected, but the period of transition may for many be a time of great mental and moral danger.

When clever men boldly proclaim, on the title-pages of their works, that they publish "Speculative Results according to the method of physical science," when they add to this that their results are logically bound up with the Kantian Philosophy, and that they are able, without accepting Theism, to give a satisfactory explanation of what are called "final causes," we may expect them to gain adherents. Moreover, the long reign and the widely felt influence of the "greatest happiness" theory of morals, are most favourable to the cause of the Pessimists. If the "Hedonical Calculus" is the only true standard of right and wrong, if good and evil are simply other names for pleasure and pain, if good is good because it leads to pleasure, and evil is evil because it causes pain, then the Pessimistic conclusion seems natural and even necessary; hence its interest for all thinking men and women in these times.

In the space at our disposal we cannot pretend to expound at any length the philosophy of Hartmann. Fortunately this is not at all necessary, as there are ample materials, within easy reach, for forming a trustworthy estimate of this and other Pessimistic systems of philosophy. A few words on the metaphysical aspects of this question will perhaps enable us to set forth in clearer and stronger light the Pessimistic standpoint and conclusion. Schopenhauer, the father of modern Pessimism, regards the world under two forms—Will and Representation; these correspond pretty much to the noumena and phenomena of other philosophical systems. The essential nature of the phenomenal is simply mental representation—that is to say, it exists only for, and as constituted by, perceiving minds. The one universal substance is *Will*; this one, absolute, indivisible being includes within its wondrous and mystic unity all actual and potential forms of manifestation. Not that we are to regard Will as the cause of the representation exactly; causality and all such categories belong only to the phenomenal. Will is the world's essence, not its cause. The world indeed is full of purpose, but the purpose belongs not to the substance but only to the representation, the substance itself, that is Will, is a blind, purposeless, eternal striving, with neither intelligence, aim, nor end! According to Hart-

mann, the substance behind all phenomena is "The Unconscious," which includes in it both Will and Idea, or intellectual representation. Underneath all forms of organic life, animal instincts, and the higher forms of intellectual and moral life, must be ever found, the only rational explanation of ail, "The Unconscious." Starting with organic matter, Hartmann works his way through human minds to what he is pleased to call the metaphysic of this "Unconscious." In these organic processes, instincts, and adaptations, we must assume endless multitudes of *Wills*, not simply behind all a single power termed Will; each of these Wills is conscious of its ends, and acts like a kind of Providence, guiding, controlling, and directing all activity. Take, *e.g.*, the migrations of birds: these must be due to a real insight, a genuine forecasting, based upon knowledge of atmospheric conditions and changes, not possible even to the highest order of human intelligence. In short, we must everywhere assume a sort of clairvoyance as one of the essential properties of Will. The evolution of life then, according to Hartmann, is presided over by a power possessing this clairvoyance, a power that foresees, arranges, alters, disposes, interferes with, and ordains all with a view to the end, and yet this power, "The Unconscious," is not intelligent, nor has it personality. As to what we term self-consciousness, it is one of the results of "The Unconscious," arising from a kind of shock, the detachment of the idea from the volition. Hartmann regards his as essentially a monistic system of philosophy, in opposition to all dualistic theories.

By the application of the "scientific method," we thus reach an ultimate substance, which differs from the substance of Spinoza, the idea or thought of Hegel, and the eternal energy of Spencer. A power that is itself unintelligent, yet gives rise to intelligence of the highest order, of which consciousness is no attribute, yet which possesses a kind of clairvoyance, what can one make of this? We may write learnedly about it; we may, by cunning use of scientific phraseology, pretend to explain what Spiritualists and Materialists have failed to explain; we may assert that, assuming the existence or operation of such a power, we can give a satisfactory place to what are called "Final Ends;" but unsophisticated minds

must pronounce this mere verbiage, and declare that the attributes of such a power are utterly contradictory. Hartmann's will and idea bear a remarkable resemblance to Kapila's "Primary spiritual essence endowed with the faculty of knowing, yet itself unintelligent."^{*} Buddhist mystics or German philosophers of "The Unconscious" may construct, and say they understand, monisms of this kind, but for our part we regard them as among the lowest specimens of anthropomorphism, and at bottom thoroughly dualistic. Hartmann ridicules the Theistic idea of God, says a "self-conscious God must either go mad or turn suicide!" Can the man be altogether *sane* who speaks of this "Elucidation of the Unconscious" as a "cognition of the highest order?" Professing themselves wise the philosophers of our day are becoming foolish, and, refusing to accept the Christian idea of God, they are inventing substitutes for God, as irrational as were the Idol-Gods of the ancient Pagan world.[†] But enough of the metaphysics of the "Unconscious."

A Pessimist is one who believes, or who pretends to believe, that if we weigh the sum total of good and evil, or, to speak more accurately, of pleasure and pain in the world, we shall ever find the balance on the bad side. A scientific Pessimist is one who regards this reading as justified, not only by the actual experience of men and women, but also by the application of the scientific method to the "world process." The more we consider life in all its bearings, the more we study evolution under all its conditions, the more must we be convinced that life is irrational, and existence, at the best, an evil.[‡] According to Hartmann, even if we believe that in the "existing world everything is arranged in the wisest and best manner, and that it may be looked upon as the best of all possible worlds," we must nevertheless conclude that it is "thoroughly wretched and worse than

^{*} See *Encycl. Brit.* vol. iv. p. 209.

[†] Janet (*Final Causes*, p. 381) declares that Hartmann, by his reform of Schopenhauer's system, "without himself advancing to the conception of intelligent finality, yet makes a way of return to that conception." Taken as it is, Hartmann's system seems to us unthinkable.

[‡] "Pessimism, according to Schopenhauer and Hartmann, follows *a priori* from the nature of Will as the principle of Life."—PLUMACHER.

none at all." There have always been men and women whose minds have been, so to say, cast in the Pessimistic mould, and who have looked upon life chiefly from its darker side. Hence it is not difficult to find among the wisest and best thinkers, among the poets and moralists of all ages, Pessimistic expressions. There is ever a dark side to even the brightest human life, and to those whose organization is at all sensitive, or who look out upon the world with anything like sympathetic vision, there will never be wanting much that is painful beyond expression. Truly man is born to trouble, but he is also born to joy and gladness! The "whole creation groaneth and travaileth in pain," and the deeper our sympathy with its inner life, the more shall we feel sorrow of heart; but this very sorrow may be the measure of our hope and not of our despair. We may expect, therefore, to find in the writings of poets and prophets expressions that are capable of being considered Pessimistic. Even the "sunny-browed Homer" gives way at times to this mournful strain; the Thracians, it is said, "greeted the newborn child with lamentations, and buried the dead with rejoicings and games." The Old Testament Koheleth is called a Pessimist, but his Pessimism is wide as the poles asunder from the so-called "Scientific Pessimism" of Schopenhauer or Hartmann. In the poetry of our age, the "pathetic minor" is often heard, but it tells the story of declining faith rather than of progress in the true knowledge of life. The more men give up Theism, the more they abandon the faiths of the past, the more deeply they must feel life's sadness. A world without God must ever be a world without hope; as Professor Blackie reminds us, "In Atheism there dwells no healing: it is sheer emptiness and despair." These phases of thought, however, belong more to what Hartmann calls "Temperamental Pessimism;" men are full of indignation at life's evils, they give way to gloomy despair, or they sulkily grumble at what they think can neither be mended nor ended. The scientific Pessimist belongs to none of these classes; his view of life is at once deeper, darker, and more hopeless. Take any man, he seems to say, place him under the most favourable conditions, let him be neither genius nor madman, let him be a man of good health, and with everything about

him that can make life a thing to be desired. Ask such an one whether, if the choice were offered him, he would prefer the same life over again, with complete oblivion, of course, of the past, or whether he would rather sleep an eternal sleep, he will in all probability reply : It were better not to be, than to live here under the most favoured circumstances ! We have all heard of the philosophic ass between two bundles of hay dying of starvation because it had no "strongest motive !" Nowhere, outside the region of the philosophic imagination, we venture to say, can such an ass be found. So nowhere outside the imagination of a Pessimist, can there be found a man of sane mind, and in good health, surrounded by all that can make life enjoyable, who will be willing to exchange life for a sleep that knows no waking—the *Nirvana* of Pessimism ! Men may be so wretched as to desire death rather than life, but they must be wretched indeed before they make such a choice ; and even among those whose lot is miserable, and who, in the judgment of others, ought to be devoid of hope, there is much clinging to life. According to Hartmann, we pass through three stages of experience, three kinds of "illusion," before we reach the Pessimistic conclusion : *First* (this corresponds to *childhood*, and has long ago been traversed by the race), Happiness is supposed to be attainable in this life ; *secondly* (the stage corresponding to *youth*, and represented by the middle ages), Happiness is relegated to the future world (this is the solution of the problem offered by Christianity) ; *lastly* (this corresponds to *manhood*), Happiness, denied to the individual, is relegated to the future of the race on earth. This is the standpoint of all the most highly civilized nations at the present time, and may be regarded as the solution of the problem offered by the religion of humanity. Men have ceased to expect, or to hope for, happiness in another life, and they fix their minds and hearts upon this world, and labour for the happiness of the race, seeking not personal, but corporate immortality. Even this third stage has long ago been abandoned by Hartmann and his daring comrades. It is hardly necessary to dwell on what is called the *first* stage of the illusion. No Christian, at all events, will for a moment contend that supreme happiness is possible in this life ; indeed, Christian thinkers are liable to the

charge of writing bitter things against this life, in order that they may set forth in brighter colours the glory of the future hope. Poets and preachers not seldom speak in Pessimistic tones of the sorrows of the present and the illusions of the seen and temporary. It will be a good service rendered if the growing Pessimist literature and the apt citations from Christian writers make us more careful in our utterances. What, for example, can be more Pessimistic than the following:—"For my part, I fancy I should not grieve if the whole race of mankind died in its fourth year. As far as we can see, I do not know that it would be a thing much to be lamented." Yet these are the words of a Christian thinker of high repute, and one who knew well the Gospel of Jesus Christ.* The world is not altogether a "vale of tears," although there are millions of eyes seldom dry; nor is it all a "fleeting show for man's illusion given;" and it will be well for the cause of God and of humanity if Pessimists make us reconsider life, and speak more hopefully about its ultimate end. We have no sympathy with much of the shallower optimism of the time, the optimism that ignores the darker side of human life, and forgets the sad fate of many doomed to suffering and sorrow, perhaps through no fault of their own. It is easy for the fortunate man, with robust health, the man who is well-fed, well-housed, and who has had but little experience either of sorrow or of misfortune, to tell how he was born under an unlucky star, how he made his own way, and how he, in spite of tremendous odds against him, is now happy and comfortable; easy to tell how, in his judgment, the same, or something like the same, good fortune would have come to others had they been as persevering, as industrious, and as self-denying as himself. But it is not so easy for those who know more of life, who know its darker side as well as its prosperities and its good fortune, to echo sentiments like these. Whatever we may think of Henry George's panacea for the ills of life, we must admit that there is truth as well as aptness in his remark that civilization, like a "wedge," presses down to more and more abject hopelessness a large class of our people. Hence,

* The late Henry Rogers.

from the days of Koheleth downwards, earnest men, looking at these things, have spoken words of grief and pain. The wisest observers and deepest thinkers have also spoken words of hope, and for the earnest lover of his kind these words have been "half battles." Nor can we allow, in spite of the sorrows and sufferings of mankind, without solemn protest, Hartmann and others to rob life of all its sweet joys and innocent pleasures, because *in this life alone* there is not abiding happiness for man. Love may not be all that the fond lover imagines as he gazes into his "magic mirror," yet there is more in it than mere vanity and vexation of spirit. Family life has its troubles, its worries, and its disappointments; it has also its joys, its helpful ministries, and its genuine consolations. Children do sometimes cause sorrow to the hearts of parents, do, when they leave home, at times forget to write "unless when they want money;" but this is not all the truth about them.* Husbands and wives do find that life is not all joy, and that wedded life has its discords as well as its music; they may be guilty of atrocities and infidelities; but they also do much to make life richer and happier, and let us charitably hope Tennyson's picture is truer to life than Hartmann's:—

"These two they dwelt with eye on eye,
 Their hearts of old have beat in tune,
 Their meetings made December June,
 Their every parting was to die.

Their love has never passed away;" &c.

It is true that severe labour has made thousands prematurely old, that the cares of life, and the struggle to make ends meet, have crushed all hope out of millions of human hearts; it is nevertheless true that toilers are often happy, and that what seems to the Pessimist "unblessed toil," is often mixed with many simple and morally ennobling pleasures and compensations. And even when this is not so, where toil is hopeless, and when all its joys are poisoned at their fountain, who will

* "When the time comes to fulfil these hopes, and the children are still alive and unspoilt, they quit the parental home, go their own way, usually into the wide world, and write even only when in want of funds."—HARTMANN.

say that these evils are due to life itself? The Pessimist cannot *scientifically* estimate life's worth, for he sees but a part of life, and no part can be judged correctly when torn from its vital relations to the whole. Professor Blackie, discussing this question, remarks, that the "real evil in the world is the negative carping spirit, the Mephistopheles of Goethe's *Faust*, which, for lack of will to use the given materials in the given way, gratifies an unreasoning restlessness in blaming everything and doing nothing."* There is much truth in this view of life, and we commend it to all who feel disposed to give way to Pessimistic complaining. Apart from the higher consolations of religion—consolations which the Pessimist denies to mankind—when they look at this life with larger and wiser eyes men can see many grounds of hope. How much might be done to sweeten life's cares, if only man were more brotherly and more in sympathy with man! How many of the evils of which Pessimists complain, and which we must all recognize, are due, not to existence as such, but to existence under conditions that may materially be altered! How many of the passions that now make life so hard, both for oppressor and victim, are abnormally strong!† How much of the hopeless grief of the human heart is hopeless only because of man's inhumanity to man! The "golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth," thoroughly accepted and rigorously applied—and that this is possible thousands can demonstrate by experience—would make this world a new world, and remove far away from human life three-fourths of its present evils. Hartmann's summary of the results of the first stage we cannot accept. His picture of this life is not true to the reality; we admit, no Christian ever denies, that happiness, in the fullest sense, is impossible in this life, but we by no means admit that things are as he describes them. We do not adopt the method of weighing in the same

* See the *Natural History of Atheism*—a work, by-the-way, which meets many of the arguments of Hartmann, and which is full of hope.

† See *Enigmas of Life*, p. 74 note. The whole work is well worthy of study in connection with Pessimism. Mr. Greg does not give its true place nor its just proportions to the "Creed of Christendom," but neither does he despair of human life, nor believe that the world is incapable of being made better. Some of his views are exceedingly suggestive and stimulating.

scales the pleasures of a "thousand gourmands" and the torments of "one starving human being." We have no desire to balance the pleasure of eating Lecky's "jam tarts" over against the pains of toothache, nor have we any scales adjusted to measure the quantities and qualities discussed by Pessimists generally; but, knowing life from experience, and knowing from their testimony the experience of others, we have no hesitation in setting aside, as worthless evidence, much of Hartmann's testimony about the first stage of the "Eudemonistic Illusion." It is impossible to compare together, so as to say how much of *this* shall be equal to *that*—the pleasures and pains of life; nor can we deal with life at all as a thing of pains and pleasures. True, we increase sorrow by increasing knowledge, but who that knows ignorance and knowledge would ever think of balancing the pleasures of the one against the pains of the other? The true end of life being neither pain nor pleasure, we cannot consent to judge of life's meaning and worth by any "Hedonical Calculus." *

As to the second stage of the illusion, Hartmann does not condescend to reason at all, he simply asserts that the Christian hope is no longer possible to the man of science. Immortality must itself be an illusion, for has it not been demonstrated that body and soul belong to the representation—that is, are alike and equally phenomena? Hence they must alike disappear with the life of the individual. Besides, the hope of immortality, what is this but pure egoism? and egoism always leads to misery and not happiness. Hopes like these are possible to and desired by the ignorant and those who do not understand the true nature of the "world-process." "Day by day secular aims palpably gain in power, extent, and interest; Antichrist is evidently advancing more and more, and soon Christianity will only be a shadow of its mediæval greatness—will again be what it exclusively was at its origin, the last consolation of the poor and wretched." † Before commenting on these bold assertions, let us see how Hartmann deals with the *third* and last stage of the illusion—the view which relegates happiness to the future of the race in this world. Here we have,

* See Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, book iv.

† Hartmann.

he thinks, only another type of the same illusive hope; who that knows anything at all of life as it now is can really expect any millennium for the race in a world like ours? All the more highly civilized nations are seeking after scientific culture, and this can only result in a development of the "Pessimistic consciousness," for, as we have already been told, the more knowledge and the more culture, the keener sensitiveness and the deeper anguish. The working classes all over Europe were never better off, yet never were they anything like so dissatisfied with their condition; never was anarchy so rife as at present. Nor can we affirm that nations are becoming more moral; beneath the smooth surface of social life there are volcanic elements, and, given only an insurrection or a civil war, we should soon learn how immoral men are at heart. The more, therefore, culture is promoted—even Pessimists hold that the great duty of man is to promote culture—the further we advance beyond the condition of mere "animality," the more will men fret against what is inevitable, and the more will they long for Nirvana, as the only possibility of reaching happiness.

The *first* stage is no longer possible; we have put away childish things and can never return to them again. The *second* stage is hopeless, for Christianity is a vanished dream, and only the ignorant can accept its hopes and rewards. As for the *third*, "with the increased *means* nothing more has increased than *wishes* and *needs*, and in their train *discontent*." "The Unconscious" certainly uses this stage for the "*wholesome fascination*" and stimulation of mankind, but the end is vanity and vexation of spirit.

What then is the Pessimistic reading of life's meaning? Happiness may not be found here, Christianity is no longer a possible solution of the problem, and the hope of a happy future for the race is an illusion; what may we work towards? If in this life we have no hope, if there be no future life, if the more we develop our faculties, the more highly we cultivate our minds and hearts, the more bitter is to be our sense of disappointment, what is the outcome likely to be? Hartmann says a self-conscious God must go mad or turn suicide;

surely these are about the only alternatives a system like his can offer to a rational man ! Perhaps we ought to say there is a third alternative, one likely to be chosen by vast masses of mankind, and this is a life of pleasure, of madness and folly, with suicide as its natural termination ; we do not, of course, say this is the ideal set up by Hartmann and his English admirers. "The endeavour after the utmost possible happiness," says Coupland, "through a continual process of self-renunciation, this is found to be the content of right moral action." We must fix our minds and hearts on the great "world-process ;" this is the *objective* of all right-thinking minds. In this "world-process" human activity is included "as a necessary aid to its attainment." The "essence of all is one ; that essence is non-blessed. It is ever seeking after blessedness it is true, but blessedness is an unattainable state." Whether then we seek for happiness in folly and madness, like Koheleth, or whether we keep to the simpler pleasures and more homely paths ; whether we devote ourselves to hard toil or try to enjoy cultured leisure ; whether we look to the development of the individual or to the ultimate welfare of the race, the same result is before us—bitter and cruel disappointment. Still let us strive and struggle, still let us refuse to shorten life or to commit suicide, we must help on the great "world-process," knowing that hereunto we were called, and that this is our true mission in life. "Perfect duty and true religion are one, to work to the utmost for the enlightenment of the Absolute Will, and to do that work reverentially and lovingly, feeling that we are labouring to abridge the pains of a God, the term of whose sufferings is at the discretion of His creatures. The difference between this theology and that of the Christian church, for instance, is that we each and all *are* the very God who is awaiting deliverance !"* And this is the last word of the new Philosophy of the Unconscious ! And for this we are to abandon Christianity at the bidding of men who tell us that they use in their investigations the "methods of physical science !" A God whose well-being is in the power of men ! A God who is awaiting deliverance at the hands of His crea-

* W. C. Coupland, in *Mind*, April, 1879.

tures! Such an idea of God may be a "cognition of the highest order," according to Pessimists; according to our judgment, it is a compound of blasphemy and absurdity, and we hardly know which is the more astounding, the presumption or the credulity of its framers. Well may this be termed the "poultice-blister" theory of life; for, according to Hartmann, the sufferings of the creatures are a kind of blister applied to the miseries of "The Unconscious." A strange method of procedure! The unconscious has no feeling, and the self-conscious is capable of keenest anguish, yet we must all suffer in order to soothe the sorrows of a Great Being incapable of either joy or sorrow! We agree with Professor Barlow, that, "if the Pessimistic arguments are really sound and valid—if it be the fact that conscious life and misery are inseparable, and, by the very nature of things, must ever so remain—the man is a fool if he continues in it a moment longer than he need, and a scoundrel if he becomes the means of bringing any more wretches into existence."* We also agree with this writer in affirming that the battle with Pessimism must be fought on the ground of what is called the *second stage* of the "Eudemonistic Illusion"—that is to say, we must be prepared to take our stand on the Divine Revelation, and find in Jesus Christ and His Gospel the true solution of life's problem. Nor can the Pessimist really object to this method; he rejects the Materialistic solution of the problem, and insists on finding room for something like *Teleology*. Hartmann ridicules the expedients of an English Maudsley, says he is still "greenwood," and wonders how such a scientist can "go on investigating;" he disdains Lange's Idealism, considers Darwinism insufficient, and boldly appeals to an "*unconscious teleological principle*." In other words, he appeals to what is "transcendental," although he refuses to allow this privilege to the upholders of Christianity, and the believers in a future life. It is not necessary, in the pages of this REVIEW, to attempt anything like a vindication of Christianity against the upholders of the new philosophy; we have simply endeavoured to set forth, as fairly as possible, the Pessimistic theory,

* *Ultimatum of Pessimism*, p. 92. *

and to give our readers the benefit of this pretended reading of life's meaning. What possible shadow of justification can be offered for such views? What benefit can come to our country from the spread of systems like these, systems that have been tried for whole millenniums in the East and have been found wanting? What good end is gained by the effort to press the Old Testament Koheleth into the service of Pessimism? The Pessimism of Koheleth is as different from the Pessimism of Schopenhauer, Hartmann, and their followers, as light is from darkness.

To those who are troubled with doubts on this point, we commend the complete justification of Koheleth, given in the suggestive lectures of Dr. Wright, with whose conclusion we heartily agree. "The restlessness of the age was fully shared in by Koheleth, and he does not scruple to express in the boldest terms his feeling of the vanity of life. He was very far, however, from abandoning himself to utter sadness or despair. He thought it was man's duty to enjoy the gifts of God; to fear God and keep His commandments. Heine has somewhere styled the book 'the Song of Scepticism,' but, as Delitzsch observes, it would be more correctly termed the 'Song of the Fear of God.' Throughout his work Koheleth holds fast his faith in the Eternal. He never loses himself in the abyss of atheism. His belief in God, in a judgment to come, in the final victory of goodness, comes forth ever and anon, distinct and clear."* We by no means deny that in the Old Testament there are what may be easily mistaken for Pessimistic strains; but these occasion difficulty only to those who forget that the book is the *Record of God's Revelation*, and that there is progress in this history. Before Christ had shed clear and full light upon immortality, men could not but feel depressed, as they looked at the darker side of human life; yet even in their darkest moments Old Testament Psalmists and Prophets never lost hold of faith in God, never ceased to believe that it would be "well with the righteous"

* *Ecclesiastes*, p. 137. All who take an interest in this subject should study these lectures. They are characterized by great learning, sound judgment, and humble piety. Surely their author ought to occupy a chair in some of the universities of the kingdom. Why does Trinity College, Dublin, neglect its loyal son?

under all possible conditions.* Even in the New Testament, yea in the teachings of our Lord Himself, we may find Pessimism, if we insist on reading according to the instructions of Hartmann; if we strip from the Christian system *the doctrine of a future life*, the residuum is plainly Pessimistic. True are the words of St. Paul, "If in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men most pitiable."† But who that knows anything of the Spirit of Jesus Christ, who that is familiar with the true meaning of the New Testament, will venture to say that Christianity is Pessimistic? No one can study the history of the first ages of Christianity without knowing that new life and hope came with Christ to humanity. Buddhism is sometimes compared with Christianity, and Pessimism is simply the old Buddhism, speaking in new accents, and using the scientific phraseology of the nineteenth century. "The morality of Buddhism," as Matheson reminds us, "beautiful as it is in its outward precepts, is still the product of a root of bitterness, and owes its existence to the despair of all rest;"‡ in Christianity, on the other hand, there is fulness of joy, and its doctrine of sacrifice is not despair of life, but new hope for all mankind: "the universe was transfigured by love" to the early Christians, "all its phenomena, all its catastrophes, were read in a new light, were endued with new significance, and acquired a religious sanctity."§ The prayers and praises of St. Paul and his comrade, when they were lying in a loathsome dungeon, with their feet fast in the stocks, are an index to this new life of gladness and hope. The shining of the first martyr's face when his bloodthirsty persecutors were clamouring for his life, is but an outward symbol of the new possibilities that had come to humanity with the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Perhaps it is well for us in this age to have these contrasts sharply set before us, well for us to be compelled to look on this picture, and on that; and this is one proof that even Pessimism may have a mission and a message to the nineteenth century. A

* "A resurrection is everywhere in the Old Testament to him who can look beneath the surface."—PEROWNE, *Hulsean Lectures*, 1868.

† I Cor. xv. 17. ‡ *Growth of the Spirit of Christianity*. § Lecky.

world from which God is banished, must ever be to its weary dwellers a world in which there is no hope, a world full of dreariness and dark despair. In our modern world, men who call themselves leaders and teachers are doing their utmost to banish the thought of God. Not now the fool only saith in his heart "no God," but the man who claims to be considered wiser than his fellows, and the man concerned about the interests of morality. Have we not offered to us in the name of the "scientific method," systems of morality in which the "fear of God" has no longer any place? Are not men eager to discredit the Divine Revelation, and to teach us that morality needs no support from Theism, but that it can supply all the needed motives, restraints, and sanctions, without any faith in a moral Ruler to whom man is responsible? * Pessimism is the natural and necessary outcome of all such systems of philosophy, and this seems to us its chief significance for our time. Pessimism most clearly demonstrates that a world without God must be a world in which there is, and can be, no hope. Buddhism, as a system of morality, is quite as lofty as the Pessimism of Schopenhauer and Hartmann, yet, wherever its influence has been felt, no matter how noble some of its principles are, "it has been a curse and not a blessing." Mr. Gilmour, in his work *Among the Mongols*, gives us a candid estimate of the moral results of Buddhism in Mongolia, and the picture is dark enough. There are no doubt some good results in the direction of kindness to man and beast, yet on the whole the effect of this system is debasing and its influence most pernicious. "Its ascetics, like those of other countries and other faiths, have not, as might have been anticipated, been able to conquer the tendencies of Nature. It has sought not to regulate but to overcome Nature, and Nature has overcome it. Its monasteries and abodes of contemplation have proved frightful sources of corruption and sensuality." † Nor can we hope for any other or higher moral result from the systems of Leopardi, Schopenhauer, and

* See Lange's *Materialism*, vol. iii. pp. 233-362. Also Spencer's *Data of Ethics*, preface.

† Dr. Wright, *Ecclesiastes*, p. 181 (see testimonies in foot-note).

Hartmann. One of the noblest results of Christianity in social life has been the elevation of woman, and as a result of this the purification of family life. All the best historians of Christianity bear testimony that in early times the Gospel regenerated the ancient world, and that it brought untold blessing to the individual, the family, and the State. They tell how Christianity taught man to reverence woman, as morally his equal, and to give her her true place in the home and in social life; how the precepts and spirit of the Master, embodied in the lives of His followers, protected the weak, restored the sinful to purity, taught men to judge each other by the moral standards they were accustomed to apply to women, and to seek for themselves the same purity they expected women to manifest. If the system of Hartmann becomes popular, if his views of life should come to be generally accepted, very different moral results may be expected. In the most highly civilized States in Europe, notwithstanding the acknowledged standards of Christianity, men generally are far from what they ought to be; we do habitually expect from women a higher morality than we expect from men, and we permit to one sex a licence forbidden to the other. But we do this in defiance of Christ's law, and knowing all the time that *we are violating our own ideals of duty*. If Hartmann's system is accepted, our standards will be lowered, and we shall cease to expect conformity to the loftier ideal in ordinary life. We do not mean to insinuate, with some, that the philosopher has himself been unfaithful to the moral life, or that he has not been exemplary in his family relationships; *we are dealing with the moral tendency of a system, and in no sense sitting in judgment on the moral character of the man, for of this we have no knowledge*. Even if Hartmann himself had been a perfect pattern of chivalry and of domestic fidelity, his cynical remarks about women, his general teaching about the relations of the sexes, his gloomy and, we hope, distorted pictures of moral life, must all tend to lead humanity in the wrong direction. We have no intention of violating the prudent reserve hitherto characteristic of the best writers in this country, nor shall we follow our philosopher in his free discussion of matters better passed over in silence. "There are things too low to be spoken of: which indeed

become low by being spoken of. The appetites are of this kind. They were meant to be the beginnings of action, not the end of speech; and, under the droppings of words, they are as wholesome food analyzed into constituent poisons. God lights that fire, and does not want our breath to blow it, or the fuel of our thought to feed it."* Dr. Wright has uttered solemn words of warning against the immoral tendencies of Pessimism, words which it behoves all wise men to lay to heart. The Pessimists profess to be much shocked at those who teach the doctrines associated with the *Fruits of Philosophy*, and they denounce unsparingly the immorality of all such efforts; surely they forget that their own philosophy differs but little from the systems they condemn. When Hartmann tries to glorify certain appetites common to man and beast; when he explains the purely physical impulse as if it contained elements that were highly spiritual; when he sneers at women, regards them as inherently weak and incapable of entering into the higher life-thoughts of men; when he declares that man is by instinct a polygamist; and when he speaks as if he believed that men generally are unfaithful to their marriage vows, and that purity, apart from marriage, is never possible; when, in addition to all this, he blows with cold and icy breath upon all the purest aspirations and simplest ideals, what other result can be expected than one unfavourable to moral life? Already men are but too ready to cast off the yoke of purity and the restraints of piety, and to give loose rein to the unruly passions of a depraved nature. What may we expect if any considerable number accept the teachings of Hartmann in his chapter about "The Unconscious in Sexual Love?" Morality, as taught by Christianity, is not so much violated, or set at defiance, as it is simply ignored, treated as if it had no existence and no authority; yea, there are scattered through his writings expressions that make us wonder whether Hartmann has any conception of morality at all. He speaks of acts and relationships, condemned by all moralists, as if they were right, certainly without a single word of condemnation. We do not really wonder at this; we simply regard it as our solemn duty

* Dr. Martineau.

to point out that these things are so, and to remind men *that for Pessimists morality has no longer its old meaning and content.* A moral system on the basis of the *Philosophy of the Unconscious* is utterly impossible. If the power behind all phenomena be impersonal, if intelligence is not one of its attributes, if all human striving and toiling *must*, in the very nature of things, end only in a deeper sense of misery, and if death ends all; in fine, if the very essence of life be an "alogical process," and its only possible outcome the "eternally unblessed," where can there be any room for, or any motive towards, morality as hitherto understood? "Let us eat and drink, let us live according to the impulse of the hour, for there is neither God nor future, and even the present has no rational meaning,"—this is the only practical outcome to be expected from the spread of Pessimistic teachings. We cannot but regard it as, on the whole, a healthy thing that the practical (may we not say the logical?) issue of its Materialisms, Pantheisms, and Atheisms, should be put thus plainly and bluntly before our age. It is a distinct gain for clear thought that men should be compelled to look at the result of estimating life's worth by the purely "Hedonical Calculus," and this is another of the benefits to be expected from the rise and progress of Pessimism. Life cannot be judged aright, nor can we reach any satisfactory solution of its deepest problems, so long as we call good what is pleasurable, and evil what gives pain. The best thinkers in the Utilitarian school all declare for the higher pleasures of the intellect and the moral nature, as against the pleasures of the sensual part of man, and the choice does credit both to their judgment and conscience. But such a choice does not seem to us capable of justification on the basis of their philosophy of life, nor can it be defended against an opponent who prefers the pleasures of the pig, so long as we use Hedonistic arguments alone. Much less can Pessimists justify their arguments about culture and the duty of self-renunciation. If body and soul, the lower and the higher elements in man's complex nature, are alike and equally phenomena; if the pleasures of both perish with the using, and if organ and function, the potential as well as the actual, are to perish at death, how can we justify

culture, self-denial, and "reverential" striving after an impossible ideal? Only when we pass beyond mere pleasures or pains to what is higher than, also capable of being promoted by, both can we expect any light on life's meaning; so long as pleasure and pain, enjoyment and sorrow, are regarded as our "destined end or way," so long must this world be a labyrinth to which we can find no clue. No Theist, certainly no Christian Theist, ignores or overlooks the terrible evils so vividly set before us in Pessimistic systems. Dr. Flint remarks that he knows of no facts brought forward by Schopenhauer and Hartmann, that have not been fully and fairly considered by him in his work on Theism; it is one thing to know and accept these facts, quite another to accept the Pessimistic conclusion. Moreover, as Stanley Jevons has well said, "If we cannot succeed in avoiding contradiction in our notions of elementary geometry, can we expect that the ultimate processes of existence shall present themselves to us with perfect clearness? I can see nothing to forbid the notion that in a higher state of intelligence much that is now obscure may become clear."* Apart from this higher intelligence in a future life, the hope of what was evidently in the mind of Mr. Jevons, we have fuller knowledge, even in the present life, than Pessimists acknowledge or understand. There are other facts equally genuine and far more important utterly ignored by them, but which go a long way in relieving the mind from the strain of the facts on which they base their terrible theory. Christianity is itself a grand and life-giving fact. The life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ are facts that fill the whole of life with new meaning, and which open up before our minds and hearts prospects and hopes that are full of light. Our experience of the consolations of the Gospel is quite as real as our experience of the ills of life, yet the Pessimists coolly ignore all this, and say that these consolations are no longer possible to men of culture. Even Sully, while rejecting the extremer elements of Pessimism, bids us not be so greedy, and says that, after all, this life may be all the life we shall ever have. Neither Hartmann's Pessimism nor

* *Principles of Science*, vol. ii. p. 468.

Sully's Meliorism has any authority for us. We follow other and wiser teachers, chiefly the One and All-wise Teacher of Men; He knows all, has revealed much, and has promised to make plain in the future what is dark and perplexing in the present. Belief in God, Moral Governor and Father, is more natural to man than any other belief, as even a study of the philosophy of Hartmann may demonstrate. Even Pessimists must speak of their "Unconscious" as foreseeing, interfering, arranging, and ordering all; Hartmann himself cannot get rid of Teleology, and his "Unconscious" is a huge Anthropomorphism in some of its attributes. In addition to the ineradicable instinct of the human heart, an instinct which nothing has killed, and which manifests itself under strange conditions, we have the authority of Jesus Christ, the wisest and best of all teachers; and, as Professor Wace has remarked, the "final answer to all objections against belief in God is that the Lord Jesus Christ lived and died in it."* Accepting this authority, and reverencing this Revealer, we no longer walk in darkness, but in the light of life. We see in His kingdom a new order of things, and in the power which He places at the disposal of the humblest and weakest, we have a new pledge and promise of ultimate triumph. Ours is not the consolation of the poor bereaved mother, taught by Buddha to cease from her grief and hopeless misery. Driven to despair by the loss of her child, she sought in vain for comfort; at last hearing of the wisdom of Buddha, she applied to him for relief. He told her to get some mustard seed from a house where no "son, husband, parent, or slave had died." Not finding any such house, the mother returned to the Buddha, her mind now beginning to grow calmer, and her heart more able to receive his teaching. According to the legend, she accepted Buddha's doctrine, and entered the "first path." Our Master does not lead us to peace, by teaching us that all life is full of misery; rather He teaches us that misery is due not to existence *per se*, but to the fruitless striving of rebellious wills, and the passionate longings of natures not purged from their evil.

* *Bampton Lectures*, for 1879, p. 53.

Trying to live a self-centred life, away from submission to, and fellowship with, the source of all Blessedness, men are weary and miserable. New ideals now arise before the soul, new and latent possibilities begin to appear even within human life. Not now the pursuit of pleasure or the avoidance of pain, but the realization of the Christ-like in life, seems the *summum bonum*, and in striving after and submitting itself to this ideal, the soul reaches a truer blessedness, and a larger hope for itself and others. To know God as revealed in Jesus Christ, to submit the whole of life to His Divine sway, to count all as evil that hinders, all as good that helps, this perfecting of the soul—this is the Christian view of life. True, there will still be much sorrow in life, even where such ideals are revered, and when such ends are sought; the followers of the "Man of Sorrows" can hardly expect to escape pain and grief in a world so incomplete as ours is, and where so many wills rebel against the Infinite Love. But much of this sorrow will come from the richer life, from the deeper visions arising out of fellowship in Christ's life, and the knowledge that so many around us are missing the Infinite good, and making the "Great Refusal!" Not now a sense of despair born of reflection, deep and continuous, on the "alogical" character of the "world-process," and no longer the terrible sense of our being orphans in a universe where there is no Father.

ART. IV.—WESLEYAN FOREIGN MISSIONS.

CHRISTIAN charity in the presence of another's need must of necessity be missionary in its thought and action. It seeketh not its own, but another's good. From the divine sufficiency of the eternal fellowship it came forth to create and to bless. For the sake of a ruined race it manifested itself that it might stoop to redeem and restore. In every child of the Father, the divine life follows the example of the divine love. To do good is a ruling instinct of his renewed nature, a necessity of his being. By the truth of the Gospel this instinct is lifted up into an intelligent

principle, a rule of action, clearly recognized, fully approved and loyally obeyed. The welfare of all is the desire and design of the one Redeemer. By those who love Him every redeemed one is esteemed and prized as part of His purchased possession. To reclaim the wanderer and bring back the lost, is to render precious service to the Saviour, to minister to His satisfaction and to increase the endless joy which He will share with His own. And so from the beginning every living Christian Church has also after this manner been essentially missionary, going always beyond its own limits that others might share its gifts.

Methodism in its earliest days was worthy to be described as "Religion in earnest;" and having so said, it is but repetition to add that it was full of missionary zeal. The evidences of this are found at every step. The Oxford Band were methodical in their lives, and scrupulous in their devotions; but they were no less diligent in ministering to the prisoners in the common gaol. The clergyman, still young, traversed the wilds of Georgia that he might preach Jesus to the dark Indians. The itinerant evangelist, exulting in his sense of ecclesiastical freedom, yet not shrinking from a responsibility as unlimited, could exclaim, "The world is my parish." The patriarchal director of a rising church, destined to be greater than his ambition, and as world-wide as his charity, admonished his helpers for all time: "Go not only to those who want you, but to those who want you most." And when the aged man rested from the labour and sorrow of his fourscore years, he bequeathed to his spiritual children a theology, a hymnary, and an organization which severally and conjointly ensured the missionary character of the united societies through all the ages. Methodism must deny itself ere it can leave a human soul, whether in the garrets of destitute London or in the jungles of India, unsaved and unsought.

We sometimes read or hear a not ill-tempered contention as to the relative ages of the modern Missionary Societies. For some of them definite birthtimes may be registered. The Church Missionary Society was founded and formed in 1800; the London Society in 1795, and the Baptist in 1792. In any similar sense it cannot be said that the Wesleyan Mis-

sionary Society was ever founded. Like Methodism itself it was a growth, and when the first attempts were made in the way of organization, it was for the purpose of maintaining and extending missions which had been in existence for several years. The Committee, in 1814, could say: "We have missionaries at home, in the West Indies, in the British Colonies in North America, in Africa, and in the East, and we hope in a short time to extend our field of action still wider." This result had been attained without any definite scheme. There was nothing visionary or romantic in the plans or in the modes of procedure which the early Methodists adopted. Men and women, having themselves tasted of the grace of God, were scattered hither and thither, not indeed by persecution at home, but some following the leading of commercial enterprise, some seeking a home in new lands, and some bent on the duties of war; and wherever they went they spake of Jesus and the resurrection. Tidings and entreaties came to the old land, and help was sent afar.

In this way it came to pass that when in 1816 the Wesleyan Missionary Society took its more definite organization, its agents were already engaged in every part of the world. Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Australia, had all yielded their first-fruits, an earnest of the harvest yet to be reaped. Methodism in the United States had long before entered upon its independent career. The Western World, however, still obtained by far the largest share of the Committee's care and help. Of the fifty-seven foreign stations then occupied, twenty-two were in the West Indies, and twenty-six in the North-American Colonies. Of the remaining nine, three were in Europe—Gibraltar, Caen in France, as supplied from "the Guernsey District," and Brussels. Ceylon was strongly garrisoned with its nine missionaries and two assistants, one of whom was a converted priest of Buddha. India was touched in two of its principal centres, Madras and Bombay, of which the latter has long since been vacated, whilst the former is fruitfully cultivated unto this day. One station in Australia, New South Wales; one in South Africa, at the Cape of Good Hope; and one on the West Coast, at Sierra Leone, these complete the list.

We now pass over the thirty-four years which bring us to the close of the first half of the present century. The period had been one of marvellous success. On the continent of Europe, it is true, there had been but little advance. In Germany one solitary missionary directed and controlled the labours of several agents; but Winnenden still stood alone. In France only had there been apparent progress, and there the one circuit had developed into nine. Besides these and Gibraltar, the Society held no station. It was not through want of will; but as yet the way was not open. The surging of the political tempest of 1848 had scarcely ceased, and the beneficial effects of that mighty uprising of the spirit of freedom are to be found only in the after years. In every other part of the world things were very different. In the West Indies the number of principal stations had more than doubled, and in the North American Colonies they had increased more than fourfold. On the West Coast of Africa new ground had been occupied on the Gambia; and at Cape Coast the mission had been commenced which to-day is celebrating its jubilee with so much enthusiasm and spiritual power. Instead of the solitary station at Sierra Leone, there were twelve circuits grouped in three districts. Ceylon, too, was being evangelized from seventeen distinct centres. In and around Madras there was constantly put forth the patient, prayerful effort of which the results are now beginning to be gathered. Bombay had been vacated; but Mysore was occupied and was steadily prospering. The sphere of missionary labour in India was restricted, and the influences of the existing government were by no means helpful, for the East India Company was still supreme. In Southern Africa the Gospel had spread abroad, so that forty-four stations were occupied, scattered over the area extending from Cape Town to the Vaal River. Yet it was in the Southern Seas that the most marvellous changes had taken place. In 1816 there was one solitary missionary appointed to New South Wales—Samuel Leigh. The news of his safe arrival had not yet reached England. In 1820 Benjamin Carvosso was on his way to join Mr. Leigh. The vessel called at Hobart Town, and Mr. Carvosso's spirit was stirred as he beheld the need of the

people. He preached unto them Jesus and the Resurrection, and thus began the mission in Tasmania. It was nearly twenty years after when the Committee, responding to an earnest request, appointed a missionary to Western Australia, where little had been attempted beyond the official duties of the chaplain and teacher attached to the convict establishment at Port Philip. Mr. Longbottom was on his way thither, but the vessel, driven by contrary winds, was wrecked on an unknown shore. After many hardships, both crew and passengers found their way to Adelaide, where a few earnest Methodists had built a chapel and were earnestly longing for the presence of a missionary. Thus began the work in South Australia in or about 1838. The mission to Australia Felix, now known as Victoria, was at first a purely missionary enterprise, undertaken in 1838 for the benefit of the aboriginal tribes. In this respect it failed and was abandoned, but an appointment was continued at Melbourne for the benefit and at the request of the colonists. The Friendly Islands had been visited by the agents of the London Missionary Society in 1797, as one of their earliest missions; but after three years' hard toil, the enterprise was given up. Twenty-two years after, Walter Lawry visited the islands, and spent eighteen months there with his family. In consequence of his report to the General Committee, John Thomas and John Hutchinson were sent out, and they landed at Tonga in 1826. The civilization of New Zealand was first attempted in 1814, by the Rev. Samuel Marsden, senior chaplain of New South Wales, in the name and with the aid of the Church Missionary Society, but no minister accompanied the Christian settlers. It was at the earnest request of Mr. Marsden that in 1818 the Rev. Samuel Leigh visited New Zealand. He afterwards came home to England, and laid before the Committee his proposals for the establishment of a mission. The Society was in debt to the amount of several thousands of pounds, but the enterprise was undertaken, and a mission party, under the care of Mr. Leigh himself, landed there in 1822. In 1827 the mission was suspended, but was resumed in 1828. The work in the Friendly Islands had been carried on in presence of many difficulties, yet

with increasing success, until the year 1834. In that year, and in answer to the united prayers of the missionaries and their helpers, there began, at Vavau, one of the most wonderful revivals of these modern days. It was under the preaching of a local preacher, a native, and in a village congregation, that the movement commenced. It swept like a tide of blessing over all the islands. One of its earliest results was the kindling of a missionary zeal among the mission churches, and an earnest desire to make known the Gospel to others. In 1835 the District Meeting designated two of their members for the Fiji Islands, whither they immediately proceeded. It was not until the end of 1838 that the first missionaries from England, of whom John Hunt and James Calvert were two, landed at Lakemba. By these successive advances the solitary station in New South Wales, which in 1816 represented the Wesleyan Missionary Society, had become *fifty-one*, spreading far over the Southern Seas. Thus, at the dividing of the century, the Society was represented by more than three hundred missionaries and assistant missionaries, on more than four hundred central stations, in every part of the world. This increase from fifty-seven to three hundred and four, Ireland not included, had been the work of thirty-four years. Another period of thirty-four years has passed away since 1850, and it is well to compare its results with those which went before.

As we enter upon the second half of this century we are at once conscious of a new order of things. Two years before there had been the great upheaval of European society, when men in every country had dared, though sometimes with small success, to assert the freedom without which there can be no responsibility. Only a free people can be a regenerate people. There may be many who think that very much remains to be done before true liberty is enthroned on the Continent; but it is not the less a fact that the Europe of to-day strangely differs from the Europe of forty years ago. Then followed the International Exhibition of 1851. Political changes were hastened by scientific inventions, leading to social and commercial revolutions. Steam and electricity were exerting their newly acquired power, and war in many parts commingled

the peoples and stimulated inquiry. Through all the following years many have run to and fro, and knowledge has been increased. All these things have had their influence upon nations, civilized or uncivilized. They have tended also to the consolidation of the British empire. The East India Company has surrendered to the Empress of India, and the British colonies have obtained large powers of local self-government.

The territorial progress of the Wesleyan Missionary Society during the present half-century has been very considerable. In Europe, whilst the work in France has extended, and that in Germany has been developed with much patience and labour, Methodism has entered Bavaria, Bohemia, and Austria. It has dotted the kingdom of Italy with thirty-eight stations; it has entered Oporto; and its earnest workers are in Barcelona, in the Balearic Islands, and in Madrid. In Ceylon there were no new kingdoms to be won; but instead of two districts there are now four, and instead of seventeen central stations there are now seventy-five.

The Indian Mission, which in 1850 touched only Madras and the Mysore, now subdivides the Madras District, still occupies the Mysore, and has added the Nizam's territory, the Province of Bengal, and the North-West Provinces. Its central stations were then four in Madras and four in the Mysore, and these were all. It now occupies thirty-one in Madras and twenty-four in the Mysore; whilst in India, as a whole, instead of eight, the central stations held in 1884, or reported as awaiting occupation, were seventy-nine. Of the wants and possibilities of this Indian work more may be presently said.

China is, for the Wesleyan Missionary Society, a new territory. When George Piercy went forth a volunteer for the Master's service in China, it was not at the bidding, and scarcely with the consent, of the General Committee. He went from his home, in Pickering, purposing to labour with his own hands, as need might arise, if only he might preach the Gospel to those whom even when an unconverted rover he had learnt to pity. The half century was scarcely begun when he entered upon his errand of love, heartily welcomed by agents of other societies already established in Hong Kong

and Canton. To-day there are eleven central stations grouped around Canton, Wuchang, and Wusuch.

Of other fields it is scarcely possible to speak without first indulging in a digression. From of old the Lord ordained that they which serve at the altar should live of the altar; and even so that they which preach the Gospel should live by the Gospel. Christianity is self-supporting. It provides its own agents and its own resources. So the Wesleyan Missionary Society has always insisted upon the importance of employing native agents, who should be maintained from local funds. The development of self-support has naturally led to that of self-control. Hence the formation of independent or affiliated Conferences. Several of these have been constituted during the period of which we are now speaking; and under their control were placed the whole of the Society's Missions in France, the North American Colonies, Australasia, and, with only necessary exceptions, in South Africa and the West Indies.

It will at once be seen that the first and last of these differ from all the others. In Canada, Australasia, and South Africa, there have been from the beginning colonial churches, and as mission work has extended these have also prospered. When the time of their independence drew nigh, there was a strong foundation of well-organized circuit Methodism, with English or Colonial lay officers, accustomed to circuit responsibilities, and prepared to take their share in Connexional administration. The Canadian and Australasian organizations, with all their subordinate annual Conferences, have been without question successful. And so far as the Southern Ocean is concerned, or the vast regions of the Canadian North-West, Methodism may rest in the assurance that by the formation of these Conferences ample provision has been made for their evangelization. Any demands which thence arise will serve only to call forth the healthy energies of these growing churches. And experience as to these Conferences works hope for the one so recently constituted in South Africa. For the present it has to contend with great financial difficulties, arising partly from general commercial stagnation, and partly from political unrest. Nor is it at first an element of strength, that it includes

within its organization, as well as under its jurisdiction, so many infant churches, and so large an admixture of non-English races. Nevertheless, there is every reason to believe that South African Methodism will more than fulfil the expectations of those who favoured its independence.

When we turn to the Conferences of France and of the West Indies the scene is altogether different. The formation of the French Conference in 1852 cannot be entirely dissociated from the political changes which had taken place in France, and which had awakened something like an impatience of foreign control or interference. This Conference, although the first of its kind, has not been the most successful. French ecclesiasticism is based upon the theory that the church pastor is a State officer. The Government appoints and the Government pays. The minister is pastor of a congregation and little more. There is much in all this that is unfriendly to Methodism, but nothing which could effectually oppose it. Yet French Methodism makes but little progress towards the maintenance of its own institutions, and still less towards providing for the need of the general population. It is even now in presence of a serious financial struggle. There is hope in the fact that every difficulty is manfully confronted by some of the most energetic members of its Conference. An attempt to supplement its work without interfering with its organization has been made by the establishment of an Evangelistic Agency in France, under the direction of the Rev. W. Gibson, of Paris. But there, as everywhere else, if Methodism is to prosper, it must be worked in its integrity and in harmony with its original design. So long as it seeks with earnestness to promote experimental and practical godliness, and to do this by a systematic combination of lay and clerical agency, and to maintain its agencies by means of the consecrated substance both of the rich and of the poor, so long may there be a well-grounded assurance of success and eventual triumph. The most vigorous thinkers and workers in the French Conference are alive to the truth that habitual dependence upon foreign support is fraught with as much danger as is habitual submission to foreign direction.

The peculiar difficulties which lie in the way of the West

Indian Conference are as real, though strikingly different. Taking the islands as a whole, the Colonial element is not strong. The coloured population greatly predominates. This is true of the West Indian Churches generally. It is barely fifty years ago since slavery was abolished in the West Indies. As a rule, every man who is over fifty years of age was once a slave, redeemed by British justice with British gold. With rare exceptions, every man who is over thirty years of age is the child of parents who were born in slavery—a slavery which was the tradition of generations. The evils which that slavery had so cruelly inwrought into the enslaved race cannot all be remedied in the course of the first generation. Where freedom does not flourish, conscience must needs be an exotic. Duplicity breeds distrust. The knowledge that notions of truth and honesty are commonly lax, will necessarily hinder one from confiding in another. That the coloured men of the islands are in many cases able to assert their rights, and to hold themselves equal in conscious integrity and in business power to the best among their whiter comrades, need not be denied. The truth remains that in more islands than one it is difficult to persuade one dark-skinned man to trust another. Lay officers are few and hard to find. These things have been too often affirmed to be regarded as strange. They were known to the Missionary Committee three years ago as fully as they are known to-day; and it is an open secret that, because they were known, the Committee was in no haste for the constitution of the Conference. Fully recognizing the preparedness of Jamaica, it would still have been willing to wait before imposing upon the Eastern section the responsibilities which must now be borne. As, however, the step has been taken, and the burden imposed, British Methodism must have patience, and, if need be, long patience, with the overburdened churches. In justice it must be said that, financially, the West Indian churches have done well. Their annual grant from the Society in 1882 was less than one-eighth of their total expenditure, and was year by year decreasing.

The formation of these Conferences has from time to time lessened the numbers presented in the statistics of the Society. To take their returns, and include them in those of the

Wesleyan Missions, would not represent work done by the agents supported and controlled by the Society. On the other hand, to pass them by would be to exclude important elements in the Society's present obligations. Canada and Australasia, except as to a few supernumeraries or representatives of deceased ministers, are no longer in any way dependent on the home funds. France, South Africa, and the West Indies, receive annual grants, made directly to the several districts, and not to the Conferences themselves. The revision and criticism of the expenditure in each district is therefore now, as heretofore, part of the Committee's duty. But their circuits no longer rank as mission stations, nor their ministers as agents of the Society.

If, then, any one should wish to compare the Society's work of to-day with that of thirty-four years ago, he must be content to confine his comparison to those fields which continue under its care. The result of such a comparison in Europe and in Asia we have already seen. In South Central Africa practically all is new. The Transvaal, the Molopo, the Swaziland missions, with their thirty-six stations, are all, with one possible but doubtful exception, of modern growth. In Western Africa the twelve stations have become thirty-seven. The Limbah mission in the Sierra Leone District, and the Popo and Nupe sections of the Gold Coast and Lago Districts represent extensions which are really important advances. So, too, in the West Indies the Honduras District was in 1850 represented only by the town of Belize. Seven other stations had been added before the end of 1883, and since then other missions have been commenced in Spanish Honduras.

In brief, on the fields which remain under the pastoral jurisdiction of the British Conference, there are now *two hundred and eighty-five* central stations, instead of the *forty-seven* which were occupied on the same fields in 1850; and the number of chapels and other preaching places is now *one thousand two hundred and ten*, as against *two hundred and fifty*.

These facts, brought from the history of the past, prove beyond doubt that the success of the Society's operations is as great to-day as it ever has been, and that everything tends to

encourage in the Committee the hope of still greater things. But if this hope is to be realized, it must be pursued with the same faith and patience which have been the strength and stay of the Committee and its agents in years gone by. There would perhaps be more of glamour resting upon the Society if something new and startling was attempted. It might pander to a certain love of excitement and novelty which cannot afford to go below the surface of events, or to persevere in well-doing for its own sake. Our answer to all such advices must be, that such has never been the policy of the Society in the past; and that thus far the openings which lie ready to hand within reach of existing bases of operation are more than sufficient to occupy the attention and exhaust the resources of the Society for years to come. A cursory glance at the present need will suffice.

The Continental missions should be both strengthened and extended. Of the value and importance of these missions the early Methodists had no doubt. France, Belgium, Spain, and Sweden, all had early attention. If other countries were unvisited it was because they were not then as now open to the preachers of the truth. We do not forget that there is a modern show of liberality which would decry as needless any expenditure of money or labour among the population of countries already professedly Christian. It is said that they have the Gospel, even though mixed with error, and are thus infinitely better off than the millions who have it not. But surely the same might have been said of England a hundred and fifty years ago; and with still more reason it might be said of many of the rural districts to-day; yet no one proposes that Methodism should withdraw its agencies from these in order to provide more fully for the wants of the heathen world. There are no doubt many true followers of Christ in Germany, notwithstanding the prevalence of Lutheran coldness and rigidity; and yet there is a destitute Germany as truly as there is a destitute London. So, too, there are no doubt many to be found among the four Latin nations who read into the teachings of an erring priesthood a force and a meaning which the teachers themselves do not always perceive. But no one can for one moment suppose that the millions of

France and Italy, of Spain and Portugal, have any reasonable idea of what the Gospel is, or of what its precepts require. For generations they have been trained in a system which denies the rights of individual conscience, or so limits them as practically to set them aside. They are taught, as Cardinal Manning himself teaches, that the highest employment of the human intellect is to contemplate truth, not to discover it. It is not for any ordinary man, Christian though he be, to busy himself with the determination of what is true and right. His whole duty is to believe what the church says, and to do what the church bids. It is thus that the whole system comes in between the sinner and the Saviour, interposing a fatal barrier. Hence the multitudes who have learnt to distrust the priest have also learnt to discard all religion. Surely these have need of a pure faith that they may come to the Father, finding light and life. Methodism cannot ignore concerning these the Lord's command : " Preach the Gospel to every creature ! " Nor is this the only reason which justifies and urges the maintenance of these missions. Romanism must be met and mastered at home, if it is to be rendered harmless abroad. In every part of the world, the error confronts the truth ; and if it is desired that the opposition should cease to obstruct our progress on mission fields, then the battle must be fought and won in the towns and villages of Southern Europe. At present all our European missions are hindered through want of more ample resources. In Spain there are many openings, and native agents are at this moment greatly needed in Gibraltar and Malta, to say nothing of Tangiers, Algeria and Tripoli, on the north coast of Africa. There is work to be done in Cyprus, and there is no sufficient reason why Egypt should ever be vacated. At the same time it is freely acknowledged that in all these lands there must be increased dependence upon personal effort, upon voluntary agency and upon local resources.

The fields of the East are white unto harvest, and so are those of Southern and Western Africa. Throughout the empire of India wonderful changes have taken place during the period of which we have been speaking. Yet among them all none are more wonderful or more hopeful, in the estimation

of the Christian philanthropist, than are the rapid increase in the demand for education and the almost startling response to the more vigorous attempts at village evangelization. The new educational policy inaugurated by the Indian Government must be regarded as in no small degree a result of forces which have long been at work. Schools are now in demand for both boys and girls. As to female education the revolution is complete and triumphant. It needs only time and opportunity, and this new creed will everywhere find illustration. The Government has formed its plans without hesitation. Some of its decisions will bear hardly upon the higher education which has been given in aided schools, and especially are they unfavourable to instruction in English. It is, however, a noble resolve that in each and every one of more than four hundred thousand towns and villages there shall be established as soon as may be an efficient primary school for native children. In this work the missionary societies must take their fair share; for by their action only can Christian schools be secured. The Wesleyan Missionary Society must not be backward in the service. As a first contribution the Committee has authorized the establishment of two hundred and fifty schools, fifty in each district, at a cost of £2,500 for buildings, and at a further estimated annual cost of £2,500 for maintenance, in addition to fees and Government grant. All these will not be opened at once; but as speedily as possible they will certainly be provided. Hence will arise a demand for Christian teachers. Nor can it be supposed that there will not be an effort made to prepare Christian teachers who may compete for other than mission schools. Training schools will therefore be required for both masters and mistresses. Every such school and every such teacher will become a distinct centre of evangelizing truth and influence.

So, too, with reference to village evangelization. There never was, among the Society's missionaries in the East, a truer or more earnest zeal than there is to-day. Possibly there may have been times and places where and when an Englishman has been content to preach Christ through an interpreter, and even to return after many years of not idle service without having attempted to master the language of

the people. It is not so to-day. It is now the only correct thing for a young missionary to become as speedily as possible his own interpreter. In every part of India the response on the part of the native population has been so far prompt and decisive, that it has become the imperative duty of the Committee to encourage and support the movement. The Rev. E. E. Jenkins went out to India with authority to select, in consultation with the district meetings, thirty of the most promising and efficient catechists, who might be introduced into the native ministry, and be employed as evangelists. Here again, training institutions will be required, and these, where they do not already exist, are among the immediate and pressing wants of the Indian work. There is abundant assurance that stations will become accessible far more rapidly than trained agents are available. The people are everywhere waiting for the truth. From Calcutta the Society's representatives have already reached forward to the North-West provinces, and now from Lucknow they are already stretching out the hand to the Punjaub. As yet, however, that region is untouched.

If less is said of Ceylon, it is because its organization is more complete; but there are large tracts of country even in Ceylon, the new district of which Kandy is the head, to wit, which still call for the labour of the travelling evangelist.

In China, after thirty-three years, the Society has little more than the foundation of a mission. It is well that it has so much. It is needless to specify the events and influences, both there and here, which for several years past have seemed to hinder progress. The mission band was already weakened when the recent political troubles began. In the heat of popular passion, but little care was taken to distinguish one foreigner from another; but when the strife has altogether ceased, it is more than possible that English missionaries will be repaid for their patient endurance. In the midst of the excitement, the medical mission at Fatshan has been continued with most providential success. Dr. Wenyon, assisted by Dr. Macdonald, is training a class of Chinese young men to take charge of village dispensaries, and several others are receiving full instruction in both medicine and theology. The possibilities which

are suggested by these facts in a land where native medical science is almost unknown, are full of hope and promise. A similar agency is needed for the inland centres represented by Hankow, Wuchang, and Wusuch. The mission staff at all these places must be recruited and strengthened. Beyond the requirements of the daily work, one or two should be on the ground acquiring the language and habituating themselves to climate and customs, ready to assume command as the necessities of the mission may require. At an earlier period, and in other circumstances, all this might appear to be premature, if not fanciful. To-day it is far otherwise; for it is only in some such way as this that the Society can possibly keep pace with the advance of the Gospel.

If now we turn from Asia to Africa, the demands upon the energy and resources of the Society do not lessen. When the South African Conference was constituted three years ago, the Vaal River was taken as the boundary. The stations which had been occupied to the north of this river in the Transvaal and in Bechuanaland were separated from the Bloemfontein district and reserved as a base for further operations. At the time when this was done there was no suspicion of the wealth of promise which was so soon to be revealed. So soon as the din of battle had ceased in the Transvaal, Mr. Watkins entered upon his charge, and, seconded by Mr. Weavind, began to survey the land. It was soon noised abroad that the Wesleyan Missionary Society had sent its missionaries to care for the tribes in the Transvaal. Then followed a series of glad surprises. Whilst the Committee in London was considering proposals for an advance into the interior by three separate routes, Mr. Watkins was receiving messages from far and near. The possibility of reaching the Limpopo, the northern boundary of the Transvaal, in the course of perhaps two or three years, was under discussion when news arrived that Samuel Mathabati, commissioned by God alone and unknown to all beside, had already carried the Gospel within fifty miles of the river, and was holding the land in faith and hope for the Wesleyan missionaries, whom he expected one day to welcome. The story need not be repeated. The central route is thus occupied. This is not all. The churches founded

by Samuel and located at Good Hope Farm and at Maleppo have themselves in turn become missionary, and during the last year have chosen from their own number faithful brethren whom they sent forth to tribes that had not heard of Jesus. They were everywhere welcomed, and brought back messages of earnest entreaty that teachers might be supplied.

The western route of the three proposed was to pass through Bechuanaland. The chronicles which in after ages tell of the rise of Christianity among the South Central tribes of Africa will have few more wondrous illustrations of Christian heroism and unflinching bravery than will be supplied from the banks of the Molopo. Montsioa has been as faithful to his Church as he has been loyal to his Queen, and for the sake of Christianity and of England he has suffered the loss of all things. Strife has delayed the return of a missionary to Mafeking; but the want will now be supplied. From this base and along this line advance will be easy. It is already announced that the great chief Kama has accepted a British protectorate, and that his territories extend to the Zambesi. As to the latter assertion there may be doubt; but enough is known to assure the hearts of our agents. Those tribes who look favourably on British protection will not receive unkindly British Christianity.

The third and eastern route proposed was to pass through Swaziland, trending northward among tribes to the east of the Transvaal. Permission to enter the country was granted almost with readiness, when it was understood that our missionaries carefully and habitually abstain from both trade and politics. A native preacher, prepared of God, was found in Daniel Msimang, the father of two native ministers connected with the South African Conference. At and around Mahamba he has already found much fruit. The station is situated on ground claimed by the Transvaal Government, and it commands with equal facility access to Swaziland and to Zululand. The latter country, in the arrangements with the South African Conference, was reserved as mission ground for the Natal district; but adverse circumstances have prevented the commencement of the work. A proposal has been made for its resumption by the Committee. If this is accepted a mission will be begun forthwith.

It will thus be seen that the Society already occupies the three main routes northward. Through or near to its central stations flows the stream of trade and travel. Hundreds are hearing, as they sojourn or as they pass, something of the Word of Life, enough to awaken within them a new thought and a new feeling, enough also to serve as a medium whereby the Holy Spirit may draw out their souls' desires after a higher and better life. And as they move to and fro they scatter these fragments of knowledge far and wide. The languages of Africa, from the region of the equator southwards, are so related that the trader or the traveller who cannot speak more than one of the many varieties is a rarity. Some are familiar with as many as ten or twelve. And so the Word runs, preparing the way for those who shall follow after with a clearer light and a more complete instruction. One thing is specially noteworthy, that wherever the Gospel is accepted, one of the first requests made is for the establishment of a school. Here, therefore, as elsewhere, teachers, catechists, and native preachers are all greatly needed, and training institutions are a first and immediate necessity.

On the West Coast of Africa the call is equally distinct and forceful. Through the weary years of the past, mission work has been confined chiefly to the coast, which is peculiarly unhealthy. Frequent illnesses and many deaths have hindered progress. Now the way is opening into the interior. The Limbah Mission, connected with the Sierra Leone District, gives promise of affording what has been long desired—a healthy inland station, whence, if need be, the churches on the coast may be efficiently supervised. Already at Fouricarriah Mr. Booth has a class of chiefs' sons, all accepting training as Christian teachers. So also farther South, on the Gold Coast, and in the Popo, Yoruba, and Nupé regions; the country is opening up, and many requests are coming from inland chiefs that teachers may be sent to instruct their people.

In the West Indies also the Committee has reserved a base from which to make further advances. The Honduras District, being chiefly on the mainland, gives access to the territories comprised in Central America. Here, too, progress has been

made, for Spanish Honduras has been entered. Many are waiting for the purer faith which Methodism proclaims. In connection with the West Indian Conferences so recently formed, there is one region which the Committee, perhaps, on reconsideration would not so willingly surrender. Demerara is an old station, and has not been particularly happy in its finances; yet British Guiana, if it had proved somewhat costly at first, would have given vantage ground from which to push forward into South America, where there is very much to be done.

Thus do we find that in every part of the world there is ample employment for the Missionary Society. There is a comparatively free course everywhere. If the work is to be done two wants must be supplied—men and money. Christianity is well able to supply both, and it cannot afford to be stinted in either. It is quite true that of the two it were better to have men without money than money without men. But from the beginning it has been the Lord's rule that the collection should be made with all care and diligence. There is comfort in the assurance that the Master will certainly, and in His own way, provide both. Men are wanted to-day, men who may be put in training for to-morrow. They must be men of zeal, of force, and of prudence—able to command, and therefore willing to obey. They may have no preference for foreign work, but must be ready to go anywhere. As compared with the requirements for home circuits, they should be above the average; for they must retain their intellectual vigour where intellectual food is scarce and intellectual life is feeble. They must maintain order and enforce diligence where there is no superintendent other than conscience, and no praise save that which comes from God. They must be able to plan, to organize, to teach, to train, and to direct, as well as to preach salvation to the people. These are to be the officers, commissioned chiefly from the churches at home, and many will be needed. Young men who believe that they are called of God to preach the Gospel, will do well to ponder prayerfully before they tell Him that they are willing to preach it at home but nowhere else. Such a refusal will have to be justified before Him in the day when He cometh. Yet, again, men.

will be wanted—the rank and file of the grand army. These must be sought among the native converts. Some have always been found, and that too in every country. Now many are needed; and He who has put His hand upon noble native helpers in the past, can, and will, give them to His church for the present and the future. It were well, if from every Christian sanctuary there went up habitually the prayer that the Lord will, Sabbath by Sabbath, raise up native converts whom He will graciously and abundantly use.

For the carrying out of these enterprises of holy ambition, there must of course be an increase in the funds of the Society. The income, as published from year to year in the annual reports, may be divided into three parts: coming respectively from living Methodists in Great Britain, from mission churches, and from legacies and investments. The total income for the year 1884 was over £150,000, and within a few pounds the expenditure was the same. But this does not represent the cost of the work done. Besides this amount, which actually passes through the books of the Committee in London, an almost equal amount is raised and expended by the mission churches themselves, and thus the whole business, which is supervised and directed by the officers of the Society, represents a gross expenditure of nearly £300,000. Of this sum about £104,000 was contributed for ordinary or special purposes in 1884 by British Methodism. In 1850 the contribution was £74,000. In 1850 the number of paid agents maintained wholly or in part by the Society was 1,296. In 1884, the number was 1,830 paid agents, in addition to the grants still made to the several districts in South Africa and the West Indies, and to other affiliated Conferences, amounting to nearly £20,000. It is, therefore, evident that, in proportion to the labour expended, the cost is decreasing. This naturally arises from the increased development of native resources, and from the more frequent employment of native agents. It is very encouraging to be thus assured that the most expensive period in the history of Wesleyan Missions is gone. It does not follow that the financial need is less. There can be no expectation of a decrease in the number of English missionaries. However economical by comparison may be the employment

of native Christian ministers and teachers, there is a real and pressing need for a growing income. The formation of affiliated Conferences brings no present relief; inasmuch as the old grants must be continued for a series of years.

The position of the Wesleyan Missionary Society, as compared with the other great Societies, is unique. It always has been so from the beginning, and the peculiarities have been of late years rather exaggerated than otherwise. Whether these peculiarities are to be a strength or a weakness, a help or a hindrance to the Society, must depend, not upon any theory, but entirely upon the practical working of the organization. If we look at the Church Missionary Society, the London, or the Baptist, all these were independent in their origin and are absolute in their administration. The Committees are in no way amenable to any superior authority. They appoint their own officers, engage their own agents, raise their own income, regulate their own expenditure, and administer their own affairs without appeal. For good or for ill, with the Wesleyan Missionary Society the case is strangely different. At its beginning it was organized, not only with the sanction, but by the act of the Yearly Conference. The General Committee is a committee for general management, and as to all matters arising during the year has power to act; but it is none the less a Committee appointed by the Conference. It cannot engage its own agents, but can only employ such as the Conference has already accepted, except in extreme cases, for which special provision is made. The Committee cannot appoint its own officers, or even determine their number; and as to any ministerial officers, although they are engaged in carrying out as well as in guiding the decisions of the Committee, they are ultimately amenable to and removable by the Conference in its pastoral sessions. The Committee reports to the Conference in its representative sessions; and must continue so to do, inasmuch as the missions are "conducted by the Conference," and are "under the direction of the Wesleyan Missionary Committee and the British Conference." The practical and ordinary management of the missions must of necessity remain with the General Committee, inasmuch as any detailed review of its work, to

say nothing of revision, would exhaust far more time and far more patience than the laity of Methodism can afford. Revision, other than detailed and thorough, would be dangerous, and ultimately ruinous.

Further it must be noticed that the General Committee cannot control its own home organization. That organization is more pervasive and more complete than any other society possesses. It embraces every city and town, every village and hamlet in which there is a Wesleyan Methodist Society or congregation. For nearly a hundred years Methodist law has provided that in every preaching place a collection in aid of missions should be made once a year. The Society has its auxiliary in every district, and its branch in every circuit. Nevertheless it cannot in any way control or direct the action of either branches or auxiliaries. It is not simply that it has no visitatorial right of entry into any circuit; but the discipline of Methodism forbids the entry except with the sanction of the superintendent minister. This must be so, Methodism being what it is. These things are not subjects for complaint, but they are facts which must be intelligently and carefully considered. They affect the Missionary Society, as represented by the General Committee, in all its attempts to reach the people. The income of the Society must of necessity be drawn from the many and by the gathering up of small contributions. To organize this in-gathering by the appointment, the direction, the supervision and the encouragement of collectors, must be the work of the local committee or the local officers. To awaken and to retain the interest of the people by the regular gift of information, whether in the public services or the prayer meeting, by reading or reproducing, or by circulating the information which is provided, this also must be the work of those who are on the spot, whether ministers or laymen. If this interest is not secured it is not for want of facts. Methodists have always an ear and a heart for soul-saving work, and this is the prominent characteristic of the missions of to-day. In the olden times it was this, and not merely novelty or romance, which kindled the enthusiasm of the united societies, and it is quite equal to all the present requirements. But who can do

this? Local committees may see that it is done. Local secretaries and treasurers may do it. But, after all, it is too often that failure arises, where failure is, because neither secretaries nor committees do their appointed work. Then, of course, the remedy lies only with the superintendent and his colleagues; and except through him, no one else can supply the lack. If we put the truth in plain Methodist fashion, the superintendent minister is responsible for keeping up and increasing the income of the Missionary Society. Be it so; and for which of all the "Home Funds" is he not also responsible—he and his colleagues? And thus the persons upon whom the General Committee must depend, and who only have any authority to act, are those upon whom also presses the most heavily every burden of local finance. In such circumstances, it is not, it cannot be, surprising if, among so many responsibilities, the wants of the far-off multitudes should sometimes be subordinated to those which arise nearer home. And yet it is certain that there is some safe and adequate solution of the problem. Methodism has not finished its work either at home or abroad. The heathen have still need of Christ. There are questions concerning necessities and difficulties, concerning ability and responsibility, which, after all, cannot be settled as merely between man and man. The Lord Himself is the only arbiter, and "all things are naked and laid open before the eyes of Him with whom we have to do."

ART. V.—THE CANON OF CERTITUDE.

1. *Lotze's System of Philosophy. Part I.—Logic.* English Translation. Edited by BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., Fellow of University College, Oxford. Oxford: Clarendon Press. London: Henry Frowde. 1884.
2. *Essays on the Philosophy of Theism.* By the late W. G. WARD, Ph.D., sometime Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford. Reprinted from the *Dublin Review*. Edited, with an Introduction, by WILFRID WARD. Two vols. London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co. 1884.

THERE are not wanting signs that weariness of the speculative anarchy, which has so long reigned in Europe, has at length generated a tolerably widespread desire for the discovery and enunciation of a rule or measure of truth capable of universal acceptance, whereby an end may be put to the otherwise interminable metaphysical controversy—a desire which can only be satisfied by such a thorough analysis of the process of verification as may determine once for all whether it consists, as modern empirical logic teaches, in the comparison of a proposition with observed fact, or whether it rests on any other, and, if so, what other principle? This question is handled with more than his wonted insight by Mr. Spencer in his chapter on the Universal Postulate, in the second volume of his *Principles of Psychology*. It is also discussed by the late Mr. George Henry Lewes in the Prolegomena to his *History of Philosophy*, and in his posthumous work, *Problems of Life and Mind*; by the late Professor Lotze, of Berlin, in the last book of his elaborate work on Logic; and by the late Dr. Ward, in two very able essays now reprinted from the *Dublin Review*, in the work entitled the *Philosophy of Theism*. We desire in the ensuing pages to sum up the results of the discussion, as they present themselves to our mind, in as brief a compass and with as much lucidity as may be possible.

It will be necessary, however, to begin with an examination of the theory of judgment which has of late years found most general acceptance amongst English logicians. That, as we understand it, is briefly as follows:—Judgments are of three

kinds: (1) a recognition of two or more states of consciousness as similar; (2) the consciousness of a relation either of co-existence or of sequence between two or more states of consciousness; (3) a belief founded on experience that a relation of co-existence or sequence always has subsisted, and always will subsist, between two or more states of consciousness.*

The first criticism which this analysis suggests is that it omits the important class of judgments of which the subject is the *ego* and the predicate one of its states. "I feel cold," is certainly a judgment, yet it does not express any relation between states of consciousness, whether in the way of resemblance, co-existence, or succession, but simply a state of consciousness. If it be said that what we term the *ego* is one state of consciousness, and the feeling of cold another, and that the two co-exist, the answer is that a feeling of cold is simply a sense that I feel cold, while if the I who feel cold am a state of consciousness, it is clear that I must either be a state of my own consciousness or of some one else's, either of which suppositions is absurd. The judgment, "I feel cold," consists, indeed, essentially in this, that I refer the present modification of my sensibility to myself as a subject not limited by the present moment, which has been sensible in the past, and which will be sensible in the future. This is the import of all judgments which express what is usually known as a subjective fact. It is evident that such a conception of myself, as transcending each successive moment of my consciousness, is not explicable as the result of association, since the mere suggestion of a feeling, idea or judgment, which is all that association can effect, is totally distinct from the consciousness that I have experienced this feeling, had that idea, or made that judgment before. It follows, then, that without a consciousness of the past, and that which is implied therein—viz., a knowledge of myself as a permanent subject uniting past and pre-

* Mill, indeed (*Logic*, eighth ed. p. 112), mentions two other kinds of judgment—viz., judgments which assert the existence of noumena, and judgments of causation; but as he defines a noumenon as the unknown cause of sensation, and subsequently resolves causation into the belief that one state of consciousness always and unconditionally antecedes another, the statement in the text merely purges his theory of a manifest inconsistency.

sent in one consciousness—it would not be possible for me to frame so much as a single subjective judgment in the present tense.

But besides omitting to take account of judgments which merely express states of consciousness, the empirical logic fails to explain how it is that the majority of our judgments concern neither feelings nor relations between feelings, but things and events and relations between things and events regarded as existing or having existed, as happening or having happened quite independently of our consciousness. In a word, it furnishes no theory of the objective judgment.

Here let us bear in mind the shape which the problem of modern philosophy assumed in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. That there are affirmative synthetic propositions,* universal in form and purporting to express a context which is necessarily true, Kant points out in the first few pages of the Introduction. He then abruptly raises the question, how are they possible?—a question which does not mean, as an Englishman fresh from Locke or Mill might suppose, how do we come to make them; but how making them can we be sure of their validity? It did not apparently occur to Kant, until he had reached a somewhat later stage in his inquiry, that it was worth while asking about the validity of any proposition which did not purport to be both necessary and universal. In a brief paragraph, however (§ 19), introduced for the first time in the second edition of the work, we find him observing that even the ordinary judgment of matter of fact asserts not merely the existence of a relation between two cognitions, but that such relation has its counterpart in an object. Thus, e.g., the proposition, "The body is heavy," is not convertible into the proposition, "I have simultaneously certain impressions of weight, solidity, extension, colour and the like;" it imports the existence of something independent of any perceptions, though only cognisable by me through them. In short, the objective judgment necessarily transcends experience.

Had Kant realized the importance of the doctrine which he thus incidentally enunciates, he would probably have recast

* By an affirmative synthetic proposition is meant a proposition affirmative not merely or necessarily in form but in substance.

the critique, prefacing the inquiry into the validity of synthetic judgments *a priori* by an investigation of the ground of the validity of the judgment of objective fact. As he did not do so, however, and the question has been generally neglected since his day, we note with satisfaction that it is raised in a definite form in a remarkable passage (§ 351) towards the close of Lotze's *Treatise on Logic*.

"The possibility," he says, "of synthetic judgments *a posteriori*, does not sufficiently rouse our suspicions, because they are taken for simple expressions of experience, into which no admixture of too forward thought has made its way. But, so long as they are judgments at all, no matter whether expressed in language or not, they are still not the facts given simply, but a preparation of the facts, made by reading into them an inner connection which in immediate observation is not to be found. No narration of an event is possible except by combining together as subject and predicate one portion of the sensuous images which arose in us when we witnessed it with another, and then going on to think in between the contents of these two conceptions, a relation of action exerted on one side and received on the other, or again of mutual alteration of states, none of which relations are in the least degree given in the perceptions as such.

"It may be contended that the proposition, Cæsar crossed the Rubicon, means no more than that a certain partially changeable but still coherent group of sensible impressions, which for shortness we call Cæsar, changed its position in space in relation to a second group of sensible impressions, which we call the Rubicon, in such wise as to be perceived by one and the same spectator, first to the right of the latter group and then to its left. I answer with no less obstinacy that this group was the same group on the left as on the right—that is to say, that it has changed *its* position; this does not lie in the simple data of observation, but is a hypothesis which covertly introduces, under a connected and continuous alteration of the appearance, a permanent substratum, with merely changing relations. Whenever in recounting an event we speak of any sort of movement in space, we are giving, not our perception, but a hypothesis about it. That one and the same real *a* passed through one after the other places *m*, *n*, *p*, is not a fact we have seen; the fact perceived is only that in successive points of time similar appearances *a* were observable in successive points of space. One who was under no necessity to explain this fact to himself by the hypothesis of a permanent subject, could not venture to affirm the proposition *a* has moved, as a description of the facts, but merely as a convenient mode of expression, having in relation to fact no significance whatever. If he denies himself this introduction of certain points of view into the interpretation of the content of per-

ception, then he must acknowledge all synthetic judgments *a posteriori*, all judgments, in fact, of whatever kind, to be inadmissible; and, instead of a recounting of past facts, there remains, in fact, merely the possibility of recalling in memory a series of perceptions,* a reproduction of the raw material out of which judgments might be formed, if only such a proceeding were allowable."

The doctrine then amounts to this, that every judgment of matter of fact, whether affirmative or negative, whether in the present tense or in the past, involves a reference of some sensible appearance to some subject or object not itself sensible as its ground.

The distinction between the subjective and objective judgment may be illustrated by contrasting the proposition, "I feel cold," with the proposition, "It is cold." The latter proposition does not mean merely that other people besides myself probably feel cold, but that the condition of the temperature is such that, without special contrivances for promoting warmth, all human beings must feel cold.

Similarly, I may be sensible of the softness and freshness of the air, the brightness of the sky, and so forth, for some time before these sensations become articulate in the judgment, "it is a fine morning," and when they do so, it is by virtue of an act of attention and discrimination whereby certain of them are grouped together into the idea of morning, others into the idea of fineness—the fineness of the morning, being at the same time conceived as a necessary part of the universal frame of things. In other words, I conceive that the morning is fine, not simply for me but for mankind generally, and that in virtue of the constitution of Nature, and of human nature. I may not be able to say why this is so, but I am sure that the fineness of the morning is no mere accident. This conception of a necessary, though it may be occult, connection subsisting between the objects grouped as subject and predicate in my judgment, is essential to the existence of the judgment as an objective judgment; without it, I might indeed express my own sense of exhilaration, but I could not say, "the morning is fine."

In brief, were it not that I thus interpret my sensations as

* Perception throughout this passage must be read as the presentation of later English psychology.

reporting to me the existence of something which transcends my experience, the objective world would not exist for me at all. I should merely have certain sensations coupled with certain expectations of sensation. The distinction between such a consciousness and that which I have in surveying a landscape is so sharply defined that only ambiguities of language can conceal it for a moment, and even those who verbally obliterate it can never really rid themselves of the thought. When Mill defined the so-called external world as a "permanent possibility of sensation," it is obvious that what he must be taken to have meant is a permanent expectation of sensation. The permanent possibility of sensation—*i.e.*, of experiencing sensation—must be identified with the sentient subject. Such a subject, if conscious also of itself as having existed in the past, might indeed learn by experience to anticipate the order of the recurrence of its sensations; it could not possibly get thereby the idea of the existence of permanent causes or conditions determining that order. We can understand that an empiricist might meet this last proposition in either of two ways: (1) he might assert that the idea which we have of the world is, in fact, nothing more than a certain set of expectations of possible or probable experience; that, for example, Calcutta means merely that after a certain series of sensations and ideas which we call a journey to the East, I should experience certain other sensations and ideas to which the name Calcutta is appropriate; or (2) he might admit that the ordinary notion of the world does indeed amount to more than a mere set of expectations of experience, but assert that what more it does contain is a pure fiction. If he adopt the first alternative, we think the facts must be admitted by all candid and competent thinkers to be hopelessly against him. The popular consciousness certainly does not conceive that it depends upon its own experience whether the world exists or not; it regards the world as existing just as it perceives it, whether it perceives it or no. We think, then, it must be generally admitted that common sense does certainly regard the world as having an existence independent of consciousness, and as related to our experience of it as cause to effect.* But to admit this is to admit that

* Cf. Dr. Ward's *Philosophy of Theism*, i. 324.

the idea in question is an *a priori* idea. No amount of comparison of sensations will ever yield more than is in the sensations. No induction will ever enable you to transcend experience. The idea of something, not sensation, which produces sensation in us, is not itself a copy of any sensation, nor is it merely that which a multitude of experiences have in common. It is then an *a priori* idea, and one which has a definite correlation with that other *a priori* idea which we found to be the basis of the subjective judgment—viz., the idea of a permanent self uniting past and present experience in one consciousness. It may be asked, if a cause is not an expectation that on the occurrence of a given event in the way of feeling a certain other event in the way of feeling will always ensue, what is it? * We answer that the only *vera causa* is the final cause. We are conscious of a clear ineradicable distinction between feeling and the self-determining activity which we put forth in fixing the attention and forming an intention. We cannot perform the simplest mental operation, cannot make so much as a single judgment, without exerting this power; the exertion of it is not in any intelligible sense of the term a sensation—i.e., a passive state of consciousness; its nature is not easy to define with complete accuracy, for in truth it is not without an element of mystery; but we are conscious that in putting it forth we actively direct ourselves to the comprehension of an object, and that without

* That this is really the empirical view of the matter appears from Mill's well-known vindication of himself against the charge of making day the cause of night and night of day. He says (*Logic*, i. 391), "It is necessary to our using the word cause that we should believe not only that the antecedent always *has* been followed by the consequent, but that, as long as the present constitution of things endures, it always will be so. And this would not be true of day and night. We do not believe that night will be followed by day under all imaginable circumstances, but only that it will be so, provided the sun rises above the horizon." Now, as with Mill, the present constitution of things meant certain possibilities of sensation—i.e., certain expectations of experiencing sensation, it follows that the true definition of cause, in Mill's sense of the term, is that given in the text—e.g., the cause of day is the fixed expectation on our part that, provided we have the experience known as seeing the sun rise, the experience known as the day will always ensue. What does the reader say to the following example?—I throw a stone into the air, and it falls to the ground. I believe that so long as the present condition of things endures, the downward movement will always succeed the upward movement; *ergo*, the latter is the cause of the former.

such self-direction, no comprehension of any object is possible. In like manner, intention is altogether distinct from simple desire or aversion, for, whereas the latter terms express merely (1) a sense of pain or uneasiness in the want or absence of an object, and a corresponding anticipation of pleasure from the satisfaction of the desire; (2) a sense of pain or uneasiness arising from the imagined presence or possession of an object, and a corresponding anticipation of pleasure in the absence or want of it; in intention, on the other hand, there need not be the slightest element either of pain or of pleasure, whether felt or anticipated. I may intend to do that of which I know that the doing will not yield me the least shadow of pleasure—*e.g.*, when the motive is mere sense of duty; and if I feel an aversion from the idea of not doing my duty, that is plainly because my intention is already bent upon the doing of it; and even in cases where intention follows the line of predominant desire, it is itself totally distinct from such desire; it is not a sense of uneasiness, but the determination of the self towards a given project or end.

It seems to us indubitable that it is this consciousness of ourselves as sources of activity which gives us the conception of causal agency,* and that it is only by a sort of quasi-personification that we ascribe such agency to any *thing*. We do not, indeed, consciously personify the thing, but we predicate of it a quality which is exclusively appropriate to a personal being. We do so likewise when we regard it as having individual existence. Existence itself is a term of perfectly general import, signifying merely the being known. When qualified as individual, it constitutes, strictly speaking, self-consciousness. By an act of abstraction, however, we are able to transfer to the object as a thing in itself, while at the same time we regard it as unconscious, qualities, such as separateness, self-identity, and activity, which really belong only to a conscious subject. It is an obvious criticism upon the last few sentences to remark that none but polytheists ever believed in the individuality and causal agency of things in the full concrete signification of individuality and causal agency, and that as anything less than this full signification

* Cf. Dr. Ward, *Philosophy of Theism*, vol. i. pp. 324-5.

tion is a figment of abstraction, the only rational course is to abandon those ideas altogether. We answer that we have never maintained that the idea of the existence of individual things is an *a priori* condition of the objective judgment, but only that the idea of a cause of our sensations is so. That there exists an individual "Ding an sich," corresponding to every group of perceptions of which I am conscious, is, in our opinion, an unwarrantable assumption; but that every such group has a cause seems to us to be involved in affirming of it objective existence, and an impersonal cause we hold to be a contradiction in terms. The grounds which lead us to conclude that the universe is a manifestation of one infinite, eternal and perfect Spirit, belong to metaphysics, and therefore do not fall properly to be considered here. It is more to our present purpose to inquire what guarantee we have of the truth of a proposition of objective fact. Philosophers of the empirical school naturally assume that it is possible to compare such a proposition with the fact which it asserts, and that such comparison is the sufficient and, indeed, sole possible guarantee of its truth.

It is, however, clear that if the analysis of judgment set forth in the foregoing pages is correct, no judgment of objective fact is empirically verifiable. All that upon our theory is empirically verifiable is an expectation of having certain sensations and making certain judgments in succession to certain other sensations experienced and judgments made. Thus the judgment, "the moon exists" is not to be verified by looking at the moon; all that by such means I can obtain being the assurance that my expectation of having a certain specific experience was not delusive. The moon herself I cannot possibly experience; if she exists at all she exists neither for me nor for any other human being: she would equally exist were the whole human race asleep or extinct. It may be said, perhaps, that the existence of the moon is an hypothesis framed in order to account for certain facts of experience, which does account for them, and which, being the only hypothesis which does so, is thereby verified. We answer, the existence of the moon, if it be taken to mean that the moon exists as an individual material entity, is not only not verifiable,

but, to many severely metaphysical thinkers besides Berkeley, has appeared very doubtful; if, on the other hand, it merely imports that there exists a cause of the specific sensations, upon occasion of experiencing or remembering which it is affirmed that the moon exists, then it is clear that it is neither susceptible nor in need of verification. That a cause of my sensations exists is not an hypothesis framed for the purpose of accounting for them, but an assertion that they can be accounted for; in other words it is simply the expression of the *a priori* necessity under which we lie of explaining our experiences to ourselves. Either, then, no judgment transcending experience is true, or the warrant of truth is not empirical verifiability. We can conceive that an empirical philosopher might readily rejoin: We admit, or rather assert, that no proposition transcending experience is true, but only at the most probable; but we affirm that truth consists in the correspondence of judgment with perception. To this we reply that every perception upon analysis will be found to be itself a judgment, a doctrine now accepted, so far as we know, by all psychologists.*

That being so it follows on the empirical theory that truth is the correspondence of such judgments as are not perceptions with such judgments as are, whence again it follows that no perceptive judgment is true, for it cannot logically be said to correspond with itself. In other words, truth consists in the correspondence of a judgment, the content of which is not given in present experience, with another judgment which just because its content is given in present experience is not true. If, however, it be admitted that judgments of present experience are in some cases true, the warrant of truth must be found elsewhere than in correspondence; while if they are not true, the only judgments which are true are so in virtue of their correspondence with judgments which are not true. When, on looking out of the window, I perceive that it is raining, that judgment cannot, on the empirical theory, be known to be true. It is impossible to compare such a judgment with immediate experience, for it is itself that immediate

* See Spencer's *Psychology*, § 314.

experience; equally impossible is it to compare it with any "rain in itself," any occult force which may be supposed to be at work producing the rain. It follows, therefore, that our assurance that it really is raining is grounded upon something else than comparison of our perception with the fact. This argument may at first sight appear to be a mere quibble. It may be said that by truth we mean primarily immediate experience, and secondarily that which corresponds with immediate experience. But if by immediate experience we mean simple sensation, then as no judgment whatever corresponds with that no judgment whatever is true. If, however, we mean by it the first judgments which we make upon occasion of sensation, it is notorious that these are often untrue, and sometimes—*e.g.*, in the case of the earth's movement—can only be corrected by elaborate reasoning. We seem, then, to be warranted in affirming that truth does not consist in immediate experience, or in correspondence with immediate experience, even in cases where such correspondence exists. It is, however, important to observe that the great bulk of the judgments which we make and believe to be true, though purporting to represent immediate experience, cannot be verified by it at all.

Thus, in so far as a judgment expresses a matter of historical fact, whether the fact be or be not one which has come within our own cognisance, it can hardly be argued that it can be verified by immediate experience. Take, by way of example, the simple judgment, "An hour ago I was in another quarter of the town." With what immediate experience can this judgment be compared? I cannot recall the experience of an hour ago, in order to see whether it corresponds with my idea of it. It may perhaps be answered that, when I assert such a judgment to be true, what I really mean is that there exists in my mind an unbroken chain of ideas linking my presence here with my past presence elsewhere, by the help of which I am able to retrace my steps so as ultimately to find myself in the same place in which my memory tells me I was an hour ago. It is clear, however, that a retrogression of this kind does not amount to a verification of memory, because every stage in it implies a memory of that which preceded it,

just as exigent of verification as the particular recollection which it is desired to verify. Thus I am now (*e.g.*) in Holborn, and I remember that half an hour ago I was in Pall Mall East. I cannot verify that recollection by retracing my steps to Pall Mall East, because, when I have done so, I shall have to trust to my memory for the fact that I have ever been away from Pall Mall East. All that I shall have accomplished by retracing my steps will be that I now have another judgment to verify—viz., that half an hour ago I was in Holborn.

Here, however, it may be objected that we certainly do correct our memory by appealing to experience. We may have what seems an accurate recollection of a certain route, but, on attempting to find our way along it, we find that in details it is imperfect or erroneous, and we supplement or rectify it as the case may be. But it is obvious that this is irrelevant, since we can only supplement or rectify in detail that which we already reckon to be true in the main. Assuming the general trustworthiness of memory, we may supplement or correct it in detail; but the judgment that a given event did happen involves that which is not empirically verifiable—viz., the belief that the distinction between past and present is not an illusion.*

Nor can this belief be treated as equivalent to a belief that memory and history correspond with or represent past events. No event exists as past except in or mediately through memory, as in history. The pastness of an event is the judgment that it is not happening but did happen. That I had the toothache yesterday, and that Richard, Earl of Cornwall, was elected King of the Romans at Frankfort on January 14, 1257, are facts which exist only for a conscious subject reflecting on them, which never did exist in any other way—the events of yesterday and of January 14, 1257, having no existence except in the happening—to which, therefore, such reflection can in no sense be said to correspond. This, of course, is not denying the reality of the events of which memory, and mediately through it, history inform us, but

* This point is urged with considerable force by the late Dr. Ward in *Philosophy of Theism*, pp. 3, 4, and again with still greater cogency at pp. 134-146.

only that their pastness is any part of their reality; while they are real they are in present time, when they are in past time they are no longer real. The veracity, then, of memory can be vindicated by no process of empirical verification, nor does memory itself consist in the belief that a given idea represents a past event, but in the unanalysable indefeasible conviction that I have had an experience which I have not now.

Similarly with regard to predictions. An astronomer, *e.g.*, predicts that on a given night of a given month at a certain hour a comet will become visible in a specific quarter of the heavens. The prediction is fulfilled. Shall we say, then, with the children, that it "came true," or shall we not rather say that it was true *ab initio*, and that its truth was exhibited by the result? No one, we suppose, will deny that a prediction, if true at all, is true as soon as it is made; yet at the time when it is made there is no fact of immediate experience corresponding with it, and by the time there is it has ceased to be a prediction. It would seem to follow either that truth does not consist in conformity with immediate experience, or that no prediction is true.

Let us ask, in the next place, in what cases an hypothesis can truly be said to be empirically verifiable. It is laid down with perfect truth by Mill (*Logic*, book iii. cap. xiv. § 4), that an hypothesis is not verified merely by its being shown that it is adequate to account for the facts; that, in order that it may be verified, it must be further proved that no other hypothesis can account for the facts.

"We want," he says, "to be assured that the law we have hypothetically assumed is a true one; and its leading deductively to true results will afford this assurance, provided the case be such that a false law cannot lead to a true result; provided no law, except the very one we have assumed, can lead deductively to the same conclusions which that leads to. And this proviso is often realized."

In other words, the ultimate warrant of the truth of an hypothesis, is our own inability to conceive the possibility of framing any other that will account for the facts. The truth is, that, strictly speaking, but few (and these trivial)

hypotheses are empirically verifiable. An hypothesis does not itself correspond with any observed fact, or it would not be an hypothesis, but a statement of fact; the mere fact that the phenomena which it is designed to explain are deducible from the hypothesis is no verification, for there may be several hypotheses which will equally well explain them, nor is the fulfilment of predictions based upon the hypothesis a verification, so long as it is open to us to conceive that some other hypothesis would supply us with an equally certain basis of prediction. It is only when we are convinced that no other equally simple hypothesis can explain the facts that we can confidently pronounce the hypothesis to be true, and as this conviction rests upon our consciousness of inability to conceive the possibility of framing any other equally simple hypothesis which will account for the facts, it is obvious that the criterion of the truth of an hypothesis is in all cases the inability of the mind to refuse assent to it when understood. This last conclusion Mill, of course, did not accept; but in rejecting it he vainly attempted to purchase consistency at the price of the certainty of scientific doctrine. Thus he says, in effect, that there is only one case in which "verification is proof"—viz., where the hypothesis "relates only to the precise mode" in which a law or cause already known to govern the phenomena in question operates in determining them. "In any other case," he says emphatically, "it is no sufficient evidence of the truth of the hypothesis that we are able to deduce the real phenomena from it." He then proceeds to point out the destructive effects which this canon has upon the hypothesis of a luminiferous ether; but he need not have taken so modern an instance. The Copernican theory was no mere trumpery working out into detail of a law known to exist, but the assumption of a law wholly at variance with that which all the world (except its author) then supposed to govern the phenomena, nor was it, nor is it, capable of empirical verification, it being impossible to observe the motion of the earth round the sun. It happens, however, to account for the facts, and to be the only conceivable hypothesis which, with equal simplicity, will account for them in their totality. Its highest warrant is

that, fully understood, it is impossible to refuse assent to it. But in what sense can any law be said to be known to govern the phenomena? Take any empirical uniformity, such as that the sun always rises in the morning and sets in the evening. It is obvious that this reposes upon the belief in the veracity of memory, which, as we have seen, is absolutely unverifiable; so that even in the cases where, and where only, according to Mill, verification is proof, it only is so in virtue of a belief which is unverifiable.

To sum up, then, we have seen (1) that no judgment of objective fact, whether relating to the present, to the past, or to the future, is empirically verifiable; and (2) that the *warrant* of the truth of an hypothesis is not its accounting for the facts, but its affording the simplest conceivable explanation of them. It follows, then, that the only warrant which we possess of the truth of any proposition of objective fact not itself self-evident, is its deducibility from, or the incompatibility of its negation with, some proposition which is self-evident. Certain affirmative synthetic propositions there are to which, so soon as understood, it is impossible for us to refuse assent; these we term self-evident, and the only possible method of verifying an hypothesis is either positively to deduce it from some self-evident proposition or propositions, or negatively to deduce from its negation the negation of some self-evident proposition.

We do not (be it observed) maintain that whatever is to us incredible, or inconceivable, is necessarily untrue,* a doctrine which, if generally accepted, would certainly retard, if not arrest, the progress of scientific inquiry; nor even that a proposition of which the negation is incredible, is necessarily true, but only that an affirmative synthetic proposition (by which, as we have explained, we mean a proposition affirmative not merely in form but in substance) to which we are unable to refuse assent, is necessarily true. Thus, that Lactantius in the fourth century, A.D., could not credit the existence of the Antipodes, was, as the event proved, no argument against the existence of the Antipodes, but that, if the theory of

* Cf. Dr. Ward, *Philosophy of Theism*, vol. i., pp. 16, 17, and p. 129.

gravitation accepted in his day was true, objects could not adhere to the under side of the earth, is a proposition affirmative in substance though not in form to which it was and is impossible to refuse assent, and that proposition is true. Inability to assent to a given proposition may arise from ignorance or weakness of intellect; inability, not merely to dissent from an affirmative synthetic proposition, but to refrain from assenting to it, is, in our judgment, a conclusive and, in fact, the only conclusive test of its truth. On the other hand, no proposition can be pronounced necessarily false unless it can be shown to contradict some proposition to which it is impossible to refuse assent.*

We conceive that there is but one way in which this theory is refutable; that, however, is a very simple one—viz., the production of a single indubitable instance of an affirmative synthetic proposition, which having once on purely speculative grounds commanded an assent which it was then impossible to withhold, has since come to be regarded as dubitable. Of affirmative synthetic propositions, which having been declared false, because incredible, have come to be accepted, and indeed ranked amongst those of which the negation is incredible, instances can be produced in some quantity, but as we do not maintain that the to us incredible is necessarily untrue, the consideration of them is irrelevant. It may, however, perhaps be suggested that before the establishment of the Copernican theory, it must have been impossible for many minds to withhold assent from the proposition that the sun moved. We are not aware that there is any evidence that this was the case, and we think it must always have been clear to the most ordinary

* In virtue of this limitation our doctrine differs materially from that advanced by Mr. Spencer in the chapter on the "Universal Postulate" already referred to. Maintaining simply that the ultimate test of the truth of a proposition is the inconceivability of its negative, he exposed himself to a powerful attack from Mill, who was able to press him hard with the notorious fact that many *negative* propositions, of which the negative has seemed inconceivable to past generations, have since been proved false. In this controversy Lewes intervened with a resuscitation of the old paradox of Antisthenes (of which, by the way, he takes no notice in his chapter on that philosopher) that only identical propositions are true, a doctrine the monstrous character of which was apparently concealed from his mind by his confounding identical with equational propositions.—*History of Philosophy*, i., lxiii.—vii.

apprehension that the appearance of the sun's motion might at least conceivably be produced by the motion of the earth, while it is a well-known matter of history that the Congregation of the Index, who in 1616 pronounced the Copernican theory contrary to the Christian faith, nevertheless placed on record an explicit admission of its tenability as a mere matter of speculation, an admission on the strength of which Galileo continued to propagate it for some sixteen years before he was finally silenced, nor did the Congregation then declare the doctrine speculatively incredible, but only heretical.

Again it may be urged that, whereas it seemed indubitable to Newton and other thinkers, that a medium was a necessary condition of the operation of gravitative force, the same has now become at least doubtful to not a few minds. The truth, however, seems to be that so far as any change has taken place, it has merely been, as Mr. Spencer observes, in the way of abandoning the attempt to conceive the manner in which gravitation comes about. A certain class of thinkers have come to regard gravitative force as what Comte in his sublime ignorance would have termed a metaphysical abstraction—*i.e.*, as strictly on a par with the occult virtues of which the Schoolmen discoursed, while those who, like Mr. Spencer, still believe, or fancy that they believe, in force as an impersonal agency, do not, as Mr. Spencer for himself avows, find themselves able to conceive it as operating otherwise than through a material medium.*

Finally, the crude realism of those who attempted to "vanquish Berkeley with a grin" may be adduced as an instance of a doctrine which, having seemed indubitably certain, has come to be doubted. In fact, however, there is no evidence that crude realism ever was indubitable to any one whose attention was really drawn to the question, while that there is a cause of our sensations is, and, we venture to affirm, always will be, indubitable. The belief in the materiality of the universe was confounded with the belief in its existence. The former belief has with many thinkers passed away; the latter has remained stable.

* *Principles of Psychology*, § 428.

Than these three revolutions in human opinion none more complete can be adduced, and they were confidently relied on by Mill in the controversy with Mr. Spencer, to which we have already referred, as instances of the renunciation of beliefs of which the negation formerly seemed incredible, which, as we have seen, they certainly are not; that he was unable to support his case by any more plausible arguments is attributable to no lack of ingenuity in the advocate, but to its inherent weakness. Doubtless truth itself consists in conformity with reality, but the reality to which it conforms is in no case empirically cognisable by us, so that inability to withhold assent is the sole warrant of truth which we possess. To make a complete list of such affirmative synthetic judgments as being fundamental to science, mathematical, physical and psychological, ethics, æsthetics, and religion, command so soon as understood an indefeasible assent, seems to us the first duty of the philosopher, a duty which, owing to the prevalence on the one hand of empirical and sceptical schools of thought, and on the other of an uncritical intuitivism, has hitherto remained unperformed in this country, though perhaps we are even now entering upon an era of speculative reconstruction.

It should go hard if the subtle and penetrative yet profoundly spiritual English mind, its whole energies once thoroughly put forth, do not succeed in vindicating on grounds of reason the highest aspirations of mankind. Meanwhile, however, we must sorrowfully take home to ourselves the grave censure which Dante heard from the lips of Beatrice in Paradise:—

“Voi non andate giù per un sentiero
Filosofando; tanto vi trasporta
L'amor dell'apparenza e il suo pensiero.”

(*Parad.* xxix. 85-7.)

The foregoing article was already in type when our attention was drawn to an able little treatise by Mr. St. George Mivart, entitled *Nature and Thought*,* in which a theory of certitude coincident in the main with our own is developed in the shape of a dialogue between two friends, one fresh from Hume, the

* Burns & Oates. Second Edition. 1885.

other a student of physical science. Occasionally the coincidence is almost verbal—*e.g.* between our doctrine of the unverifiability of memory as stated on p. 300, and the following remarks of Mr. St. George Mivart's physicist :—"As to experience vouching for the veracity of the faculty of memory, how can you have experience if you do not already trust that faculty? Particular acts of memory may of course be confirmed by experience if the faculty of memory be already confided in. But you must trust your memory in every such instance. How can you know you ever had an experience except by trusting your present memory? You would repose confidence in your present act of memory because in past instances its truth has been experimentally confirmed, and you know that it has been so confirmed by trusting your present memory. Evidently, if we cannot trust our present memory all past history is for us a dream, and the whole body of physical science is nothing better" (pp. 32-3). So also his criticism of Mr. Spencer—viz., that in his theory of the test of truth "he fails to distinguish between two kinds of inconceivable propositions—viz. (1) those which cannot be conceived owing to mere negative impotence and defect; and (2) those which cannot be conceived because they contradict what we positively and actively see to be certainly true" (p. 45), is substantially identical with that which we make on p. 304. It is matter of lively gratification to us that we are able to agree so far on this fundamental question with thinkers so eminent in science and metaphysics, and alas! so widely separated from us on other points, as Mr. St. George Mivart and the late Dr. Ward.

ART. VI.—MARK PATTISON.

Memoirs. By MARK PATTISON, late Rector of Lincoln College, Oxford. London: Macmillan & Co. 1885.

DEAN STANLEY once observed to Mark Pattison, "How different the fortunes of the Church of England might have been if Newman had been able to read German." Little

doubt of the justice of this saying is left in the minds of those who have studied the remarkable literature of the Tractarian Movement. Newman's *Apologia*, while it vindicated his sincerity, revealed the singular superstition and weakness of that powerful dialectician, whose penetrating and persuasive sermons and whose personal influence made him the real head of the Oxford Movement in its earlier stages. "Newman," Mark Pattison says, "assumed and adorned the narrow basis on which Laud had stood two hundred years before. All the grand development of human reason, from Aristotle down to Hegel, was a sealed book to him."

Several recent publications have contributed largely to a just estimate of that perplexed time. Thomas and James Mozley have both rendered conspicuous service in this respect, but no volume of greater interest has appeared than the *Memoirs of Mark Pattison*. The enormous effect of the great upheaval of religious thought in the young Oxford of their time is illustrated by many painful examples. Both the Mozleys came under the spell of Newman; both escaped, Thomas not without weakening and loss; Mr. J. A. Froude, who had been set to work by Newman on the most incredible of all the lives of the saints, found his way into the ranks of the pronounced sceptics. Mark Pattison, who had been one of the most zealous Puseyites, came to be regarded almost as an atheist in his last days. Each of these lives forms a painful illustration of the mischievous results of the Oxford Movement. Even James Mozley was fettered in every movement by the prejudices imbibed in this narrow school. The writer of these *Memoirs* claims attention for them as a mental history. He lived a quiet life as a student, a tutor, a lover of nature, a literary man. "All my energy," he writes, "was directed upon one end—to improve myself, to form my own mind, to sound things thoroughly, to free myself from the bondage of unreason, and the traditional prejudices which, when I began first to think, constituted the whole of my intellectual fabric. I have nothing beyond trivial personalities to tell in the way of incident. If there is anything of interest in my story, it is as a story of mental development." In that light the book possesses great interest. It is impos-

sible, however, to read it through without being led to suspect that it was written quite as much to enable the author to tell the history of his own wrongs, to expose the college intrigues from which he suffered, and to pour forth the hoarded bitterness of his own heart, as for any other reason. Here are personalities of the fiercest temper written by the dying autobiographer. And it was with these distinctly in mind that he strictly forbade the editor to omit or soften any word of censure, however severe. The book will certainly not tend to raise our estimate either of Oxford during Mark Pattison's fifty years of residence, or of the writer.

Mark Pattison went to Oxford in 1832, and never left it. His volume, therefore, is a monograph on Oxford life during the most memorable half-century of its history, the time of the Tractarian Movement and of University Reform. These Memoirs only give some brief glimpses of the writer's life before he went to Oxford, at the age of nineteen. His father, who held the living of Hauxwell, in Yorkshire, had been a commoner of Balliol New College. Nothing in his early life had taken such a hold of his memory and imagination as his three years at Oxford. There was never any question as to his son's future. He was to go to Oxford and become a Fellow of a College. From the time he was twelve, an Oriel Fellowship was held up as the height to which he must strive to attain. It is no wonder that a boy brought up under such influences set his whole soul on a successful university career. Oxford life lost nothing of its charm in the hands of his father. The elder Pattison had the "habit of embroidering and glorifying," which his best known daughter, the famous Sister Dora, inherited from him. Of her, these Memoirs say with unnecessary frankness, that "She spent a faculty of invention, which would have placed her in the first rank as a novelist, in embellishing the everyday occurrences of her own life. A very faint reflection of Dorothy's powers of self-glorification is preserved in Miss Lonsdale's romance, *Sister Dora*."

The year 1830 was a memorable one for the country boy. He went up to London with his father and mother in an old open barouche of their own. That visit to the South led to

important results. Being within seven hours of Oxford, it seemed a happy opportunity to inquire about a college. We have a charming picture of the two enthusiasts visiting those academic scenes.

"It was May, and Oxford, not then over-built and slummy, looked—as Oxford can look still in May—charming. I was intoxicated with delight, and my father was as pleased as a child. His constant recurrence to his reminiscences of the place had so rivetted it in my mind that I had, by aid of an old guide-book I found at Hauxwell, mastered the topography by anticipation, and was proud, as we walked along the streets, to show that I knew where to find the colleges."

The father took his son on the water—his own favourite amusement when he had been at college—where he enjoyed paying the overcharge made by the boatman and listening to the dialect which he had not heard for five-and-twenty years.

Next morning the all-engrossing question was before them. At what college should the boy's name be entered? In those days the tuition at Oriel and Balliol stood higher than in any of the other colleges. Lord Conyers Osborne, the second son of the Duke of Leeds, was then in residence at Christ Church with his private tutor. Mr. Pattison was chaplain to the Duke, and stood high in his confidence. He therefore called on the tutor to ask his advice. Lord Conyers told Mark that the undergraduates called Oriel and Balliol the two prison-houses. But the young aspirant for honours was eager to enter one of the colleges where he might best receive the training which would qualify him for the coveted prize—a Fellowship of Oriel. After anxious consultation it was decided that his name should be entered at Oriel. Newman, Robert Wilberforce, and R. H. Froude were then its tutors. All were young; Newman, the eldest, was only thirty. But the choice was not made because of the tutors, who were then comparatively unknown men. Oriel combined the attractions of intelligence and gentle blood, and this combination proved an irresistible attraction to the country clergyman who wanted his son to have a thorough education, and who at that time read *Debrett's Peerage* almost more than the Bible.

To get into a popular college, where candidates were often kept waiting for years, was, however, no small difficulty. Mark

was now seventeen. Dr. Hawkins, the Provost, told them that he was full up to October, 1832, but would give the offer of any chance vacancy.

They returned to Hauxwell at the end of May. During the months that followed, Mark Pattison first acquired that love of Nature, and especially of fishing, which proved such a valuable distraction to him when his disappointments at Oxford broke down his health and spirits. For the first time he was allowed a gun, and joined the farmers in rook-shooting. Then there were long days of trout-fishing, during which all the mysteries of the art were laid bare to him. He began to feel a passion for natural history. Gilbert White's *Natural History of Selborne* he read over and over, till he knew it by heart. His father regarded these tastes with little favour, because he thought them likely to usurp the place of Herodotus and Thucydides. He bowed, however, before the name of Gilbert White, when he found that he had been a "Fellow of Oriel," although he could not himself get through ten pages of White's fascinating book.

Such was the life at Hauxwell, where both father and son eagerly awaited the news of a vacancy at Oriel. They were beginning to feel that much longer delay would be serious, when a letter arrived from the Provost, summoning Mark to Oxford to matriculate. "All was joy and astonishment and perturbation." The letter only arrived on the Saturday night, and it asked the young student to present himself on Monday. That was of course impossible. Oxford was a three days' journey from Hauxwell. The father and son were off early on Monday, and reached the University on Wednesday morning. On Saturday evening they were home again. The young commoner of Oxford had matriculated successfully; his college life was to begin a month later.

On Thursday evening, May 4, the Birmingham coach set young Pattison down at the Angel in the Oxford High Street, wearing an old brown great coat of his father's, which had been reduced to the proper size by a country tailor. There was plenty of sterling stuff in the new-comer, but the seclusion of his country life told very unfavourably when he was first thrown into Oxford society. He hoped to find congenial

friends at the University who would elevate and help him, but his early experience was unfortunate. "If I was lazy, selfish, greedy, and rapacious, these youths were so to a degree which disgusted me."

His character suffered by attempts to adopt the fashions of his companions. He bowed to their opinions even where this meant the surrender of his own convictions. Hence sprang a nervous self-consciousness which made him exceedingly awkward and uncomfortable in society. When he first met the Provost in the street he was seized with such a tremor that in thinking how he should perform the ceremony of "capping" he omitted it altogether, and passed in blank confusion. Dr. Hawkins knew him, and smiled good-naturedly, but the poor novice tortured himself with conjectures as to whether the smile meant contempt or compassion. A few days afterwards he met Dr. and Mrs. Hawkins in the back lane. The Provost advanced, holding out his ungloved hand with a friendly greeting. "Good morning, Mr. Pattison." Mark managed to make a proper salute, but took no notice of the outstretched hand. He heard the Don's grunt of dissatisfaction as he rushed past, but it was too late to repair the blunder. A little more care in his home training might have saved him many a trying hour. His own experience made him "wondrous kind" when he came to deal with freshmen in after years. No *gaucherie* surprised or alienated him; he could not forget his own early undergraduate days.

If the young commoner produced an unfortunate impression by his boorishness, he was still more unhappy in the preparation for honours. He had covered an amount of ground in his classical reading, which was wonderful for a boy of eighteen. None of the niceties of scholarship had, however, been pointed out to him. His father held the crib (without which he was lost) whilst Mark translated his classical author with the help of *Scapula's Lexicon*. He had thus gained a large vocabulary with considerable facility in translation, and he had also been practised a good deal in turning an English version of Cicero back into Latin. In all exact scholarship, however, he was quite at sea.

With his powers, his ambition, and his industry, all might have been set right. But Oriel provided no efficient tuition. The freshman went to Denison's lecture on the *Alcestis* with no small hope and fear. His fears were soon set at rest. It was a large class. One or two members got well through their translation, but, to Mark's amazement, most of them stumbled over the easiest lines. A question as to the metre went the round, till Pattison answered, "Anapæstic dimeter." No one else seemed to have read Monk's Latin note in the edition of the play they used. Denison looked on the new comer with a kind of amazed incredulity. His fears were over, his hopes were soon at an end. During the whole term, the tutor, a man of no small reputation as a scholar, gave no explanation or aid, save what might be found in Monk's notes.

In less than a week, the student was entirely disillusioned as to what could be learnt in an Oxford lecture-room. Denison knew his plays, and could say a clever thing, but W. J. Copleston, he says, could teach nothing and was the butt of the college. Oriel was losing its *prestige* in the University. Edward Copleston, the uncle of this tutor, had been made Bishop of Llandaff in 1827, when Hawkins succeeded him as Provost of Oriel. In him the college lost a man of literary reputation and of assured ascendancy in the University. Another change was disastrous. Newman had wished to push his views of the pastoral relation of a tutor to his pupils to a length that would have turned the college into a mere priestly seminary. Hawkins had refused to yield. The arrangement would have robbed him of all control of the tuition, and to that he would not submit. The result was that the three popular tutors—Newman, R. H. Froude, and R. Wilberforce, who bestowed as much time and trouble on their pupils as if they had been private tutors—were deposed, and the men whom Pattison describes stepped into their place.

Despite these disadvantages, the young undergraduate read carefully, but in a way to improve his general scholarship rather than to fit himself for the examination on which his hopes of a Fellowship hung. His vacations were spent in a way calculated to improve his health and quicken his sympathy with Nature, but his reading was diffuse rather than close and

accurate. At last, when examination time was near, he went to a "coach." His choice was unfortunate. C. P. Eden was a man of ability and high reputation, but he wished entirely to reconstruct Pattison's education, and held long arguments with him on any theological or philosophical problem. All this was serious waste of time when the examination was so near. The young student had fallen into a dawdling habit of work. He refused to take anything on trust, thought out every point for himself, and thus consumed an alarming amount of time. Hyman, the scholarship coach, to whom he afterwards went, read Aristophanes with him, corrected his Latin prose and verse, and, above all, inspired him with an interest in the generation of scholars from Bentley to Porson, which he never afterwards lost.

The want of adaptation and forethought with which Mark Pattison prepared for the schools is shown in every step he took. A cheap manual of divinity would have furnished all the information he needed as to the contents of the Old Testament, but he spent an hour every day in reading the prophets with the notes in Mant's Bible. Instead of working vigorously and consecutively at Aristotle, he consumed his time over passages which he tried to reconcile with the Scotch philosophy. His time slipped on so fast that he was at last compelled to throw overboard the *Rhetoric*, which the Examiners of that day knew best, and on which most stress was laid. He needed to know something of Niebuhr's views, and set out to learn them, not in an epitome, but in Thirlwall's two volumes of translations. A fortnight before the examination, he was seized with a panic, and rushed to Wall, the famous coach. Wall told him his own time was full, and that any attempt to cram now was waste of money. When Mark persisted he agreed to give him twelve doses of preparation. After looking at his answers to some questions he said, "Yours is simply a case of neglect; had you come to me six months ago you might have made your first certain; could you not put off to November?" He might have done this, but he had already put off his examination, and had received a letter from his father which seemed to impute it to him as a serious fault that he had not taken his degree at the earliest possible time. The result was that he went into

the schools, and came out in the second class. The strain upon him had told so seriously that on the logic day his head refused to work, and he sent in an almost blank paper so that he was thankful that the result was not more serious.

Mark Pattison took his B.A. in 1836; on the 8th of November, 1839, he was elected Fellow of Lincoln with which college his whole after-life is bound up. We may pass over the struggle to secure a Fellowship during the three years' interval. These years are more important as the time when the Tractarian Movement took entire possession of his mind. Up to April, 1838, he says that the only sentiment Newman could have entertained towards himself was one of antipathy. Pattison had ostentatiously taken the side of Hampden in the matter of the Regius Professorship, and once, when invited to one of Newman's common-room evenings, he had offered a flippant remark on some point of philosophy which brought upon him one of Newman's "ponderous and icy 'very likelies'; after which you were expected to sit down in a corner, and think over amending your conduct." But when Pattison stood unsuccessfully for an Oriel Fellowship in April, 1838, he was surprised to receive a message from Newman that there were some who thought he had done the best. Pattison had fallen under the influence of Coleridge, had studied Schlegel, and fallen away from his adhesion to the Baconian principles. The philosophical power in his papers had evidently impressed Newman.

Before the end of 1838, Pattison, disappointed in his hope of a Fellowship, and turning his attention to the Church, was glad to close with an offer made by Newman. This was to become an inmate of a house in St. Aldate's, which Pusey had taken for young B.A.'s whom he wished to employ on his *Library of the Fathers* and other literary work. Here James Mozley resided for a considerable time. A small sum per week was paid by each inmate for the frugal diet. Whilst he lived here Pattison established for himself quite a Bodleian reputation for his skill in finding his way among the Fathers. He prepared a translation of Aquinas' *Catena Aurea on St. Matthew*, which Newman wished to publish, and verified every citation from the Fathers. This took up

nearly the whole of 1839, but it made him familiar with the entire range of patristic bibliography. Aquinas only gives the name of the Father he quotes, with at most the title of the particular work, but never chapter and verse. Pattison, with characteristic thoroughness, spent days over his verification, and would not be beaten. In October, 1839, discontented with one or two of the inmates of the home, he left, and took a private lodging. Here, on November 4, James Mozley and Ashworth of Brasenose, came running to tell him that a Yorkshire Fellowship at Lincoln was vacant, for which names must be sent in that very day. He stood, and was elected. No moment in all his life, he says, was ever so sweet as the morning when the Rector's servant came in to announce his election, and to claim his five shillings for doing so.

The new Fellow became a declared Puseyite, then an ultra-Puseyite. He delivered himself up entirely to his party. His love of study, however, did not fail. He wrote two *Lives of the Saints* in Newman's series, upon which he says he spent an amount of research, of which no English historian at that time had set the example. He also wrote an article on "The Earliest English Poetry" in the *British Critic*. In 1843, he was offered a tutorship in his college. At first his classics were rusty, but he gradually became an efficient teacher. He was saved from following Newman when he went over, in 1845, to Rome by this timely opening wide of the gates of work. How far he had gone, the interesting extracts from a diary kept during a fortnight spent with Newman in his Littlemore retreat will show all readers of these Memoirs. When Newman went over, Pattison had no inclination to follow him. In 1847, he reached what he calls the zero of his moral and physical depression, partly from injudicious fasting, partly from moral causes. Then he might have been led to take that step. "The converts," he says, "never left you any peace; they were always at you, like Christian's conscience in the *Pilgrim's Progress*, urging you to flee from the wrath to come." Happily he escaped. Many circumstances contributed to break the spell. He paid a visit to Paris, where he found in Catholic circles a spirit

of credulity so vulgar that it could not have existed had it ever been brought into the light of day.

In 1848, he was nominated one of the Classical Examiners. The friend who ventured to do him this service took a bold step in putting forward a man who was known as a violent Puseyite, and who had only taken a second class. Pattison went to his work in the schools with no small trepidation. His colleagues were all "first-class" men. But he soon found that he could hold his own ground, and the handsome report which his fellow-examiners gave of his work silenced all adverse criticism. His ambition was now fairly roused. He took to riding (which contributed greatly to restore his physical strength), and threw himself into his studies with fresh courage and purpose. When the spirit of University Reform spread through Oxford in 1850, Lincoln felt its influence almost more than any other college. The old Rector left the management almost entirely to Pattison, who was Senior Tutor. He was, in fact, much more absolute than when he himself became Rector. His hands were full. In one term he had four successive hours' lecturing every day. Then he addressed the students, and tried to inspire them with a taste for poetry and literature. In addition to all tutorial work, the burden of administration of college business rested almost entirely on his shoulders. He had developed a magnetic influence before which all bowed, and had become the acknowledged and honoured leader of his college.

In October, 1851, Radford, the Rector of Lincoln, died. The three junior Fellows desired to have Pattison as their head, and another Fellow (J. L. R. Kettle) promised his support. Five out of nine votes were thus pledged, and Pattison's election seemed sure. But the cup was dashed from his lips. Kettle turned traitor through the plotting of a former Fellow, whom Pattison, by his want of tact and self-restraint, had turned into a deadly enemy. The plot was only known the night before the election. The disappointed party were just able to save the college from having a strong Conservative and anti-reformer placed at their head, and managed to secure the return of Thompson, another candidate. We have no time to dwell on the disgraceful cabals which

marked this painful election, but it changed the whole current of Mark Pattison's life. Bitter though the trial was, it cannot altogether be regretted by those who remember the services which he was able to render to English literature in his altered circumstances.

Pattison's mental forces were for a time paralyzed by this blow. Everything for which he had laboured seemed snatched from him. He lost all interest in the tutorial labours which had been his delight. The new Rector was so unfriendly, that he gave up his post and turned his attention to private tuition. His fishing excursions to the North of England and Scotland did more than anything else to restore his shattered nerves. For weeks he wandered in quiet country places with no companion but his rod. Then there were long rambles in the quietest nooks of Germany. Gradually his strength and courage returned. He took great interest in the question of the history and organization of universities. His study of the philosophical causes which led to the sudden rise and extinction of "Deism in the Eighteenth Century," which was published in *Essays and Reviews*, represents nearly two years' labour. His article on Casaubon in the *Quarterly* was the beginning of those exhaustive studies which are represented by his masterly Life of the great French Protestant scholar who spent his last days at the Court of James I. Pattison passed from Casaubon to his friend and contemporary, J. J. Scaliger, whom the Jesuits had set themselves to defame with all their arts. In order to destroy the reputation of the Protestant scholar, they had elaborately prepared a double or harlequin Scaliger, who was to obscure the true man. For thirty years Pattison gathered together the material for his vindication. He returned from the Tyrol in the autumn of 1883 intending to give the next twelve months to complete the Life of which many portions were already written out in their final form. That task was never finished. He was struck down by the illness from which he never recovered. We trust that some competent hand may yet be found to complete and give to the world that Life of Scaliger.

Mark Pattison's last twenty-three years were spent as Head

of his old college. His academic leisure and ample income set him free to pursue his literary work with increased devotion. His love of study never failed. But the most interesting part of the Memoirs is his description of the way that his home Puritanism expanded into the grander idea of the Catholic Church, which in its turn gave way "to that highest development when all religions appear in their historical light, as efforts of the human spirit to come to an understanding with that Unseen Power whose pressure it feels, but whose motives are a riddle."

Mark Pattison was looked upon as a sceptic if not an atheist at Oxford. He says, in reference to his own life history, "By whatever name you call it, the unconscious is found controlling each man's destiny without, or in defiance of, his will." This is perilously akin to Agnosticism, but we cannot find anything in the Memoirs to confute our cherished persuasion that the man who wrote the *Life of Isaac Casaubon* kept at least his faith in God though not only did his narrow Anglicanism fall from him as his mental horizon steadily grew, but, as Mr. Tollemache's *Recollections*, which come to our hand as we are closing this article, allow us no longer to doubt, he became so predominantly a "humanitarian," and so merely a rationalist, as to have lost all dogmatic or strictly Christian faith. He has said that Casaubon "moved, thought, and felt, as in the presence of God. His family and friends lay near to his heart, but nearer than all is God." These are hardly the words of one who had quite lost touch of spiritual convictions or of personal faith. The book, however, is a melancholy record, especially when regarded as written by a man who knew himself to be measurably near the end of his earthly course. There is little either of "sweetness" or of "light" among its critical austerities, and if of "charity" there is little, if anything, to be found, of "faith" and "hope" there is, if possible, still less. His cankered rationalism had blighted his whole soul and life.

ART. VII.—IMPERIAL FEDERATION.

1. *History of Federal Government.* By E. A. FREEMAN, M.A. London. 1863.
2. *Imperial Federation of Great Britain and her Colonies.* By F. YOUNG. London. 1876.
3. *The Expansion of England.* By J. R. SEELEY, M.A. London. 1883.
4. *The Defence of Great and Greater Britain.* By CAPT. J. C. R. COLOMB, F.S.S., F.R.G.S. London. 1880.
5. *The Political Organization of the Empire.* By F. P. LABILLIERE. London. 1881.
6. *Imperial Federation.* By the MARQUIS OF LORNE. Imperial Parliament Series. London. 1885.
7. *Statistical Abstract of Colonial and other Possessions of the United Kingdom.* London. 1884.
8. *Imperial Federation League : Report of Conference.* London. 1884.

E Federation League may possibly be prudent in not committing itself to any definite scheme of federation; but even prudence has its disadvantages. The aim of the League, for the present, at least, is simply to foster the feeling, already widely spread, in favour of a permanent union between the various self-governing colonies and the United Kingdom. But it seems to us that this end cannot be reached unless some clear and well-defined and practicable scheme or schemes are placed before the public for consideration; and, with this conviction, we invite the attention of our readers to a plan, suggested for the first time, so far as we are aware, in the pages of this REVIEW.

Two-and-thirty years ago, at the close of an historical and descriptive sketch of our Australian possessions, the writer of the article,* after expressing the opinion that it would be "next to treason against the human family to contemplate

* LONDON QUARTERLY REVIEW, vol. i. No. 2, Dec. 1853.—After so long a time, it need be no secret that the article referred to was from the gifted pen of the Rev. Wm. Arthur.

the disruption of the only existing Empire where every person, every conscience, every organ of opinion, and every industry is free; . . . and the only power which is pouring in upon Asia the blessings of European inventions and of Christian light," adds:—

"But the idea that this empire can permanently be conserved by merely giving Constitutions to our colonies is not to be entertained. That is right in itself, and immensely valuable in its time and for its stage; but its time will expire, its stage be run out, and, unless further-seeing provisions are made, the glorious spectacle of the British Empire will dissolve, and England be left alone—a kingdom with, perhaps, a few dependencies."

And then, with what looks like one of the intuitions of genius, the writer makes the following suggestion:—

"Let us at once recognize the fact that, by growth and accessions, we are an Empire, comprising many States. Let us lay down the *organic laws* of this Empire, which no Legislature, either of the parent State, or of any other, may infringe; let us add to our legislative chambers an Imperial Senate, without the concurrence of which no measures affecting *imperial* questions can pass; let each existing colony, on reaching a certain point of population or revenue, be eligible to become, on its own application, a State, and a member of the Imperial Federation, bound by the organic laws, and sending to the Imperial Senate its representatives in such proportions as shall be fixed; let it, on all provincial or internal questions . . . be entirely free, bound, in fact, only by the organic laws, and, in imperial questions, subject to the Imperial Legislature."

Since these words were written, three great groups of colonies—the Canadian, the Australasian, the South African—have received Constitutions formed on the British model, and have become practically independent States—independent of each other, and bound to the mother-country only by the slenderest governmental ties. Each of these colonies is virtually a self-governing State. But whilst exercising almost absolute control over all their local or internal affairs, their external relations are entirely determined and regulated by the parent State. In their relations one with another, and with other powers, they have no voice whatever, nor have they any part in shaping or controlling the foreign affairs of the Empire as a whole, even when those affairs affect their interests most

directly and most vitally. At any moment any one of them may be plunged into all the horrors of war, for example. Their ports may be bombarded, their cities sacked, their exchequer exhausted, their homes made desolate, through no fault of their own, through no action of their own, but simply and solely because they are the loyal subjects of our Queen, and because they happen to be the most vulnerable part of her dominions. And all the while these colonists are debarred from exercising any direct influence over the policy which has led to such results. The humblest voter in the United Kingdom can bring his voice to bear upon the action of the Imperial Government; but these millions of our fellow-subjects must perforce be dumb. The fullest freedom is accorded them, and justly so, to regulate their home affairs, but in respect to all external and imperial matters they are still bound hand and foot. And this is neither wise nor just.

On the other hand, all Imperial burdens are borne by the English taxpayer; and this, of course, is felt to be unfair.

It will thus be seen that the present relations between the mother-country and the colonies are full of anomalies, and it will be evident, we think, that such relations cannot last. As now constituted, the British Empire is in a state of potential dissolution. The chief link which binds its various parts together is the sentiment of patriotism that is common to Englishmen. But it is acknowledged on all hands, that this link, strong as it is, is not strong enough permanently to hold the Empire together; and the alternative is presenting itself to thoughtful and far-seeing minds more clearly every day of *organic union*, with its sure accompaniment of ordered freedom, progress, peace; or, what every patriotic pen almost refuses point blank to write down—*disintegration*, weakness, strife, the eventual domination in the world of other peoples with less lofty aspirations, purposes, and powers.

For we must remember that our colonies are rising rapidly into populous and wealthy States. Already, there are more Englishmen abroad than there were within these shores a century ago; and these ten millions of colonists will multiply into a hundred millions before another century has rolled away. In a very few years, the seven Australian colonies

will be a powerful dominion of 5,000,000 people, with territories three times the extent of Europe west of the Vistula, and capable of holding and maintaining the whole Teutonic race, with a revenue at least of five-and-thirty million pounds, and with the power of training a permanent militia of 150,000 men, by drilling only those between 19 and 22. The resources and the prospects of Canada are equally large and equally brilliant. State their probabilities of progress as extravagantly as we will, "the exaggeration ends while the dispute continues," as was said by Burke of the growth of the colonies which even his genius and eloquence could not preserve to us in face of the almost incredible stupidity and lack of foresight of the rulers of his day.

Is it probable, then, that such mighty States, possessing the power at any time to break the tie which binds them to one another and to us, will consent to remain in union on any but the most equitable terms? It is not probable. It is not possible. Their separation is inevitable, unless some means can be devised to prevent it. And such means can be devised, must be devised: the prospect of such a separation would be appalling: the bare idea of it is intolerable.

Happily, there is no desire at present for anything of the sort. The feeling is all in favour now of closer union in some form. In all the colonies, the sentiment of loyalty and brotherhood is deep and strong, and recently the world has witnessed such an outburst of patriotism, of generous and enthusiastic devotion to the British Crown, as it is not likely to forget. Sydney at Suakim, and Ottawa upon the Nile, were spectacles to make the hearts of Englishmen throughout the world beat high with hope, and fill their enemies with wonder and concern. Nor can Canada and New South Wales monopolize the glory of these patriotic acts. From every colony of any consequence came offers of assistance, which lost none of their significance and splendour by the fact that, at the time, they were not needed. And, at home, we note an answering and a growing pride in those who are so bravely and so splendidly building up the fabric of British law and liberty in the ends of the earth.

Ten years ago we used to hear more talk of separation in a day than we now hear in a year. In July last, we took up paper after paper containing leading articles on the Conference of the Federation League, expecting to find the usual "empty talk," in some of them at least,—

"Of old achievements and despair of new ;"

but quite a chorus of approval rose from the whole British press. As in the colonies, so in England, then, the people are alive to the fact that they are still one people, bound by duty, qualified by strength, impelled by high philanthropy to play no secondary part in the unfolding drama of the world's enlarging life.

"We feel that we are greater than we know."

There is a general, if not a universal desire and determination to remain united, if that be possible ; and the only thing we have now to consider is how we can best consolidate and organize that union.

By some form of federation, says the League ; and so say we. The basal resolution of the Conference referred to—a conference composed of men of light and leading in both the great political parties at home, and in all the principal colonies—was to the effect that, in order to secure the permanent unity of the Empire, "some form of federation is essential ;" and, in this opinion, we cordially concur. But the colonial Council for consultation and advice which some of the leading members of the League are advocating* is not federation in any sense. Neither Mr. Forster nor Mr. Gorst, however, would contend that this could possibly be more than a temporary arrangement. What Mr. Forster means by "imperfect, incomplete, one-sided federation" we cannot understand. "One-sided federation" is a misnomer: there is no such thing. As Mr. Freeman, in criticizing Mr. Forster's phrases, says: "The adjectives destroy the substantive ; they show that the relation spoken of is not a federal relation at all. All the elements

* See especially Mr. Forster's article in the *Nineteenth Century* for February, 1885, and the powerful paper read by Mr. Gorst before the Society of Arts on the 28th of April last.

of a federation are wanting. There is no voluntary union of independent States, keeping some powers to themselves and granting other powers to a central authority of their own creation." *

Mr. Freeman is rather too hard, though, on the title of our paper when in the same article he brings his learned Gatling-gun to bear upon it, and literally riddles it from end to end. He shows conclusively enough that, technically speaking, the phrase "Imperial Federation" is a contradiction in terms; that what is imperial cannot be federal, and that what is federal cannot be imperial; and he seems very anxious to know how far the federation that is proposed is to extend. Is it to extend to all the Queen's dominions? If so, India would overwhelm us with her votes. Or is it to extend to all the English-speaking race? If so, that were a consummation devoutly to be wished. As to the title, we at once succumb to Mr. Freeman's erudite artillery. The name is nothing to us, but the thing itself (to which we are sorry and surprised to see the distinguished historian almost furiously objects) is very dear. What is meant by the phrase in popular usage, Mr. Freeman does not fail to see. It is not the federation of the whole Empire, though it would be our glory as a people so to govern and to train even India as to fit her in a far, far distant future for incorporation into the Federal Union; much less is it the federation of all the English-speaking peoples, including the United States. That is a prospect far too dazzling for our eyes. The scheme we advocate is far more modest and practicable. It is, to use Mr. Freeman's own words, "the closer and more equal political union of" the self-governing portions of the Queen's dominions; and the means we recommend for effecting this union is federation.

And what is federation? It is an arrangement by which a number of separate States, or communities, are joined together for certain specified purposes, while remaining distinct and independent for other purposes. In a federal union, each of the component parts keeps some powers to itself, while granting other powers to a central authority of their own creation. This

* *Macmillan's Magazine*, April, 1885, p. 434.

central authority, or Federal Government, exercises control over all matters of common interest to all the members of the Union, but leaves each State to order its own affairs. The sphere of the Federal Government is limited to the external affairs of each State and of the Union as a whole, and the sphere of the Government of each State is limited to its own internal affairs.

"Each member of the Union is perfectly independent within its own sphere, but there is another sphere in which its independence, or rather its separate existence, vanishes. It is invested with every right of sovereignty on one class of subjects, but there is another class of subjects on which it is as incapable of separate political action as any province or city of a monarchy or of an indivisible republic. The making of peace or war, the sending or receiving of ambassadors, generally all that comes within the department of international law, will be reserved to the central power. . . . A Federal Union, in short, will form one State in relation to other powers, but many States as regards its internal administration."*

Mr. Freeman also has a valuable dissertation on the division usually made between the two classes of federal unions—by the Germans called respectively the *Staatenbund* and the *Bundesstaat*, the former being a loose and imperfect, and the latter a close and perfect federation. The passage is too long to quote, but we give the substance of it. The difference between the two classes turns chiefly upon the way in which the central power exercises its peculiar functions. In the former class, "the Federal Power represents only the *Governments* of the several members of the Union; its immediate action is confined to those Governments; its power consists simply in issuing requisitions to the State Governments, which, when within the proper limits of the Federal authority, it is the duty of those Governments to carry out, in any way that they think best." In the latter class, the Federal Power is a Government co-ordinate with the State Government, sovereign in its own sphere as they are sovereign in their sphere. "It is a Government with the usual branches—legislative, executive, judicial; with a direct power of taxation, and the other usual powers of a Government; with its army, its navy, its

* Freeman, *Federal Government*, p. 3.

civil service, and all the usual apparatus of a Government, all bearing directly upon every citizen of the Union, without any reference to the Governments of the several States." Under the former system, the several Governments are constitutionally bound to meet all lawful requisitions for federal purposes; but, as the history of many federal unions shows, in such a system, "the State Governments will always lie under a strong temptation to disobey such requisitions, not only when they transcend the limits of the Federal authority, but also when they are simply displeasing to local interests or wishes." And we quite agree that "such a compact may constitutionally be a federal union, but practically it will amount to little more than a precarious alliance."*

A federal union, then, is a union of sovereign States for mutual aid and the promotion of interests common to them all. With this end in view they agree to abrogate certain functions of sovereignty which they severally possess, in order that these functions may be jointly exercised for the common good by means of the body which they concurrently vest with such sovereign power; but all other rights are reserved.

And that such a separation of spheres and functions and such a combination of local autonomy with central government are possible is proved by the fact that they have already been realized. The Achaian and the Ætolian Leagues in ancient, and the American and Swiss Republics in more modern times, to which we may now add to Mr. Freeman's list the Dominion of Canada and the German Empire, are all examples of successful federation. They differ considerably in the constitution of the central government, and in the functions exercised by that government, but, in all respects essential to the idea of federal union, they are alike. In all of them the sphere of the central government is clearly distinguished from the sphere of the several separate governments, and the distinction between their respective and recognized functions is rigidly observed; and, in all of them, we may note that superlative excellence in English eyes, this complex, and at first-sight cumbrous form of government, is

* *Federal Government*, p. 12.

found to work, if not with perfect smoothness, yet with tolerable ease and marked success. Moreover, they are all close federations; and this accounts for their stability and endurance. No loose confederation ever yet worked well, or bore the strain of strong temptation to dissolve the Union, long. The German Bund which fell to pieces in 1866, and the old American Confederation which, after lasting only two years, gave way in 1779 to the present Union, were both examples of this loose confederation. So was the earlier Swiss Republic; and so, too, we regret to say, will be, in its first stages of existence, the long-desired Dominion of Australia.

We wish our friends at the Antipodes had done what we are pretty sure they will be led by their experience to do; we wish they had agreed to form a federal union like that of Canada. But evidently they are not quite ripe for that yet; and we must be thankful that they have seen the necessity of federation, and have taken the first steps towards forming a complete one. That five out of the seven Australian colonies have consented to combine for common objects, while it is confidently hoped that the consent of the other two is only a question of time—unless indeed Sir Julius Vogel's idea should be carried out, and the Pacific Islands under the British Crown should form a separate Union, with New Zealand for a centre—is a striking and a welcome testimony to the hold that the federal idea has taken of them. The Bill now passing through the British Parliament bears witness to a growing desire for unity and mutual help; and that is, in itself, a good thing. But it points to a better: it points, we trust, to a complete organic union not only of the Australian (and, by-and-by, of the South African) colonies, but also of all the colonies and the parent State.

In this way only can the colonies maintain their union with each other, and the unity of the whole Empire be preserved. In this way only can the forces of the Empire be efficiently organized and utilized for the defence of its territories and the fulfilment of its mission. A Union such as we propose would mean far more than strength; it would mean peace through all our borders—peace, that is, over a third of the surface

of the globe, and amongst at least a fourth of its inhabitants. No State in the Union would ever think of fighting the rest of the Empire; and foreign powers would think a hundred times before they threw the gauntlet down to us. Many questions affecting our joint and several interests will never be raised at all by other nations, if we only hold together. Our rulers, too, would speak in every council with a voice to make the tyrant tremble and to set the captive free—a voice too potent to be disregarded, too unanimous to be mistaken, too beneficent, we verily believe, to be despised. The United States of England would, more than anything that we can think of on this side the millennium, mean the peace, the freedom, and the progress of mankind. Already, Englishmen have made the “estranging sea” a highway and a bond between the nations; already have they made a pathway of the billowy mountains for the feet of them that take good tidings to the sinful and oppressed; and such a Union as we contemplate (and this, for us, is the supreme consideration) would enable us to keep a foremost place amongst the Christian peoples that are seeking to evangelize the world. Of the other advantages of federation we cannot now speak in detail. A volume rather than a paragraph would be needed adequately to set them forth. It would relieve our sorely-burdened House of Commons by the transference of foreign and colonial affairs to a Federal Parliament,—a relief that will be needed quite as sorely by every State throughout the Empire as they begin to feel the pressure of accumulating home affairs; it would lift our foreign policy out of the arena of mere party strife; it would open out careers of dignity and usefulness for every British citizen in every portion of our vast domains; it would encourage and facilitate the exchange of surplus capital and labour; and last, but not the least advantage we can now enumerate, it would effect a saving that can only be called enormous in the expenditure of all the several States if only one instead of five or six great armies, navies, and consular and diplomatic services were needed for the whole.*

* The small percentage of taxes levied by a Federal Government would not only be a mere fraction of what each State, if separate from the rest, would have to pay for its own defence and diplomacy, but it would be a percentage that would

In the light of such advantages as these, a hundred seeming difficulties vanish. Indeed, to our minds, there has never been more than one difficulty in the way of English federation. The difficulty is this—that the sacrifices involved would all have to be made by Great Britain. She would have to give up her exclusive control over the Empire as a whole. Her representatives would still have a proportionate, and for a long time a predominant, voice and influence in the Federal Assembly; but gradually, as the other members of the Union grew in wealth and numbers, the parent State would lose her exclusive and preponderating power. But, says Mr. Freeman, such a thing is quite unprecedented. "No ruling State has ever admitted its subject States into a federal relation."* This, of course, is not a conclusive reason why no ruling State ever should; and the only question that need concern us now is, "Will Great Britain; or rather, ought she?" Mr. Freeman thinks she neither ought nor will. He thinks that she would lose in political position by entering a federal union; and so, no doubt, she would, in a sense—in the sense in which she may be said to have lost in political position by granting self-government to some of the colonies in their home affairs. But let us hear Mr. Freeman for himself: his words will at least enliven our page, and it will not be altogether unamusing to see the distinguished historian posing, even hypothetically, as a champion and defender of the Empire.

"It will be quite another thing," he says, "to ask a great power, a ruling power, a mighty and ancient kingdom which has for ages held its place among the foremost nations of the earth, to give up its dominion, to give up its independence, to sink of its own will to the level of the State of New York and the Canton of Bern. It will be quite another thing to ask the parliament of such a kingdom . . . to come down from its seat, to give up to some other assembly not yet in being the widest and greatest of its powers. . . . Such a demand was never yet made on any ruling

decrease in proportion to the ratio of the increase in the wealth and population of the whole. We have been compelled to omit the reasonings, calculations and statistics on which this paragraph is based; but we may call attention to the fact that these advantages are mutual and reciprocal, and may state it as our firm conviction, that they could be secured more surely and more easily by federation than by any other means.

* *Macmillan's Magazine*, April, 1885.

people or any ruling assembly, and the Parliament and people of Great Britain will assuredly not be the first to set the world the example of accepting it. The soberest of us will be driven to turn Jingo and sing 'Rule Britannia,' if we are asked that Great Britain shall sink into one canton or three cantons of Greater Britain."

But Mr. Freeman loses sight of two or three important facts. The first is the one to which we have already adverted—namely, that the colonies are rising rapidly into States which, for population, wealth, and power, will one day favourably compare with Great Britain herself. The second is, that the British Parliament, in the sense in which Mr. Freeman here uses the term, is a mere abstraction. The actual British Parliament, at any given time, is made up of Peers and Representatives of the people; and both Peers and People would still have their fair share in the government of the Empire, even if the Lords and Commons handed over all imperial affairs to the Federal Assembly. The United Kingdom would have its proportionate share of power in that assembly; and, for the life of us, we cannot see how we can righteously claim more. So that the only question is, Will this sovereign people consent to share its sovereignty, in imperial matters, with the colonists, or not? If it will, it will soon return a Parliament that will not be too sensitive to its dignity to be just. But if it will not, then there is an end of the matter. The colonies will grow away from us. Inevitably they will become sovereign States themselves. And then where will Great Britain's greatness be? For, in the meantime, other States will not be stationary. The United States and Russia will each of them in half a century swell into portentous powers; and Great Britain—well, of course, Great Britain will go on singing "Rule Britannia" to the end of time! The legend about Nero fiddling while Rome was burning, then, no longer will be the supreme instance of imperial folly and infatuation. Painful as the sight would be, we must confess that we had rather see Mr. Freeman in the most pronounced of Jingo war-paints than that our great-great-grandchildren should see some Slav equivalent of Lord Macaulay's New Zealander taking his stand upon "a broken arch of London Bridge to sketch the ruins of St. Paul's." The fact is, that, unless we

are prepared to share our sovereignty with our fellow-subjects beyond the seas, as fast as they are fitted for that sovereignty, and unless we are content to live with them beneath one sceptre and on equal terms, we shall be depressed into a second or a third-rate power, and they will rise into separate, mighty, and perhaps antagonistic States. Then would be fulfilled again the saying, true of nations as of individuals, "He that saveth his life shall lose it." Selfishness is always suicidal; but in this case the suicide would be upon a tragic and gigantic scale; it would be the suicide of an empire.

We quite believe that—

"England never did, nor never shall,
Lie at the proud foot of a conqueror,
But when it first did help to wound itself."

"Nought shall make us rue, if England to itself do rest but true." And what is it for England to be true to herself, but to be just and generous? Not that we claim a share of power for the colonists on the ground of generosity. We claim it on the ground of justice and expediency. But as Burke said: "A politic act is not the worse for being a generous one."

But we put the matter on the simplest grounds of justice, and we are not doubtful of the issue when it once is fairly brought before an Englishman. After all, who are these colonists with whom we fear to share our sovereignty, from whom we would keep their rightful share of power? Are they not Englishmen? Are they and we not common subjects of one crown? Are not our interests, aspirations, aims, and resolutions theirs? What should we say if we were colonists, and were debarred from all control over the widest and the most important of our interests? Should we not say precisely what is being said by men whose loyalty cannot be questioned. Suppose we listen to a sample voice—the latest that has reached our ears. It is that of "a distinguished gentleman who has held high office on both sides of the Atlantic," whose words are quoted *in extenso* by Lord Lorne:*

"I claim," says he, "that a British-born subject emigrating to Canada has in no degree waived or impaired his right to an equal voice

* *Imperial Federation*, p. 36.

with his fellow-subjects resident in the United Kingdom, in determining what may or may not be best for the common Empire. I wholly deny the pretension which seems to be present to most English minds, that it is for them alone to judge of such questions; . . . and that the colonist has no concern beyond the local affairs of the country in which he happens to dwell. Far, indeed, above this standard is the conception of most colonists of their duties and rights. While their countrymen have remained in the peaceful prosecution of industry at home, they have been engaged in the more arduous task of extending the influence, commerce, and civilization of Great Britain in Canada, Australia, South Africa, and countless other possessions of the Crown; they have been cheered with the conviction that in their several spheres they have been laying the basis of a mighty Empire, to be hereafter their protection and their pride. . . . Surely the time cannot be remote when the pressure of overpopulation—failing all other reason—will force Englishmen to recognize the truth that an Englishman in Australia is as good and useful a citizen of the British Empire as an ill-paid workman in Birmingham or Leeds, and that he is entitled to an equal voice in determining whether Egypt and the Suez Canal . . . shall be left to anarchy, or whether France shall demoralize Oceania by making it the cesspool of her crime, vice, and infidelity."

On what grounds can the millions of electors, who will soon go to the polls in England for the first time, be granted a voice on imperial subjects that would not justify, that does not demand, a similar grant to the millions of partially-enfranchised Englishmen beyond our shores? They do not pay Imperial taxes? But whose fault is that? Give them a fair share of Imperial power, and see if they will not gladly bear their share of Imperial burdens. We bear more than our share of such burdens now, and wield more than our share of power. That is the gist of the matter; and the sooner both the burdens and the power are equalized, the better for us all. Englishmen, everywhere, must and, in the long run, will rule themselves. They will insist on having an equitable voice in the management of all their affairs. Nor do they often grumble to discharge the debts incurred in self-defence and government. Men do not grumble to pay premiums for insurance of their lives and goods; and what would Federal taxes be (which, by the way, might all be raised without the slightest interference with the fiscal policy of any of the States), what would such taxes be but, practically, premiums

of insurance against the dissolution of the Empire, and against the attacks of foreign powers? Besides, we must remember that, if the Union proposed involves some sacrifice, the advantages to which we have referred would be a rich and ample compensation both to us and them. Sacrifices, doubtless, we shall have to make. What noble end was ever yet attained without them? But what then? The end we aim at is the grandest and noblest that ever filled a patriot's intellect or stirred a patriot's heart. And the prize is great. It is the power for centuries, perhaps millenniums, to serve the highest interests and ensure the welfare of the human race.

Our voice, then, is for federation when the time is ripe for it. Meanwhile, we welcome every project that prepares the way for it—from the sixpenny telegrams proposed by Mr. Douglas, between England and Australia, to the Exhibition of Colonial Produce to be held in London early in the spring of 1886; and from the sending of a few colonial peers and commoners to sit beside our statesmen in the halls of Westminster, with voices but no votes, to the scheme which, for the moment, is most popular at home, but which, we fear, is not so likely to secure support abroad—the scheme for forming a so-called Federal Council of Advice. Only it must be remembered that these schemes and projects are but tentative and temporary. Nothing short of perfect federation will meet the necessities of the case. A Federal Union and a Federal Parliament must some day be formed.

Both space and skill would fail us were we to attempt to draw a detailed plan for such a parliament, and, without details the outline that we have before our minds, would be almost worthless, and might be misleading. Moreover, in the federal assemblies already in existence, we have outlines, and more than outlines, in abundance that might serve as models—one in one particular, and another in another—to those experts whose duty it would be to frame a Constitution for the Union proposed. In the Canadian Dominion Parliament, in particular, which is a happy combination of the English and American styles, we have an excellent example of the sort of Constitution that might be formed upon a larger scale, and with the necessary modifications. Why should not the

Federation League obtain and publish for consideration one or more elaborate plans? Why should not the committee offer £100 for the best prize essay on "The Constitution, Sphere, and Functions of the Assembly, needed as the Organ of the Proposed Federal Union of Great Britain and Her Colonies"? They need not commit themselves, until they wish, to any definite scheme. Already they have declared unanimously in favour of some form of federation; and, as we have seen, a form of federation requires as its organ a federal parliament; why then should they hesitate to take this further harmless and most helpful step? Their branches are now spreading into all the centres of influence both here and in the colonies, and everywhere the cry is for more light. The members of the League are not at present able to answer the inquiries which at once arise in every thoughtful mind as to how the federation that is aimed at could be worked. The people are at sea upon the subject, and all sorts of misconceptions and prejudices are being formed which may hamper the movement in a needlessly mischievous way. More light would soon create purer, stronger, and more serviceable emotion, if that is what the League is striving to promote.

And so we end as we began by gently urging urgency upon the League. No time is to be lost.

"The enemy increaseth every day;
We, at the height, are ready to decline.
There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries,
On such a full sea are we now afloat;
And we must take the current when it serves,
Or lose our ventures."

ART. VIII.—THE DOCTRINE OF THE SPIRIT IN
THE GALATIAN EPISTLE.

A SERIES of papers has appeared in this Journal presenting some of the various aspects of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit in the New Testament. These sketches have not been governed by any determinate order; as it was intended to sum them up by a general survey presenting the result of a careful inquiry into the general and particular development of the doctrine in the finished revelation. After tracing St. Paul's views of the Spirit in the epistles to the Romans, Ephesians and Corinthians, we now turn to the Galatians. And there we are met by the remarkable fact that the Holy Spirit occupies a central and most commanding place, a place more commanding than in any other: that the epistle is ruled and controlled by it from beginning to end. It is literally, to borrow the Ephesian expression, "filled with the Spirit."

To see this, we must consider another phenomenon: that the epistle to the Galatians is distinguished from every other document of the New Testament by being an epistle of one idea, absolutely one idea. It has one thought, to which a long introduction leads, which impresses itself on every argument and exhortation, and which through Old Testament allusions and allegorical illustrations continues faithful to the very close. Its unity has no parallel in the Scriptures, and that unity is no other than the relation of the law to the Spirit or of the Spirit to the law. We may adopt which order of these two we please. Taking the former, we find the object polemical; and the law is superseded if not abolished by the Spirit: with that idea in the mind, we find ourselves in possession of a key that unlocks all the recesses of the epistle. Taking the latter, we find the object doctrinal; and the Spirit consummates the law, putting it to death, but quickening it in the very process, and glorifying it into the accomplishment of its first design. But, whichever order we take, here is the unity of the treatise. It is a unity which fragments and portions of other treatises in the New Testament share, but which is not characteristic of any other

whole book. In the epistle to the Romans it occupies a conspicuous place, but is by no means all-pervasive : it is only one subordinate aspect of the economy of redemption as embracing the whole government of the world and the entire destinies of mankind. Writing to the Corinthians the apostle introduces the same theme ; but with a different application, and only as preface to another order of topics. The epistle to the Hebrews draws out a long parallel between the law and the Gospel ; but the worship of the law, with its sacrifices, is contrasted with the worship of the Gospel and its One Sacrifice ; and there also the topic is only a subordinate branch of a wider subject. But in the epistle we now consider, the relation of the Spirit to the law is literally the only subject. There are scarcely three verses which do not bear its impress.

Before proceeding to illustrate this, it may be well to note that the antithesis between the Spirit and the law is expressed also as between the Spirit and the flesh. This stamps on the epistle another characteristic of uniqueness. There is nothing like this anywhere else. It might almost seem as if St. Paul carefully arranged the phraseology of the epistle beforehand ; and determined that his term "flesh" should be generally synonymous with "law," answering to it in its several significations ; while the one word Spirit should confront, oppose, or consummate every application of the two terms. The law has several applications ; and the flesh is adapted to express each of these. The Spirit, standing alone in its grand simplicity, with less appendages than in any other document, is turned towards each and all in common. If we considered these in order—first the Spirit and the law, then the Spirit and the flesh—we should detect the singular fact, that the antithesis dwells more on the law in the beginning of the epistle, and more on the flesh at the close ; while the middle closely unites them. But both terms will have more justice done them if they are united.

Having committed ourselves to the theory that the relation of the Spirit to the law is the great theme of the epistle, we are bound to support our theory by a preliminary analysis. Roughly dividing the epistle, we have down to ch. iii. the law as carrying with it condemnation and death and the curse.

That section is closed by the gift of the promised Spirit as abolishing this curse by its blessing, this condemnation by its justification, and this death by its life. The fourth chapter deals with the law as holding men in internal bondage; and the Spirit is introduced as the Spirit of adoption or sonship. In the fifth chapter the law is the law of the flesh opposing the law of the Spirit. Here the opposition makes the flesh more prominent; while in the first part the flesh was mentioned only once. To this analysis we shall return in due time; and try to turn it to good account. Meanwhile, it is important to remember that we must mark, underlying this threefold order, the one general antithesis of which we have spoken, the parallel drawn between the law which is adapted to man as flesh and the Spirit of life in the Gospel which makes man spiritual and the law of his life spiritual also. The one simple note of contrariety runs through all, recurring at different points according to the skill of the artist, but always with increasing effect. He who reads this epistle, written in the apostle's anger, that is, in the anger that sinneth not, with this idea in his mind will discern with what skill the variations on the one theme are conducted. He will note that every time the word law occurs it is introduced under some aspects that sets in relief the Spirit; and that every time the Spirit is introduced it is in distinct ascendancy over the law in some form. Of course, it requires a somewhat trained ear to detect this: we must know the apostle as an artist, "the man and his communications," and be quick to discern his meaning afar off. And we must well understand what is his moving impulse, what it is that forces him to write: what that intense emotion is which began, continued and ended the appeal, ordering its abrupt transitions, creating its vehement antithetical paradoxes, ejaculating its quick, swift, unanswerable questions, and generally giving this epistle beyond any other he wrote the character of a decisive attack that should end the campaign and render further controversy needless. We must remember what the Judaizers were to him; how much worse than Jews, because they would furtively bring in the law to supplement the Gospel and surround the very cross with ordinances necessary to give it a perfect work, ordinances of the flesh through which that cross must be reached and in which alone its

consummation could be found. And, worst of all, these Judaizers had at their head Peter, the chiefest of the apostles; or, if he were not still at their head, and James next to him, it was because he had been publicly rebuked, but too late to prevent the influence of his unhappy compromise from endangering the freedom of the Gospel.

Hence it may be said that this "liberty which we have in Christ Jesus" is the same one keynote of the epistle in another form. Writing to the Corinthians St. Paul says, "Where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty:" this is not expressly stated to the Galatians, but it is everywhere meant. The Judaizers came in "privily to spy out" that liberty, "that they might bring us into bondage." It is obvious that the first idea suggested by liberty and bondage here is release from the ceremonial subjection to those many ordinances of the law from which the Gospel had taken away their meaning, and the endeavour of the "false brethern" to reimpose this burdensome system of outward forms. But it is also obvious that this was but a small thing in the apostle's estimation; and that he would never have called these ceremonial obligations bondage and release from them liberty had not some far deeper danger lurked behind them. It may be questioned whether at any time of his life he thought or spoke of the observation of "days and months and seasons and years" as slavery: a fair view of his character and conduct and writings would suggest that a decorous and symbolical ritual was in harmony with his religious worship; and that his becoming "weak among the weak" was by no means the hardest part of his concessions to others for the sake of the Gospel. What then (it may be asked) makes him so anxious about the Galatians because they were "turning back again to the weak and beggarly rudiments whereunto they desired to be in bondage over again?" It was simply this, that these ritualistic observances were tokens of a danger that would come with or follow them; that the Galatians were incapable of distinguishing things that differ; and that through the pleasant and decent avenue of attention to times and seasons they would find their way back to the bondage of the whole law and its "commandments without promise" which were

really and alone the "beggarly rudiments." After congratulating them that from bondage to Gentile idolatry they had come to the knowledge of the true God, we cannot suppose that he would rebuke them for simply complying with certain times and seasons of public worship which had been sanctified for ages in the Jewish church out of which Christianity sprang. What he trembled for was the tendency this betrayed. Hence after mentioning the comparatively innocent "days and months and seasons and years" he goes on to say, "I am afraid of you;" and what his fear really meant was expressed in another question, "Tell me now ye that desire to be under the law," that is, the whole obligation of law, law generally, and only law: it was the danger of "falling from grace" into the arms of a system which was slavery under condemnation and impotence and sin. In other words the law with its bondage has throughout this epistle only one meaning which is always and everywhere viewed under two aspects; it brings the man who is "of the law" into condemnation as it were from without; and it keeps him inwardly a slave to his impotence. And the Spirit is set against these two forms of bondage as "the Spirit of the blessing of Abraham," and as the "Spirit of adoption in Christ." Again we have to say that the two bondages are really one; there are not two laws, but one law; without is the curse, and within is the slavery, proceeding from the same commandment as yet "without promise." And again we must note that the two liberties are really one; there are not two Spirits but one Spirit; the "curse" without is changed into a "blessing;" and the servant-slave has become a son; and these two "changes of the right hand of the Most High" are one in the "ministering of the same Spirit." But all this will be made more plain by a consideration of the two branches of the epistle, which are both separated and united by the allegory.

Down to ch. iii. 14 the one theme has been the emancipation of mankind, Jews and Gentiles alike, from the bondage of law as a dispensation under which all men are alike condemned. The law is throughout regarded as an external institute, whether as written in a code as for the Jews or as

an unwritten testimony of the reason or heart as among the Gentiles. Every word of the long introduction keeps in view the closing words, which contain in a new and unique form the announcement of the Gospel of freedom: that Gospel being the vicarious endurance of the curse and the impartation of the Spirit of blessing. With ch. iii. 14, let it again be asserted, the description reaches the close of its first part; its triumphant consummation is there; the text comes after the sermon; and it is introduced exactly as if the apostle were repeating a sentence with which he had begun. Why then, it may be asked, does the apostle take so long to reach his central subject? and why does he so long withhold the great declaration that the blessing of redemption from law is the gift of the Spirit? If we examine the context we see that it has not been altogether withheld. There are three distinct references to the gift of the Spirit in the beginning of the third chapter; which, occurring rapidly one after another, show that they contain the theme the writer wanted to reach, though he had been "let hitherto," and that when he reached it his mind was to make up for lost time by reiteration. The little cluster of three allusions to the Spirit are beautifully connected together as marking the one common blessing that marked the time when Christ was set forth, when faith came, and the law had wrought its preliminary work. But the three prepare for the fourth, which sums them all in what we must affirm to be the keynote of the epistle: The Promised Blessing of Abraham, for Jews and Gentiles, in the Gift of the Spirit to Mankind through the Cross.

It is remarkable that all the four references are in precisely the same form: "the Spirit," and nothing more. Indeed this peculiarity runs through the epistle, and distinguished its allusions to the Holy Ghost from those of all others. There is but one attributive or predicative word, of which however more hereafter. Then, this "one and the self-same Spirit," being introduced as the climax and close of the first half of the epistle, we must travel back with it through what precedes and apply the text as we go. Then we find that the Spirit is the seal of justification and silences the law as a condemnation; that of the blessing instead of

the curse of the law ; and that of life in Christ instead of death. Undoubtedly, the first antithesis occurs only in regard of the second of these here : " Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law . . . that we might receive the promise of the Spirit through faith." But it must not be forgotten, in reading the epistle, that the antithesis virtually includes the other two, though it is not actually expressed as in the epistle to the Romans. If the law condemns, and lays the sinner under the sentence of death, and pronounces over him a curse, all this is reversed by the Spirit of the Gospel, who, in the language of the epistle to the Romans, " delivers from the law of sin and death," that is, from the sentence which condemns to death. In that epistle, nothing is said of the Spirit's deliverance from the curse ; in the Galatian epistle nothing is said of the Spirit's delivering from condemnation and death. But in both epistles the condemnation of the law is one, and the Spirit is one : the relation may be variously expressed, but it is always the same. We claim then for the Spirit His place in the second chapter where He is not named. The condemnation and death which that chapter refers to are the same as the curse in the third ; and to show that the apostle has Him in view all along we need only to mark how suddenly and as it were naturally the name of the Spirit occurs in the triplet which opens ch. iii. But the introduction of this entire cluster is so interesting and so important in the connection that we must look at it more particularly.

The vehement apostrophe, " O foolish Galatians, who hath bewitched you, before whose eyes Jesus Christ was openly set forth crucified !" links their view of the cross with their reception of the Spirit in a most impressive manner. They had believed in Jesus crucified, and had therefore and thereby " received the Spirit : " nothing less than this is meant ; for they had " begun in the Spirit," and were still " receiving the supply of the Spirit." Nothing can be plainer than that the apostle joins them with himself in all that he had just said concerning his having " through the law died to the law," being " crucified with Christ," and " nevertheless living through the faith of the Son of God, who gave Himself for him." It

is very much as if he had said : " We all, O Galatians, ye like me and I like you, died to the law when we were united by the Spirit to His crucifixion, when we apprehended by faith our union with Him in His death to the penalty of the law, and our union with Him in His risen life. We all in Him paid our debt of condemnation, we died and death hath no more dominion over us ; for the life we live in the flesh is a life of deliverance from the curse of the law, through faith in Him who bore it for us, and of this He has given us assurance in that He sealed our release from condemnation by the gift of the Spirit, who began as the Spirit of Jesus our new redeemed life and is continually supplied as the constant evidence and strength of that life." But, while the apostle thus unites them with himself in the foundation and beginning of this new life of justification, he nevertheless stands in doubt of them. He hardly knows if he can still speak so confidently about them as he can about himself. His fear makes him tremble for them. The combination of joyful recognition of their past and deep solicitude for their future gives an undefinable tremulousness to the whole epistle : a commingling of confidence in his " little children " with fear that he must " travail in birth again for them " which takes a variety of forms and has no parallel in his writings. At the point we have now reached—the quadruple reference to the Spirit in the third chapter—his profound anxiety takes a peculiar character and introduces a unique expression. As if it had not been enough to speak of the general condemnation and death in which the law involves all sinners alike, Jews and Gentiles, and their deliverance from both by the Spirit of justification and life he takes up the theme with the darker colouring of still stronger words : words found nowhere else in his writings. As when writing to the Corinthians, he enforces the truth that the blood of Christ has effected reconciliation between God by uttering the solemn and unique words, " He made Him to be sin for us who knew no sin," so here, after having exhausted the thought of our freedom from condemnation and death, he goes on to the dread announcement that Christ " was made a curse for us," that we, believing in Him, and sharing His vicarious curse in the crucifixion, may have the " blessing of Abraham in Christ Jesus,

the promise of the Spirit through faith." Thus the final and consummating reference to the Spirit, coming after the other three, confirms our principle that the gift of the Spirit is in every sense freedom from the external bondage of the law.

Then we do well to look back from this point on the whole of the first part of the epistle, which ends here, as a continuous protest against those who would reintroduce the law by degrees on the ground of acceptance. The question is, either Christ without the law or the law without Christ. And that alternative runs through the epistle more or less, though it formally closes here. The strong and vehement protest is really exhausted, though its pulsations throb here and there to the end. But it is important for the expositor to remember that it has been up to this point the only theme. It is the habit of some expositors to read the second chapter under another light. The apostle is supposed when he cries, "Is Christ the minister of sin? God forbid!" to be asserting that justification by faith does not tolerate or sanction continuing in sin. That interpretation may be thus paraphrased: "If, while we sought to be justified in Christ, we ourselves, as Jews, are like the Gentiles found to be sinners, and justified as such, is Christ the minister of sin? If we Jews, not being sinners like the Gentiles, are nevertheless found sinners requiring free justification, is then Christ the minister of sin?" To us it seems that this view of the passage has nothing to do with the context, which simply refers to the building again the law after we had on admitted Christian principles pulled it down. Much less is the thought of our continuing in sin by introducing the law again contrary to the design of the law in the apostle's mind. What he signifies is that "if"—to paraphrase again—"we seek, as we all do, to be justified in Christ without the law, we then begin again to introduce the law, we assert ourselves to have been transgressors in having renounced the law, and thus make Christ the minister of sin by offering us a salvation without the law which was really not without the law. He would seem to have required us to be 'sinners' against the law in coming solely to Him, a 'transgression' which we

must repair by returning back to the law." However, we are not expounding the passage as such. Our only object is to show that the entire deliverance of believers from the burden of the law, its condemnation, death, and curse is secured by the cross of Christ, and sealed to believers by the gift of the Spirit.

When St. Paul said, "The life that I live in the flesh I live by the faith of the Son of God," he really means, "The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." Here it is hardly possible to avoid comparing the two epistles. The two passages here brought together stand almost alone in their direct personal reference to the apostle's own experience, "I was and am crucified with Christ: the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath me free from the law of sin and death." We should never read one of these passages without thinking of the other. His brother Peter had constrained him to assert himself here; and in the epistle to the Romans his own experience as recorded in the seventh chapter had required it. But taken together, they are a wonderful pair of tributes; and they throw much light on our present subject. "As to all law, viewed as condemnation I have died to it: lawfully died to it. Its honour has been secured. I have died to its penalty: it can exact no more; for what more does the law demand as the justification of a doomed man than death? But I died with Christ; and because He liveth I live. That is my faith in Him that we are one. The life I live—I who am as it regards the law no better than dead—is by my union with Him who—let me say for the first and last time—loved me and gave Himself for me. The new law is a law of life, as the old one was a law of death. The Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death." But the apostle rejoicing in his union with the death of Christ pauses for a few verses before He brings in the Spirit. So towards the end of the epistle he suddenly introduces the text that should explain much of his previous meaning: "We, through the Spirit by faith wait for the hope of righteousness by faith." The Spirit brought it to us when we were penitently waiting under the bondage of the law.

Now that we wait for its eternal ratification, it is the Spirit that keeps alive our confidence.

Let us now pass to the second view of the bondage of the law, which is the slavery of the unregenerate soul to the service of sin : a slavery which St. Paul views under two aspects. As the law of Moses, and law generally, is the schoolmaster that brings to Christ, he regards the bondage of that of a spirit of servitude and fear, which ends when the servants have been made children through the "adoption of sons." As the law is the standard of righteousness to which no man by nature can inwardly conform, which does nothing but show him his utter inability, he regards the bondage as simply the slavery to sin which can only end with regeneration. It is the adoption which is made prominent in the early part of the epistle, the regeneration by another name which is prominent in the latter. But the apostle never really disjoins the adoption from the regeneration. He seldom uses either of these terms : neither "adoption" nor "regeneration" occurs more than two or three times. But the things they signify constantly appear, and always as blended. If we are made "sons," that is, invested with the prerogatives of sons in contradistinction to servants, then we are necessarily made "children" also, that is, whether the apostle says it or not, "begotten again." He may call it a new creation, or a renewing ; but what he means is the new birth. In the Pauline theology there is no adoption of children in the forensic sense of Greek or Roman or any human law : God never calls those sons who are not really His children. In human "adoption," the adopted must by the theory be other than a child of the adopting father : if he is adopted he cannot have been begotten, if begotten he never could be adopted. In St. Paul's theology there is no human law to which his phraseology is bound down. He calls the brethren of Jesus the sons of God as they are invested with privileges that servants never could have ; he calls them the children of God because they are verily and indeed born of Him. They are predestinated to the adoption of sons in Christ because they are really new creatures, or children, in Christ.

It may be said that the inward bondage to the law, as distinguished from outward bondage of condemnation, is not

so carefully separated as we have maintained. But the more narrowly the epistle is examined the more plain will be the distinction. However, we have only to do with the central idea of the Spirit as sealing the deliverance, at the same time that the deliverance from the curse is sealed by the gift of the Spirit who assures of blessing and not of curse, the deliverance of the penitent soul seeking to keep the law but unable is effected by the Spirit of adoption, who makes the law the delight of the soul, because it is the will of a Father who is loved and whose regenerating Spirit gives the new life which is the power of obedience. God "sent forth" His Son to redeem from bondage to the law; and He "sent forth" His Spirit to assure of that redemption and make it perfect. At the same time it is to be observed that the new law of inward obedience does not so entirely take the place of the old law of impotence as the new law of justification takes the place of the old law of condemnation. Where there is justification there cannot be the curse. But where there is regeneration there may be the conflicting law of sin in the members. Very much of the apostle's doctrine rests upon this.

At the same time it must be remembered that the apostle is not repeating here his doctrine of the opposition of the mind and the flesh as found in the epistle to the Romans. There the law in the members, or the flesh, is in the ascendant: the reluctant "mind" is in bondage. There is no mention of the Spirit there. But here it is remarkable that the Spirit who is Himself the new law is not yet absolute. The freedom is perfect freedom for the regenerate man; but the regenerate man is only part of the new personality. The Spirit through love fulfils the law; but the apostle bids them not suffer their freedom to be an occasion to the flesh. The law of the Spirit is the guidance to all duty which must be yielded to. There is no law against those who walk after the Spirit: the freedom from condemnation is absolute. But if they do not walk after the Spirit, the condemnation returns. Such is the general strain of the apostle's teaching. There is no law against the believers; neither are they under the law; but they are still under obligation to keep its commandments through the Holy Spirit. But this subject will demand some reference to the

peculiar relation of the flesh to the Spirit : which here enters with a most remarkable emphasis, so much so indeed as to constitute one of the most peculiar subsections of the apostle's theology.

At this point we may introduce the allegory of Hagar and Sarah, or rather the allegorized history, which is here aptly introduced for the illustration of his purpose to impress upon the Galatians the fact of their entire deliverance from the bondage of the law. The sons of the bondmaid and of the freedwoman respectively "contain," the writer says, "an allegory." St. Paul is among the Rabbis; and gives here the most perfect little specimen of a well-known method of educing Divine truth out of its germs and veils. Here the principle of interior bondage, as opposed to the freedom of the adoption, is made prominent; and it is carried out with great completeness. But the peculiarity of the allegory is that it unites the two aspects of the law to which we have been referring. Though the latter is prominent, the former is not forgotten. Believers are the children of the freewoman; that is, they are "born after the Spirit;" they are regenerate as well as adopted; for the apostle, though among the Rabbis, introduces here the Christian doctrine of which the Rabbis had but a dim conception. They are new creatures, or born again, as by the Spirit; their adoption is their possession of the privileges of the new Jerusalem, the Christian church, the mother of us all. With St. Paul, as we have seen, the regeneration and the adoption always go together; and he never introduces the one without introducing the other also. In the epistle to the Romans the *νόμι* and the *τέκνα* are woven together. Here in this epistle the "adoption" rules the discourse; but in the allegory the childship is conjoined with it—that is, those who have the adoption of sons have also the regeneration, the contrary of the "gendering unto bondage." But, though the interior deliverance from the law is thus prominent, the external deliverance from the condemnation is blended: that is evident from the express reference to "Mount Sinai," which brings us at once to the ancient law with its threatenings of death and condemnations to curse. Thus we may say that the allegory

here inserted—the only instance of the kind in St. Paul's writings—is introduced as it were purposely to show that the bondage under the law is one—that is, slavery to its condemnation from which the Spirit of promise sets us free, and slavery to its internal yoke from which the Spirit of adoption sets us free. That the apostle has this intention will be perfectly plain to any one, who notes with what simplicity, and at the same with what a striking effect of novelty, the Spirit is introduced. As Isaac was born as a child of promise, so he was “born after the Spirit.” This is the most remarkable instance of New Testament meaning and word being put directly into the Old Testament.

But this introduces another contrast and antithesis, which will occupy the remainder of our notes: that between the flesh and the Spirit. This relation is if possible more characteristic of our epistle than even that on which we have been dwelling.

Is Paul here also “among the Rabbis?” It might be shown with some measure of plausibility that he is. There is a great mass of allusions to the correlation of flesh and Spirit which may be found in the Rabbinical teaching of Judaism. Of this, as of everything else in Christianity, it may be said that the “men of old times” had presentiments of the truth, and were feeling their way to Christ as well as to Christian phraseology. Still, the Pauline correlation of flesh and Spirit is not found among them. Nor indeed is it found in the Old Testament precisely as he left it. The mysterious words which open the history of fallen mankind, “they are flesh,” which were not spoken again until the Saviour expanded them at the opening of the history of redeemed mankind, “that which is born of the flesh is flesh,” seem to contain the germ of St. Paul's teaching as to the inward law of sin from which the Spirit delivers us. Beyond this it is vain to trace the parallel between the Saviour and His new apostle. Suffice that the antithesis abounds in the Gospels, and that no one has reproduced it with anything like the frequency and explicitness of St. Paul. “That which is born of the flesh is flesh, that which is born of the Spirit is Spirit;” “the flesh profiteth nothing; the words I speak unto you are Spirit and

life;" "the Spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak;" these are keynotes which might be shown in some sense to govern St. Paul's distribution. But we are not anxious to establish parallel where there is none. Suffice that the Lord "gave the word;" and St. Paul was the first of the multitude who have echoed it. He has in this epistle more than anywhere else dilated on this; indeed, in such a way as to give the law to theological phraseology ever since.

Perhaps it would be too much to say that term "flesh" is used by St. Paul to signify the law in those two senses which have been referred to. Yet there is much to recommend the thought. At any rate the antithesis of the Spirit to the flesh is the same as that of the Spirit to the law. With regard to the inward law that is sufficiently plain, and will bear any amount of development. With regard to the outward law of condemnation we must be content with a mere fleeting glance at a correlation hardly defined enough to be dwelt on. When the question is asked, "Having begun in the Spirit, are ye now made perfect in the flesh?" it is obvious that he uses the term flesh to signify nothing less than the whole economy of the law as that from which by receiving the Spirit they had been delivered. The Galatian Christians had received the Spirit, delivering them from the condemnation and curse of the law. It is a rational question which is rather an exclamation of wonder than a question: Having begun your religion in a dispensation of the Spirit through the Gospel, are ye thinking to finish it by returning to the law which without the Spirit is a ministration of death alone? It is remarkable that the apostle should use the expression "flesh" here; just as it is remarkable that writing to the Philippians he should, speaking of "confidence in the flesh" with the same latitude of meaning. Certainly in the allegory, we must assign to the flesh this meaning: it is there the synonym of Mount Sinai which represents the system of condemnation. It may be hard to trace the metonymical steps by which the apostle came at last to call the Jewish economy of law "the flesh;" but there is no doubt that he has given it that sense. As the law was death, it has given place to a Spirit of life; as it was condemnation, the Spirit of justification

seals release from it; as it was "the flesh," or a system of mere ceremonial symbol representing the body as yet without the soul, it is opposed here to the Spirit generally.

But when we come to the internal bondage of the law, from which the Spirit of regeneration and adoption releases us, we find the synonyms of "the flesh" abundantly and most distinctly used. The law is the "law of the flesh" in the members, opposing the law of the Spirit. St. Paul had used the very expression "law" when writing to the Romans; and it is hard to determine why he did not use it here. His argument is this, "Ye have become emancipated from the spirit of bondage to a law which you cannot perform. You have the filial love of adoption to help your obedience: indeed, to make it perfect, for love fulfilleth the whole law. But you have that still remaining in you which waits to take advantage of your freedom. You must not let your freedom be made an occasion to the flesh." Now what does the singular introduction of the term "flesh" mean here? Nothing in the previous part of the epistle has suggested the meaning which is evidently present to the apostle's thoughts in this passage. When he makes the alternative or opposite of serving the flesh serving one another in love, it is evident that he has no special reference to the material physical constitution of human nature, and the peculiar sins which owe their origin to this. The sum of his words is "Yield not to the flesh, but love one another in the spirit of self-sacrifice." It would be simply absurd to regard the flesh as signifying the lower tendencies of the nature as disposed to rebel against the higher. It is rather, "Give no license to the spirit of pride and selfishness:" that is, the flesh condemned in this passage. Similarly, again, we find that the "works of the flesh," which are plain, are not those manifest sensual indulgences which require no further mention, which in fact are generally termed sensual. The flesh has also its manifest works of hatred, pride, variance, and in fact all the sins with which the flesh as such has nothing to do. Whence we gather that in the term which the apostle here uses as the antithesis of Spirit, he intends to include the whole nature of man as corrupt, which in the unregenerate is the characteristic of the personality and in the regenerate is

present but no longer the characteristic of the personality. It is there, but it is no longer master. It is the servant or slave not perfectly cast out; but, in the apostle's forcible language, crucified: the crucifixion being "unto death" but not literally death itself. According to St. Paul's bold phraseology they that are Christ's have themselves dedicated the evil of their nature, which is governed by sin and can never be reformed but must be cast out, to destruction: they crucify it, they make no provision for it, they deny all its desires, and they want to see its end, which must be death, and death that need not be deferred to the separation of soul and body.

It must be noted that the antithesis of "flesh and Spirit" is here a peculiar one; and illustrates forcibly the freedom with which St. Paul uses his leading theological terms. Almost every epistle has a new reading of the two correlatives; the words flesh and Spirit represent a wider variety of theological distinctions than any others. When he speaks of the Redeemer's human nature as "the flesh" in the beginning of the epistle to the Romans, the opposite is "the Spirit of holiness," that is, His most holy divinity, as in the Septuagint. That distinction is specifically reserved for the Lord alone; it could belong to no other. The opposition of flesh and spirit as it lies before us in the middle of the Romans and in the Galatian epistle could have no place in Him, who was made only "in the likeness of sinful flesh." That St. Paul uses the two words to signify the Divine and human natures seems to us incontrovertible, as also that St. Peter adopts the same style. Writing to the Corinthians, St. Paul divides human nature into flesh and spirit; the flesh being the man as under the influence of self, and the spirit the man as under the influence of the world of spiritual existence. "Let us cleanse ourselves from all defilement of the flesh and spirit, perfecting holiness;" undoubtedly this is a unique passage, and the flesh is the human nature as under the bondage of corrupt sensual passions. Earlier, to the Thessalonians, St. Peter had spoken of body, soul and spirit, which was only the same twofold distinction used to the Corinthians expanded a little more fully in his earlier theology. The flesh is common to both: the spirit is soul as linked with the

flesh, the spirit is spirit alone as independent of the body. The same distinction appears in the adjectives "psychical" and "spiritual." But it is in the Romans and the Galatians that the distinction is introduced between the "flesh" as the corrupt nature of man as a whole, and the Holy Ghost as possessing the whole nature, but making the spirit his special home.

Hence there are two things carefully to be noted here. The correlative words are the same as in the other epistles; flesh and spirit. But each word has a distinct meaning. Here the flesh means the remainder of sin or the natural man or the old man not yet dead; and belonging to the personality of the regenerate Christian. And the Spirit is here the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of regeneration and governs the new personality. It is not the "spirit" as the better part of the man; but the Holy Spirit as giving His own name to the new personality. The mutual antagonism is in the same personality. "The Spirit lusteth against the flesh" cannot refer to the opposition between the higher and the lower part of the nature; it is not true that man's spirit lusts against his flesh. It is the Holy Ghost dwelling in the new man. And now let us deduce a few final conclusions from the whole.

It may seem a strange thing to say, but it is nevertheless true, that this plain and simple doctrine of one personality in the Christian man, combining so to speak two natures in conflict—one of which is doomed to perish—has been the subject of more discussion and the occasion of more error than almost any other of St. Paul's peculiar dogmatic statements. Two distinct forms of this perversion, which curiously meet here from opposite points, let us consider. Both are constrained to admit that there is something in the regenerate that still links him with his former self. But they cannot reconcile their theology to admit that one personality covers both.

The Antinomian—that is, the Calvinist who pushes his principle to licentiousness—insists that the one and only personality is Christ, who has suffered the penalty of the law in our stead and fulfilled in our stead its requirements. He takes the place of the "man in Christ," who shall never be

called into account for the conflict between his flesh and his spirit. It is a conflict which is in the nature of things permanent and necessary while the man in Christ is in the world also. The flesh is essentially sinful; and as long as the renewed Spirit is bound up with it, there must needs be the conflict between corruption and incorruption. The regenerate spirit, which is the spirit with the Holy Ghost indwelling, resists its inclinations with more or less of decision; and according to the vigour of the conflict is the dignity and purity of the religion. But nothing eternally depends upon it. The tolerant apology which the Spirit Himself admits is: "So that ye cannot do what ye would." The personality is the better nature, and is represented by the "ye;" but what that better nature would do it never can accomplish in the present life. Meanwhile, nothing really depends upon this: the "living in the Spirit" is the Christian character; and those who "walk in the Spirit" and are "led by the Spirit" are not condemned by the law for the sins they do; being indeed no longer responsible to law any more than their Representation and Substitute is with whom they were crucified. But this method of expounding the passage is essentially wrong. There is no such limitation of Christian privilege contained in it, neither here nor anywhere is it asserted or implied that a Christian man "cannot do what he would do." The Revised Text gives precisely the meaning of the words: "that ye may not do the things that ye would." The meaning then is, that the flesh, the original sinner in man not quite gone, opposes the Spirit, who gives His name to the new nature, in order that this better man might not accomplish what his renewed heart is set upon.

The peculiarity and the difficulty is, that the same words are used concerning the two natures. As the flesh desires against the Spirit—the Holy Spirit—so the Holy Spirit desires against the flesh. That is undoubtedly a unique declaration, but it is not the less acceptable for that. Every one of the main passages concerning the Third Person contains some specific term or declaration that finds no parallel elsewhere. Some think that there is an obvious parallel in Rom. vii. But the Holy Spirit does not enter

into that chapter at all. There the contest is between the flesh and the "mind;" and literally the war is to prevent the better part of the unregenerate man from having his will. And there the war is successful. The "mind" is enslaved by the flesh; the bondage is actual and absolute until the Spirit of ch. viii. arises on the scene. The striking fact of the mutual antagonism of the flesh and the Holy Spirit is not relieved by that parallel. But we can hardly accept the literal mutuality of the contest: the apostle himself—by omitting the verb—seems to protect us against that. The conflict is of the flesh against the Spirit, and of the Spirit against the flesh. It is not, however, that "the Spirit may not do what He would" and "the flesh may not do what he would;" but that the inner man, the regenerate personality, may not do what he would. That this is so seems plain from the words that follow: "If ye live in the Spirit, walk in the Spirit," and "If ye be led of the Spirit, ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh." Here the personality is not the flesh nor the Spirit; but the man between and behind them. The man will be in due time only spiritual; the flesh is crucified and must die; but there is nothing to signify that it is not regarded as part of the man.

This leads to the other error, which has some affinity with the Antinomianism in all but its licentiousness, it is that of those who regard the flesh as something necessary to the regenerate, as being the physical medium of his life and the seat of all those evils which perpetually threaten the believer without belonging to himself in any sense. The advocates of this theory would not allow that flesh is anything in the new man which is inherently sinful. They say that the new creature is without sin; but that, living in the flesh, there are tendencies to be guarded which might take him for a moment out of Christ. To be regenerate is to be without sin: the flesh notwithstanding, for the flesh is only the occasion to sin, which may render a fall possible. St. Paul says that we must not use the liberty we have as "an occasion to the flesh:" these interpreters of St. Paul would say that we must not use the flesh "for an occasion to sin." According to the apostle there is sin in believers, of which believers must

repent, and from which believers may be set free. According to some of the apostle's expositors there is no residuary sinful flesh at all: only the possibility of using our material, corporeal frame and investiture in such a way as to cease for a time to be new creatures in Christ. The whole epistle combats this delusion.

It may not be amiss to sum up its teaching concerning the Holy Ghost once more. There is one new personality which has for its characteristic the indwelling of the Spirit: once He is called the "Spirit of His Son," as noting that the new personality is united to Christ. The Christian man is with Christ dead to the law, crucified with Him, and having the Spirit of promise of the blessing instead of the curse. The same new man is an adopted and regenerated son of God: this also is described as his union with Christ through having His Spirit "sent into his heart." But the old man as within is crucified, while the new man is led by the Spirit. Finally, the flesh lusteth against this Spirit in the same new man; but the Spirit lusteth against the flesh in him. And the time shall come, as is implied in crucifixion, when he shall be delivered from this contrary principle, and only live in the Spirit. A later time will come when he that "sowed to the Spirit," as the characteristic of his whole and finished life, shall "reap of the Spirit" life everlasting; while he that "sowed to his own flesh, shall of the flesh reap corruption." Here, as before, the "flesh" is not the material flesh; and the Spirit is the eternal Spirit of God, who shall present every man sanctified in Christ Jesus.

SHORT REVIEWS AND BRIEF NOTICES.

THEOLOGY.

A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians. By JOSEPH AGAR BEET. London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1885.

THE article on the doctrine of the Spirit in the Galatians was drawn up before this volume appeared. Had it been otherwise, Mr. Beet's might have been the subject, for it is quite worthy of a longer consideration than our space will allow. The characteristics of Mr. Beet's commentaries have been acknowledged by us already: their completeness, their thoroughness of investigation, their simplicity of style, their fidelity to the original text and to the scope of the epistles, their devotedness and habitual aim to bring the reader into harmony with the apostle's devotion to his Master. All these characteristics are found in this volume, and some of them even to greater advantage: for instance, the noble exhibition of the unity of doctrine maintained throughout the New Testament is maintained with more marked success than before. On the whole, these commentaries are a very successful attempt to make exposition of the English text serve the purpose of an exposition of the original.

Those who have read the article above alluded to, the last in the present number, will perceive that in many points we differ from Mr. Beet. Some of them have been discussed before; and it will serve no good purpose to renew the discussion. But we could wish that he would reconsider his whole view of the meaning St. Paul attaches to the "flesh" and its conflict with "the spirit." What does the following sentence mean? "This list begins with sins immediately prompted by the constitution of our bodies; then passes on to idolatry which rules men by gratifying their bodily desires; and to the collision with others which results inevitably from the selfishness of such gratification, and against which St. Paul has in v. 15 just warned his readers; and concludes with another class of sins immediately prompted by the appetites of the flesh." But St. Paul makes all these sins directly and immediately prompted by the flesh. But a few other sentences will further explain our meaning: though detached they are not unjustly dealt with by us. "Notice three crucifixions in this Epistle: of Paul, of the flesh and its desires, and of the world. Each of these implies the others. In each case crucified denotes death in virtue of Christ's death on the cross and by union with the crucified. The *flesh* is dead, *i.e.*, its life, or in other

words its activity and power, has come to an end." We omit the references to the Romans, in which Mr. Beet maintains the same doctrine. We cannot understand the crucifixion of ch. v. "by their own act" to have the same meaning as "crucified with Christ" in ch. xi. Crucifixion is not death, but tends to it. Mr. Beet goes on: "At first sight this statement seems inconsistent with v. 17. For if the flesh has desire and purpose, it must be alive, whereas Paul implies that it is dead. But this inconsistency is but the poverty of human language, which often compels us to state opposite sides of the same truth in terms apparently contradictory." This last explanation may be true in some applications; it is utterly out of place here. There is a sense in which crucifixion with Christ is a life ended and a death perfected once for all: that sense we find both in the Romans and Galatians. There is a sense in which believers themselves "crucify" their own flesh, with its affections and lusts, in order to a certain death, but not an immediate one. Of the former Mr. Beet says truly: "'I have shared with Christ the results of His death on the cross.' For by the agony of His crucifixion Paul escaped, as did Christ, from the penalty of sin imposed by the law. Through the death of Christ, and therefore in some sense upon His cross, Paul's old life came to an end." "In some sense" the expositor need not have said: he knows very well in what sense. Nor can we understand why his theological instinct allowed him here, as in other places, to say "escaped from the law"; perhaps a little reflection will suggest an amendment here also. But it would be ungenerous to censure words when the doctrine of the atonement is so nobly vindicated. For the same reason we abstain from commenting on the distinction made between St. Paul's and St. James' doctrines of justification: as if the latter referred to a declaratory justification at the last day. Nor will we dwell on the difference asserted between St. John and St. Paul as to "sonship"; as if St. Paul only once spoke of the new birth as such. Every time he says "*τίκτα*" he contradicts this, as Mr. Beet must admit; though some of his readers may not know it, and may be misled.

Again we wish our indefatigable expositor great success in his labours.

The Scientific Obstacles to Christian Belief. Boyle Lectures, 1884. By G. H. CURTEIS, M.A. London: Macmillan & Co.

We cannot think that Canon Curteis has grappled successfully with his important theme. The treatment is far too discursive. There are of course many intelligent remarks; but we can find nothing but remarks, no thorough discussion of any one of the many grave topics mentioned. The preface treats the three schools of thought in the English Church has so many "facets" of the same system of truth. To outsiders they seem mutually exclusive; and such would be the opinion of leaders of the

schools. We cannot so much as guess the meaning of this sentence: "There are hundreds of intellectual men, and men of high scientific or literary acquirements, to whom *the mental liberty accorded by a ritual presentment of religious ideas* has been salvation and peace" (the italics are the author's). The numerous scraps from Ingersoll, Bradlaugh, Besant, Büchner, &c., are so unimportant, that they might have been spared. On p. 169 we are told that the author of *Natural Religion* makes the scientist's awe and admiration a sort of religion "good-humouredly." The author of that book is serious enough in his contention. Colonel Ingersoll "is virtually a Christian, if he only knew it." Bishop Temple's treatment of a similar theme is far preferable.

Expositions. By the Rev. SAMUEL COX, D.D. London: T. Fisher Unwin.

The prominence given to Universalism in this volume is, we are assured, "out of all proportion to the usual course" of the author's ministry, and is explained by the circumstance that he had by him several expositions which he had kept back while editor of *The Expositor*, "to avoid hurting certain susceptibilities." There is no keeping back here. Universalism, which had been faintly hinted and suggested, is openly preached. That the present volume amply justifies the action taken by the proprietors of that journal, is perhaps a little matter. A more serious point is that by the line Dr. Cox has now taken he will seriously limit his constituency of readers. Many, who would gladly profit by his special expository gifts, but who decline to have Universalism thrust upon them on every occasion, will take his own hint: "These fresh woods and pastures new are my private possession; no man need come on them save by his own goodwill." Dr. Cox calls his opponents "timid souls." Timidity is rather a note of his own doctrine. Surely one who believes what Universalism denies manifests greater boldness of faith. Opponents of Universalism are also spoken of as persons who, "while they boast their right of private judgment, never use it themselves, and cannot bear to see their neighbour use it." This may be smart writing, but it is neither accurate nor just. We do not wonder at an advocate of Universalism saying "I object to the whole method of balancing text against text, and passage against passage" (p. 298), because his whole case depends on the rigid isolation of certain passages. It is enough to reply that, on the same principle, Predestination, Transubstantiation, and many other equally erroneous doctrines, might be easily proved from Scripture. The way in which the author deals with the passages fatal to Universalism is best described in his own words in reference to other interpreters: "Quite inevitably they had certain ways of looking at every subject presented to their minds. These ways or habits of thought of necessity influenced and biassed the forms which their conceptions

took and the conclusions at which they arrived" (p. 43). An excellent illustration of this description is furnished by the author's discussion of 2 Thess. i. 9 (p. 308). So again, "son of perdition" or "son of loss" means "lost son," and only applies to Judas as it applies to every human being. Even our Lord's saying, "It were good for that man that he had never been born," "must not be taken too literally or pushed too far." The same might be said of Euclid's first axiom. "Children of wrath" (Eph. ii. 3) means simply "wrathful men" (p. 48). The apostle says: "*We* were children of wrath." This is certainly a feature of Paul's character, which has escaped the notice of every historian of his life. Even supposing that Paul speaks in the name of mankind, we never heard that wrath is a universal form of sin. We say nothing of the context. Original sin is classed among "dreadful dogmas" (p. 50). Indeed, from the unity of Christian doctrine, one part cannot be given up and the next retained. We have seen the logical issue in other churches and countries. In the end we shall be led to "a different gospel, which is not another gospel." Many of the expositions in the volume are suggestive and are expressed with the author's usual point and force. We wish they were in better company.

No Condemnation—No Separation. Lectures on the Eighth Chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. By the Rev. MARCUS RAINSFORD, B.A. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

This volume is a supplement to the author's previous volumes on chapters v. vi. and vii., and belongs to the same school and style of teaching. Practical edification is steadily kept in view. The preacher speaks like one who believes in the intrinsic force of truth, apart from the form of presentation. He provides meat for men, not milk for babes. We wish that his exposition of ver. 16 were more definite. It is not quite clear whether he believes in any direct testimony to the individual; but on the whole it seems as if he did not. We are thankful indeed for the Spirit's testimony in and through the Word; but the apostle's meaning surely goes beyond this. The sentence, "He divinely and immediately bears witness by the Word of God to the believer's spirit" (p. 94) sounds self-contradictory to us. The objection of fanaticism brought against the idea of a direct testimony would also apply to all God's gifts to the individual. Mr. Wesley's two sermons on "The Witness of the Spirit," expound the verse better. The author's exposition on ver. 29, 30, is strongly Calvinistic. He says, "God's foreknowledge and foreordination are the same thing" (p. 161). Why, then, in the very text of the discourse does the apostle use two words, "foreknown, predestinate?" These seem to us defects in a work whose devout and spiritual tone we greatly admire.

What Saith the Scripture? An Exposition and Analysis of the Pentateuch and Earlier Historical Books of the Old Testament, with Explanatory and Practical Notes. By J. ANDERSON, M.D., M.R.C.S.L. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

Unlike many books, this one is evidently not made to order; it represents great intelligence and earnest conviction, much research and care. Moreover, its references to the original text and to questions of science are trustworthy. The writer's belief in verbal inspiration, does not, of course, prevent him putting the question which forms the title of his book. Thus, he does not think that Jephthah's daughter was slain (p. 194). Much of the scientific information is interesting, such as that relating to sun, stars, and nebulae (p. 28). The discussion of Genesis occupies half the volume, the other books of the Pentateuch and the historical books being treated more briefly. The following is the explanation given of the two accounts of Creation: "Careful study will at once determine that there is not the slightest antagonism. The first record in Gen. i. 26, 27, is a general statement, showing man's dignified position in the work of creation generally, and setting forth the divine determination in regard to the creating of the human being (male and female) in the image and after the likeness of God. The second record in Gen. ii. 7, is a detailed account of the creation of the individual man, describing his nature, how formed, and by what power and process life was imparted to him" (p. 49). The work is one to be warmly commended to teachers and students of Scripture.

Scripture Biography. For the Use of Sunday-school Teachers, &c.
By JOSEPH HASSELL, A.K.C. Lond. London: Blackie & Son.

The volume is well adapted to the purpose announced on the title-page. It consists entirely of outlines or enlarged notes, the substance of which has been found useful by the author in his own work. The outlines are arranged under six heads: Patriarchs and Judges, Kings and Prophets, Christ and His Apostles, Paul and his Companions, Women of the Bible, Subjects for Senior Classes.

A Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians. By THOMAS C. EDWARDS, M.A., Principal of the University College of Wales, Aberystwith. London: Hamilton, Adams & Co.

It is not often that a commentator puts himself, on his first appearance, into the front rank of a distinguished class; but it is no exaggeration to

say this of the writer of the present work. In grammatical criticism and interpretation of the line of thought alike, the work is solid and strong. As to the first point, the exposition is based throughout on the original text; the acuteness of philological criticism is worthy of a scholar of the Master of Balliol, and reminds us, more than any other recent work, of Meyer. The many comparisons with classical Greek alone cannot fail to be helpful to students. These dry grammatical details are lighted up with many suggestions. On page 2 we find the note:—"If the fourth Gospel had been written in the second century, the name ἀπόστολος would not have been absent from it." On xv. 3, ὑπὲρ πάντων ἁμαρτιῶν is thus explained:—"In Heb. v. 3 περὶ is the true reading. Elsewhere ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. But the one expression explains the other. The apostle might have used ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν in the sense of 'for our behoof,' but he could not have said ὑπὲρ τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν, if Christ's death were only an example of self-denial, not because ὑπὲρ must be rendered 'instead of,' 'in loco,' but because the reference to sin involves with ὑπὲρ the notion of expiation. Indeed, περὶ ἁμαρτίας in LXX. means a sin-offering (cf. Lev. v. 11; vii. 37). The words are a distinct statement of the doctrine that Christ's death was a propitiatory sacrifice for sin; and that the occurrence of such a statement in this place proves that in the Pauline presentation of the Gospel this import of Christ's death constituted an essential aspect of the Gospel. Cf. i. 17, ii. 2; Gal. iii. 1; Rom. iv. 25."

The exposition of the substantive teaching of the Epistle is equally thorough. No difficulties are shirked. The crucial phrases and passages are ably discussed, even if they are not always satisfactorily explained. While other interpretations, ancient and modern, are taken into account, they are kept in a subordinate place. The discussions of "natural" and "spiritual" (ii. 14), of vii. 12, the sanctification of believers' children (vii. 14), baptism for the dead (xv. 29), and of the whole of chapter xv. strike us as particularly good.

The work has grown out of prolonged study of St. Paul's life, undertaken with a view to discover the apostle's central idea. This idea—the mystic union between Christ and believers—first comes to the front in the present Epistle. The principle is assumed, not proved—assumed on the authority of revelation and personal experience. The first Adam represents the unity of the race in evil, the second in redemption. Thus St. Paul's leading thought is no abstract idea. "What the idea is to Plato, and what the Wisdom and Word is to Philo and the author of the Book of Wisdom, that Christ is to St. Paul no less than to St. John. But, whereas Plato's idea transcended existence, and the Alexandrian conception of God's Wisdom and Word is the poetical personification of an attribute, the ideal Christ of St. Paul is identical with the historical Jesus, who once died of weakness and rose from the dead in power, as the Spirit, the Lord, the Glorified Redeemer, the new beginning of humanity. This saves the apostle from the deadening effect of abstrac-

tion. He is in no danger of identifying God with $\tau\acute{o}\ \delta\epsilon\upsilon$, or of confounding, as was done by Philo, and long afterwards by the Schoolmen, logical distinctions with differences of things." This principle "as it is the pivot of the apostle's entire theology, is also the key to the intricacies of this Epistle." We quite agree with the author so far. We have no doubt that the key fits the wards in most cases. But we are not quite sure that it does so with respect to all the seven questions discussed in the Epistle—*i.e.*, it does not seem quite certain that the apostle in writing his letter judged each question by its bearing on the spiritual union between Christ and believers. But the author may be right. He is certainly right in the main.

In his Introduction, Mr. Edwards writes enthusiastically of the merits of Calvin and Bengel as expositors. Of Calvin he says:—"Profound thoughtfulness, sobriety of judgment, fearless honesty, fine culture, and instinctive sense of proportion, all meet in this prince of commentators. In expounding St. Paul, he holds converse with a kindred spirit." "Bengel founded, and could found, no school. His marvellous felicities must ever remain inimitable. He is mighty to quicken thought. Reading him often acts like a charm; and, unless the reader is well on his guard against the fascination, he is in some danger of actually surrendering his own power of thought." We trust Principal Edwards will give us much more work of the same quality.

An Introduction to the Books of Ezra, Nehemiah and Esther.

By A. H. SAYCE, M.A. London: Religious Tract Society.

A small book of great value, throwing a flood of light on some of the least known books of Scripture. "Its distinguishing peculiarity is the use made in it of recent monumental discoveries, more especially of the inscriptions of Cyrus." Several of these inscriptions on tablets and cylinders are translated in full. At the end of the volume the long rock-inscription of Darius at Behistun, giving his own account of his reign, is thus reproduced. The Jewish history of the period is brought into relation with general history. We are shown how Cyrus regarded his restoration of the Jews to Palestine as "a master-stroke of policy," while he was unconsciously fulfilling a divine prophecy. The new knowledge obtained is effectively used to reply to the objections to the historical credibility of the Book of Esther both on external and internal grounds (page 98). "It is difficult to read the book with impartial eyes without being struck by its local colouring, its minuteness of detail, and its general agreement with historical facts." Of the Book of Esther generally, it is said, "God's inspiration is not confined to a particular kind of literary work or a particular description of narrative. Holy Scripture contains examples of almost every sort of literary

composition; all are alike consecrated in it. In the Book of Esther the Divine name does not occur even once; and we look in vain for references to religious observances—fasting perhaps excepted—and even to the peculiar institutions of the Jews. Nevertheless, secular as it seems to be in tone, it has been made an instrument through which God has revealed his will to us, and prepared the way for the work of Christ.”

Galilee in the Time of Christ. By SELAH MERRILL, D.D.
London: Religious Tract Society.

Dr. Merrill sets himself vigorously to refute the disparagement of Galilee and everything Galilæan which has established itself in tradition. The tradition is certainly widespread and persistent. It is accepted by writers like Stanley, Howson, Keim, Hausrath, Delitzsch. Dr. Merrill's position, on the other hand, is that in the time of Christ Galilee was a rich territory, inhabited by a numerous, well-to-do population. His evidence is collected from every possible source. It is summarized with great ability, and supported by personal observation. The writer is perhaps in danger of going to the other extreme. Nathanael's question is interpreted as meaning, “the great good which we expect cannot come from Nazareth, because Scripture has declared that He must come from Bethlehem.” Dr. Zeller, “who has spent eighteen years as a missionary at Nazareth, and whose knowledge of the region is extensive and intimate, has examined the present work, and his first criticism was that the facts with regard to the natural fertility of Galilee had been underrated.” The book is brightly written, and the contents are full of interest.

Theological Encyclopædia and Methodology, on the Basis of Hagenbach. By G. R. CROOKS, D.D., and J. F. HURST, D.D. New York: Phillips & Hunt.

“Theological Encyclopædia” is a new branch of theological study in England. Its aim, as long pursued in Germany, is to map out in general lines the whole field of theology, describing its different divisions and subdivisions, and at the same time directing to sources of more detailed information. Theological bibliography is thus one of its principal features. The only analogues in English are such works as Bickersteth's *Christian Student*, which, however unsystematic and incomplete, did good service in their day. Now that the time has come for something more scientific, the translation of such a work as Hagenbach's is to be sincerely welcomed. As it is now in its eleventh edition in German, it comes to us with the stamp of public approval. Eminently free from speculative elements, it is well adapted to serve as a guide to beginners. Rübiger's work, now in course of translation, is of another character, and forms an admirable supplement to Hagenbach's.

After a brief discussion of the nature of "General" encyclopædia, Hagenbach plunges in his "Special" section into his main subject. Under the four heads of Exegetical, Historical, Systematic, and Practical Theology the whole field is covered. The first branch, for example, discusses general questions respecting the classification of the Old and New Testament Books, the Original Languages, Biblical Archæology, Isagogics, Canonicity, Criticism, Hermeneutics. The second branch discusses, with equal fulness, Biblical History, Biblical Dogmatics, Church History, History of Doctrine, Patristics and Symbolics, and Ecclesiastical Archæology. Whatever questions may be raised on details of classification, the advantage of such clear demarcation of the several subjects is obvious.

The translation is clear and intelligent, though not always idiomatic. The references to English bibliography add greatly to the value of the work for Christian students. We are disposed to think that it was scarcely necessary to reproduce all the catalogues of German literature; a selection of the best works would have been better. But we know the difficulty of such a selection.

The Self-Revealing Jehovah of the Old Testament the Christ of the New Testament. By S. M. BARCLAY. London: J. Nisbet & Co.

The writer seeks to establish the thesis stated in the title by a very complete review of the Old Testament passages bearing on the subject. A chapter is devoted to the theophanies, to the patriarchs, to those in Exodus, in the three other Pentateuchal books, in the historical books, and the prophets respectively. The question throughout is one of interpretation, and decision upon it will be largely influenced by subjective leanings. Reading the Old Testament in the light of the New, the writer's views acquire great probability. But whether these occurrences were prophetic theophanies, anticipations of the Incarnation, to any of the ancient Jews, is a more difficult question. Dogmatic statements would be out of place, and the writer does not deal in them. Certainly the consensus of ancient Christian interpretation is in favour of the conclusions of the volume, with which most Christians would like to agree. An excellent feature in the volume is that the numerous references to the Scriptures, as well as to early Fathers and modern interpreters, are quoted in full. We are glad to see that the heading of one chapter does not go beyond "*Intimations of the Doctrine of the Trinity in the Old Testament.*" Gill's Commentary and J. J. Gurney are favourite authorities with the writer. It is satisfactory to find a member of the Society of Friends laying such stress on the Bible doctrine of the Trinity. Proper names are frequently misspelt. Tertullian against Praxeas often appears as "Tertullian against Praxeau," Novatian as "Novation."

Archbishop Thomson is quoted as "Thompson," Harold Browne as "Harold Brown," Clark of Edinburgh as "Clarke."

The Preacher's Homiletical Commentary on Leviticus. By Rev. W. HARVEY JELLIE. London: R. D. Dickinson.

The series to which the present volume belongs is intended, not to be a substitute for, but to supplement, works of exposition proper. In this character the volume on Leviticus will be welcome to those who possess the other volumes. Even more interesting than the "Suggestive Readings" and "Homiletics," which form the bulk of the work, are the "Illustrative Addenda" to each chapter, giving brief quotations in prose and poetry from various authors. Used with discrimination, the series can scarcely fail to improve the preaching of the day.

Metaphors in the Gospels, a Series of Short Studies. By DONALD FRASER, D.D. London: J. Nisbet & Co.

The writer takes the minor metaphors in Christ's discourses only, not in the whole of the Gospels, explains their origin, and gives hints as to their moral application. The number of the studies, thirty-six, suggests the extent to which our Lord's teaching is pervaded by a figurative element. The expositions are freshly and concisely written, and contain much that will be helpful to teachers and preachers. On the Chip and the Beam it is suggested, first, that it is a delicate operation to correct the faults of other men; secondly, that self-ignorance and self-conceit incapacitate one for performing this operation; and, thirdly, that an honest Christian reserves his strictest judgment for himself. The metaphor of the Gnat and the Camel suggests, that inward qualities count for more than outward observances, and that a just sense of proportion is essential to a well-regulated Christian mind. The saying about Salt teaches, that usefulness is a duty, the great secret of usefulness is goodness, the faculty for usefulness may decay. "Scarcely any part of Scripture has been more praised and less obeyed than the Sermon on the Mount." "We anticipate no good result from the present-day tendency to avoid or soften statements of God's impending judgment. We trace its influence in superficial views of the guilt of sin, and a feeble grasp of the great fact and doctrine of Atonement." "It is right to be charitable. but no one needs be more charitable than Jesus Christ. It is well to be liberal, but with one's own things, not those of another. It is a cheap and hollow liberality that is always ready to give way on the truths of God's Word, and to yield the claims of His righteousness." "Monogram" seems to be a slip for "monograph" (p. 347).

The Sunday Home Service. By Rev. DONALD MACLEOD, D.D., Editor of *Good Words*. London: Isbister.

The Preface expresses the hope that the volume "will prove useful,

not only to many families in this country, but to travellers abroad and to residents in India and the Colonies, who may be deprived of opportunities for public worship." Each of the fifty-two services contains suggestions of a portion of Scripture to be read, a brief discourse, a prayer, a collect from the English liturgy, and the Lord's Prayer. The subjects of the discourses are practical, and include the different Christian festivals. The bulk of the teaching is sound and calculated to do good. If criticism were in place, we might take exception to one or two points. The writer warns against the "fanatical" use made of the doctrine of regeneration "by those who insist on every regenerate person knowing the day or the hour when they were changed, or who require that a certain experience be passed through before true life can be reached." "Insist on," is scarcely the phrase to be used. In treating of the "Destiny of the Wicked," he intimates that his own "sympathies are very decidedly on the side of 'the larger hope.'" But he is not, like Dr. Cox, unaware of the difficulties, apart from Scripture, standing in the way of Universalism. The volume is solidly got up.

Communion Memories. By J. R. MACDUFF. London : J. Nisbet & Co.

The popularity of Dr. Macduff's books is explained by their picturesque style, spiritual fervour, fidelity to evangelical doctrine, and engaging titles. The last is by no means an unimportant element. We have had "Memories of Gennesaret, of Bethany, of Olivet, of Patmos," in as many volumes. Now we have "Communion Memories." Titles of other volumes are equally happy, "Eventide at Bethel," "Noontide at Sychar," "Palms of Elim," "Grapes of Eshcol." The present volume well illustrates the character of Scotch Communion services. The introduction describes the order and spirit of such services. Then follow sermons, addresses, prayers, and meditations, which are excellent examples of the teaching of the Scotch churches on the subject. Of course there is a sermon from Solomon's Song. An historical appendix adds much miscellaneous information respecting the Lord's Supper in general. In the severe simplicity of Scotch churches as well as in the elaborate ritual of episcopal bodies, the ordinance is equally recognized as the central, supreme act of Christian worship. The ideal underlying the rare celebration in the one case and that underlying frequent celebration in the other are precisely the same—namely, the solemnity and greatness of the service. No one who has joined in a Communion-service in Scotland will admit that elaborate forms could add anything to its impressiveness. The simplicity is that of the Most Holy Place in the ancient temple. Silence may express more reverence than speech. The volume is tastefully got up; but our copy has a sheet misplaced in binding, not an uncommon occurrence in these days.

The Great Cloud of Witnesses, or, Faith and its Victories. Second Series. *Joshua to David.* By W. LANDELLS, D.D.
London : Religious Tract Society.

The present volume completes the author's exposition of Hebrew xi. One chapter is given to Rahab, Barak, Gideon, Jephthah respectively, two each to Joshua, Samson and Samuel, three to David, while four chapters discuss the general statements respecting the power of faith in the closing verses of the chapter. The delineations of moral character and the practical applications of truth are worthy of the author. Thoughtfulness, vigour, elegance, mark all Dr. Landells' books, and not least the present one. In discussing Jephthah and his vow, he felicitously quotes Tennyson's description in the *Dream of Fair Women*. The book is one to be earnestly commended.

The Alternatives of Faith and Unbelief. By C. STANFORD, D.D.
London : Religious Tract Society.

This telling brochure applies Whately's maxim, "that disbelief is belief, only they have reference to opposite conclusions," to the several points in debate between faith and no faith—the Being of God, the claims of Christ, the Bible, the Gospel. On each point the writer asks, What is the alternative or substitute? and then criticizes this alternative in a keen, forcible way. Those who know Dr. Stanford as a writer will scarcely need to be told, that his style is pointed and his spirit sympathetic. The form of direct address is preserved throughout. To doubters the work can scarcely fail to be useful.

Old and New Theology: A Constructive Critique. By Rev. J. B. HEARD, M.A. Edinburgh : T. & T. Clark. 1885.

Having tasted the old, we do not desire the new; for the old is better. We are not among those who refuse to admit that there can be such a thing as New Theology. Of course, if theology be taken to mean the whole body of revealed truth, as contained in the Bible, then there is no such thing as a New Theology. But if it signify, as it generally does, the human systems deduced from the Bible, then we are prepared to admit that there is, and ought to be progress in such systems, that every age, adding to the stores of knowledge of its predecessor, ought to have a clearer apprehension of the meaning of the Word of God, and that the progress of the human race is constantly unveiling truths, and aspects of truth, previously hidden. But we cannot accept a New Theology which is a contradiction of the Old. Mr. Heard is a great admirer of the principle of development, but he utterly disregards it in the construction of his new creed. Continuity is essential to development; there is, however,

no continuity between the new creed of this book, and the old creed of Christendom. It is not a question of modes of expressions, but of fundamental difference. When we are told that the old theologians "speak of the Fall, the Atonement, the Final Judgment, as if all were agreed to accept these terms as the expressions of some *fact*, instead of their being only obscure inferences from a few obscure passages of an old Book, at best but imperfectly understood," we cannot but feel that our author is building upon an entirely new foundation. The new creed is based upon a maximum of assertion with a minimum of proof. The psychology of "the Tripartite Nature of Man," a psychology which we are not prepared to accept, is the metaphysical basis of this New Theology; we do not, however, think that that psychology logically tends to all the issues set before us in this book. So far as we can make it out, the god of this New Theology is no longer the glorious Jehovah of the Bible, but an abstraction in which are brought together "the reigning ideas of the age," what Carlyle would call the time-spirit. This being so he is no longer the Unchangeable One, but a creation of the human mind, varying according to "the fashion of this world which passeth away;" and every successive age will have to wait till some new Constructive Critique shall come to rear its image, and blow the trumpet which is to be the signal of the new worship. And when the Nebuchadnezzar of the age gives the sign, all must fall down and worship at the peril of being cast into a furnace of ridicule as being under the dominion of "Priestism or Pietism." For ourselves we prefer the furnace to the idolatry.

Christ and Christendom. The Boyle Lectures for 1866.—

Biblical Studies.—Theology and Life: Sermons chiefly on Special Occasions. By E. H. PLUMPTRE, D.D. London: Griffith & Farran.

This is a re-issue of three well-known books of Dean Plumptre. They require no extended notice, having been for some time before the world. The Boyle Lectures are an exhibition of the principal questions surrounding the Life of Christ, dealing with the points of debate raised by modern criticism. The "Biblical Studies" were mostly contributed to *Good Words* or *The Sunday Magazine*. The sermons on "Theology and Life" treat of the practical bearing of Christianity upon the life of individuals and communities.

A Reasonable Faith: Short Essays for the Times. By THREE "FRIENDS." London: Macmillan & Co. 1884.

This little pamphlet, though containing a few good things, is, upon the whole, a most evil piece of writing. While hurling its anathemas at existing creeds, it proceeds with charming modesty to formulate its own,

which it calmly asks its readers to accept mainly because it assures them that it is "reasonable." Several of the fundamental verities of Christianity are assailed in this book, but the strength of its assault, if we can speak of strength in relation to it at all, is directed against the doctrine of a substitutionary atonement. We sympathize strongly with the writers' horror at certain forms of stating that doctrine which have prevailed in the ranks of Calvinism; but we have quite as strong a dislike to the opposite extreme to which, in their revulsion from Calvinism, the writers have oscillated. The book contains nothing particularly striking; it is composed of stock objections furnished up with quotations from modern poets, and from William Penn and William Law; and we should describe it as a second-rate manifesto of the Rationalistic school flavoured with a good deal of the tincture of mysticism.

The Conquest of Canaan: Lectures on the First Twelve Chapters of the Book of Joshua. By A. C. MACKAY, Lecturer in Sacred Rhetoric, Presbyterian College, Montreal. London: Hodder & Stoughton.

The present volume is one of many indications that the unwise neglect of the Old Testament by the Christian pulpit is passing away. The effect of the increased attention given by scholars to the earlier Scriptures must be seen sooner or later in the greater breadth of public Christian teaching. If the Old Testament can only be understood in the light of the New, the converse is equally true. Every student of the New Testament knows how it is pervaded by the spirit and the ideas of the Old. We cannot wonder at this when we remember that the life of its writers grew out of, and was fed by, the teachings of the earlier revelation. As Christian preachers know the Old Testament better, they will become fitter expounders of the treasures of the New. Mr. Mackay's volume is a good example of the way in which the lessons of a section of Jewish history, Joshua's life and character, may be brought to bear on Christian life and experience in modern days. The exposition is intelligent and natural, the style bright and attractive. We trust that the author will have many imitators equally capable.

PHILOSOPHY.

Types of Ethical Theory. By JAMES MARTINEAU, D.D., LL.D. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1885.

THIS remarkable work has both the merits and the defects incident to every partial history of the development of a mind. Trained in early

manhood in the straitest sect of English empirical psychology, Dr. Martineau found himself, about the year 1841, slowly outgrowing his early necessitarian and utilitarian creed. This led, some years later, to an ardent study of the mighty philosophical movement of ancient Greece, the effect of which he describes as "a new intellectual birth." "The experience," he says, "thus forced upon me by a new way of entrance upon ancient literature could not fail to spread and carry an interpreting light into modern studies; it was essentially the gift of fresh conceptions, the unsealing of hidden openings of self-consciousness, with unmeasured corridors and sacred halls behind; and once gained was more or less available throughout the history of philosophy, and lifted the darkness from the pages of Kant and even of Hegel. It was impossible to resist or distrust this gradual widening of apprehension; it was as much a fact as the sight of Alps I had never visited before." We commend these eloquent words, in which, after the lapse of thirty-six years, the aged thinker testifies with a noble enthusiasm to the revivifying influence of his first intelligent converse with the master minds of Hellas, to the attention of those who, in the conceit of their "scientific" methods of speculation, dream that the modern world has no longer aught to learn from Plato and Aristotle, and that the time devoted to the study of Greek in our schools and universities might be more profitably spent on some less recondite and more "useful" subject. To return, however, to Dr. Martineau: After his new birth he appears to have read substantially the whole of modern philosophy, and to have won for himself a position far indeed removed from the arid deserts whence he set forth. The book before us represents a part of the conquest of these thirty-six years of noble effort. It is to be followed, if the author's life and health are spared, by a treatise dealing with Ontology. We sincerely trust he may be permitted to enrich the philosophical literature of his country with another work as worthy of reverent attention as that which it is now our duty to introduce to our readers. The book consists partly of a review of certain conspicuous "types of ethical theory," partly of an exposition of the author's own views. The types belong, roughly speaking, to four genera: (1), theories in which a determinist doctrine of volition is coupled with a very crude psychology, or wholly divorced from psychology; (2), theories in which a determinist doctrine of volition is coupled with an elaborate but sensationalistic psychology; (3), theories in which a doctrine of free will is coupled with a rationalistic doctrine of conscience; (4), theories in which an æsthetic doctrine of conscience is coupled with an erroneous or ambiguous doctrine of freedom, or with a doctrine of determinism. In the first genus are comprised the theories of Plato, Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, and Comte, and to the criticism of these thinkers the first volume is exclusively devoted; the second genus comprehends Hobbes, Helvetius, Bentham, Mill, and Mr. Herbert Spencer and Mr. Leslie Stephen; the third, the "dianœtic"

moralists Cudworth, Clarke, and Price; the fourth, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson. The second volume opens with an attempt to build up a pure, or as Dr. Martineau somewhat quaintly designates it, an "idid-psychological" theory of ethics, upon the basis of the analysis of conscience contained in Butler's celebrated sermons, from which the author passes to a criticism of the several forms of necessitarian and hedonistic theory which are represented by the thinkers grouped in the second genus, concluding with a review of the rational and æsthetic moralists. Of the lucidity with which Dr. Martineau expounds, and the delicate appreciativeness and unerring logical instinct with which he criticizes, the several theories which he passes under review, we can, of course, give no idea within the narrow limits of the present notice; we must perforce be content to indicate a few of the salient points of his thought. Briefly, then, the Platonic idealism, the scattered lights of which Dr. Martineau focusses with rare skill in the first hundred pages of the book, failed in his opinion to afford a basis for a valid theory of ethics, because the theory of *ἀνιμωσις* fell short of such a doctrine of the noumenal self as alone can vindicate the intuitive assurance of moral responsibility, the free individual personality of man being resolved by his crude psychology into a hierarchy of principles, on the cognitive side *αἰσθησις*, *δόξα*, *ἐπιστήμη*; on the practical side *ἐπιθυμία*, *θυμὸς*, and *νοῦς*; whereof the rational principle, though entitled to supremacy, is nevertheless, in a certain sense a foreign element, rather a divinity struggling in man for the mastery over his baser nature than itself the true human soul.

From Plato, Dr. Martineau passes at once to Descartes, omitting, for reasons which we do not profess to understand, all notice of Aristotle. A somewhat slight sketch of the Cartesian system is followed by an elaborate exhibition of the process of its disintegration by Malebranche and Spinoza. The dualism of the theory, its assertion of the heterogeneousness of mind and matter, and consequent denial of the possibility of either affecting the other, was not acceptable to either of Descartes' great pupils. Both, in attempting to evade it, fell into Pantheism, and Spinoza into a Pantheism which is hardly, if at all, distinguishable from Atheism. Both profess a doctrine of freedom, but while the Frenchman clings inconsistently to the idea of free will, the Jew adopts determinism and identifies freedom with determination by rational motives. The review of Comte, which closes the first volume, strikes us as the ablest criticism of Positivism which we have hitherto met with. Dr. Martineau in effect places the whole system out of court by showing that the monstrous assumption on which it rests—viz., that knowledge is only of *phenomena*, is inconsistent with scientific thought, and in particular with Comte's own theory that psychology is a branch of physiology. We do not know that we have ever seen any cleaner dissection of a fallacy than the following:—

"Suppose that we had reached perfect knowledge of the brain, and could read or register every molecular movement in its exact time-

relation to the changes of our consciousness, what would be the difference, in the absence of causation, of a *derivative* series and a parallel series? Invariable antecedence and sequence being all that we have on hand, we cannot speak of any one term *producing*, or *failing to produce*, another that follows it, whether in the same line or in its counterpart; the whole account must run in terms of time. The story then would come out as follows:—Let A B C represent three consecutive molecular changes in the brain; and $\alpha \beta \gamma$ the three corresponding feelings. . . . Now the only way of determining to *what* series the several items belong, is to find their 'immediate' or 'proximate' antecedents, and to link together the terms thus selected as coming under the cognisance of the same science. Let us trace the working of this rule. A is proximately followed by B, say, in a second; it is also followed by α , also, let us say, in a second. B is similarly followed, in another second, by C, and also by β . β is therefore just one second removed from both α and B, which will, therefore, have, by the rule of proximity, to quarrel for possession of it; and the same dispute will arise between β and C, and so on all along the series. Nor will the case be mended by assuming an interval between the two sequents (physical and mental) upon the molecular change. If you put the cerebral consequent first, you make it the proximate antecedent of the mental which belongs to its predecessor; if the mental comes first, it is turned into the proximate antecedent of the next physical, and the two series fall into cross purposes throughout; and the passage in time-succession is just as frequent from the mental to the physical as from the physical to the mental. The truth is, Comte's absorption of psychology into physiology not only rests entirely on the causality which he repudiates, but gives it action from the material to the mental while withholding it from the inverse direction. What he really thinks is this—that the molecular change *produces* its thought-change, while no thought-change *produces* either another or any molecular. And yet the time order is exactly the same as would be required by the causal law when cut down to the rule of invariable sequence."

Of a thinker who merged psychology in physiology it might have been anticipated that he would pronounce ethics impossible in mere consistency. This, however, Comte does not do, and to make the incongruity the more startling, his *Art of Morals* assumes throughout the absolute authoritativeness of the idea of duty. Towards the moral law he seems to have been incapable of assuming the attitude of calm intellectual scrutiny. Hence he edifies, but he does not instruct.

The emphasis with which Dr. Martineau insists throughout the first part of his treatise on the necessity of a rational theory of freedom as a basis of ethics makes it the more disappointing to find, on turning to the constructive portion of the work, that he does not attempt to provide such a theory. Perhaps this *lacuna* is to be filled up in the volume on metaphysics, which, as we have already intimated, he hopes to publish before long. As a moralist he is, in a certain sense, as we have already stated, a follower of Butler, but in so far as he attempts to supply what Butler failed to furnish—viz., a guide to the individual conscience, he may justly claim to be an original thinker. No one can read Butler's sermons attentively without seeing that in effect they throw the reins, so to speak,

upon the neck of the individual conscience, in the face of the fact that it is only too possible to misinterpret the voice of conscience. It is necessary, therefore, Dr. Martineau urges, to construct a regular scale of motives, ascending from the lower to the higher, so that in case of conflict we may never be in doubt as to which is entitled to the preference. And this he attempts to do.

Into a detailed criticism of the scale we cannot enter, and we are the less disposed to do so because no attempt is made to furnish what seems to us essential to its utility and intelligibility—viz., a definition of moral worth. The scale, we are told, indicates degrees of moral worth, but in what moral worth itself consists we are not informed. Dr. Martineau, no doubt, would reply that moral worth is an unanalysable idea, but we do not think that even so our criticism would be irrelevant. An idea may be ultimate and yet perfectly definable—i.e., classifiable. Thus moral worth, as predicable of a motive, must consist either in the approbation of the conscience, or in some quality of the motive which elicits the approbation, and if the latter, then it must be common to every motive which is approved, and the community must be capable of exhibition. No such community, however, is shown by Dr. Martineau. Thus he ranks the social affections as higher than the love of power, and this, again, as higher than the sensual desires; but he does not show that the social affections and the love of power have any common quality, the more and less of which determine their relative places in the scale. It is plain to us that the degrees of moral worth can only be marked upon the scale of disinterestedness, and in that case the love of power would be no less excluded than the sensual desires. From the exposition of his own theory Dr. Martineau turns to criticize the several forms of hedonism and utilitarianism. This part of the work is marked by great acuteness, his exhibition of the impossibility of distilling the sense of duty out of sentient experience by any process of evolution, being, in our opinion, perfectly conclusive. The several essays on the rational and æsthetic moralists of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with which the book concludes, are interesting, but the importance of these thinkers is so slight at the present day that we refrain from criticism. The foregoing disjointed remarks cannot have given our readers more than a very imperfect idea of the contents of a work which is worthy of the most careful perusal and re-perusal, whereto we trust they will betake themselves without delay.

Active Principles; or, Elements of Moral Science. By J. H. GODWIN, Hon. Prof. New Coll. London. London: J. Clark & Co.

This volume is complementary to the author's former one, on *Intellectual Principles*, and is the more welcome as it traverses comparatively

untrodden ground. Psychologists usually give their strength to the intellectual powers, passing lightly over the more obscure spheres of feeling and volition. Hamilton does this. On the contrary, Professor Godwin's analyses of the contents of the latter faculties will be found as clear and generally as accurate as those of his former volume; and he has added a section on "Moral Perceptions and Sentiments." Although necessarily brief, his statements of the leading principles of moral science are sound and well argued. His attitude in regard to materialistic theories is decided enough. Thus, "No examination of the brain and the nervous system can show anything of joy and sorrow, hope and fear, love and admiration, duty and honour, right and wrong. Human knowledge, affections and choice, are inward experiences, of which much may be learnt by internal inspection, but nothing by external." The line taken on another great controversy is thus indicated: "Expediency is of great importance, though never the same as right, nor alone the reason. It is not the same thing to say that an action is right, and that it is useful. . . . Utility is often the condition, without which an action would not be morally right; it is sometimes a criterion or sign of its being right; but it is never identical with right." A very good example of the author's teaching and style is the discussion on "Liberty and Necessity" (p. 178.) In nine pages he gives first the arguments for necessity, and the replies to them, and then the arguments for liberty. It would be difficult to find a better example of succinct yet complete presentation of a great controversy. Professor Godwin's small volume contains more solid thinking than many far more pretentious works.

HISTORY AND BIOGRAPHY.

Woodhouse Grove School Memorials and Reminiscences. By
J. T. SLUGG. London: T. Woolmer. 1885.

WOODHOUSE GROVE was the younger sister of old Kingswood School. Old Kingswood has been translated from amidst the colliers to Lansdown Hill, Bath, and has long been known to University men as one of the best schools in England. Woodhouse Grove School, born half a century later than Kingswood School, was a few years ago, after a distinguished record, merged, for reasons of organization and economy, in the enlarged new Kingswood School. Hence this history of a completed course. Every Yorkshire special institution is distinguished by a strong *esprit de corps*, and this has been remarkably the case with Woodhouse Grove. Mr. Slugg, himself an old scholar, has in this pleasant volume given a clear and somewhat detailed history of the school during its seventy years of life. Much of the story is very quaint, and will be read with intense interest by "Grove boys," wherever they may be famed. The

work has been well done by Mr. Slugg, who himself entered the school some sixty years ago.

History of Methodism in Ireland. Vol. I. *Wesley and his Times.* By C. H. CROOKSHANK, M.A. London: T. Woolmer. 1885.

We have read with much interest this first volume of Mr. Crookshank's history. The author's industry of research and competency as a narrator were already known from his former works. Till the work, of which this volume is only the first instalment, is completed, it would be premature to attempt a review of it. We observe, however, one error relating to what is spoken of the "corporate status" of the Irish Conference in 1782, which is as quaint as it is characteristic—not of the writer in particular, but of certain ideas which struggle for existence in the sister island. Even the British Conference had no "corporate status" or existence till 1784, and, when it was incorporated, Irish Methodism was folded in, together with British Methodism, under the jurisdiction of its Anglo-Irish—or, perhaps we should say, British-Irish—Legal Conference.

Outlines of the World's History, Ancient, Mediæval and Modern, with Special Relation to the History of Civilization and the Progress of Mankind. By EDGAR SANDERSON, M.A. London: Blackie & Son. 1885.

In its way this book is perfect. It is a manual of world history, both ancient and modern, in 650 pages, enriched with illustrations and maps, which are of great value, and add interest and clearness to the admirable epitomes of historic facts. The history of the British Empire, as familiar ground to students, has wisely been omitted. This leaves more space for less-known fields. Achievements in art, science, literature, and politics are all carefully chronicled. The records of the Franco-German war and the American Civil war are clear and full. For students this will be a book of great value.

Consecrated Culture: Memorials of Benjamin Alfred Gregory, M.A. Oxon. By BENJAMIN GREGORY, D.D. London: T. Woolmer. 1885.

Dr. Gregory is a distinguished Wesleyan minister, both preacher and poet, a man of genius as well as a learned and able divine. In this volume he enshrines the memory of a beloved son, whose promise more than equalled all that even such a father could have hoped. Young Gregory was an Oxford first-class man of rare attainments, who, during his University course, had won high honours for his college; and he was the

first Oxford man that entered the Wesleyan ministry. In so doing he sacrificed all that mere scholarly ambition could have desired, but he never hesitated as to his decision, nor seems afterwards to have felt the slightest touch of regret. He put his hand to the plough of the Methodist itinerant and never looked back. He went by choice to a most remote and secluded Cornish country-circuit, where his lot was cast among warm-hearted and excitable country Methodists of the most primitive stamp, and he found there happy and congenial employment. A man himself of very various and versatile culture, and a polished writer, he loved his village circuit, his country walks, and his pastoral visitation among his homely flock. He had a dainty and refined soul, with a brave and brotherly heart, and the manliest instincts and habits. Such an example as his is well fitted to animate and inspire every young minister, indeed every Christian, who reads this volume, and, perhaps, may prove a timely and powerful rebuke to some degenerate souls, who are apt, even in these days of mitigated hardship and labour, to speak plaintively of the "trials" of their calling as ministers.

The book is throughout one of the deepest interest. Though the father has written it, it is as admirable in taste as it is excellent in style. There is no undue dilation, the proportions of the biography are well balanced, and the intelligent and sympathetic reader will find the memoir too short for his interest in the subject. Even so early a death—he died in his twenty-seventh year—is, in such a case as that of this rare youth, not without great compensations. To have *lost* such a son—lost in time to regain in eternity—is to have a precious and wonderful treasure of memory and hope.

Life and Letters of Adolphe Monod, Pastor of the Reformed Church of France. By one of his Daughters. Authorized Translation. Abridged from the Original. London: James Nisbet & Co. 1885.

A competent authority pronounced that Adolphe Monod was in two points of view the first of the Protestant pastors of his day; in the height of his oratorical genius, and in the sanctity of his life. Abundant evidence of Monod's piety is given in this volume. His letters breathe the highest devotion, the most simple patience and trust. But on his oratorical genius this book throws less light. It is true that the preface warns us not to expect a biography so called. During his last illness, Monod, with characteristic modesty, requested those around him not to write one. Further particulars would, however, have given interest to this Life. We hope somewhat to supply that deficiency in an article on the original French work in a later number. This English edition is furnished with some good explanatory notes, but it needs more. There is no account of the "Consistory" which plays such an important part in the early life of Monod at Lyons. Altogether the work wants fuller particulars and

explanations. The great preacher was born of a distinguished Protestant family. His father was a pastor in Paris, who, on hearing Adolphe's first sermon, foretold that he would be a distinguished preacher. He had a long struggle with doubt, which taxed his health of body and mind, during his earliest ministerial life in Naples. At last he was rooted and grounded in the faith. For eight years—1828–36—he was in Lyons. At first he was pastor of the Reformed Church. Afterwards, when dismissed from that post because of his faithful Gospel preaching, he founded an evangelical church and became its first pastor. The next eleven years were spent as a professor at Montaubon, then he came to Paris in 1847 as one of the pastors of the Reformed Church. Paris was in those days one vast parish. The pastors conducted service alternately in the three churches of the Oratoire, Pentemont, and Sainte Marie. Pastoral work devolved on the pastor of the week, or of the month. Adolphe Monod often wished for a division of the city into parishes, which would have enabled him to feel at home among his own people; as it was the pastoral relations were very unsatisfactory. The change was made after his time. The work of the Reformed Church in Paris is now divided into eight parishes.

Adolphe Monod died in 1856, at the age of fifty-four, after a lingering and painful illness. This volume will help to keep alive the memory of his great devotion and eloquence.

Cornish Worthies. By WALTER H. TREGELLAS. London : Elliot Stock.

Mr. Tregellas, an enthusiastic Cornishman, devotes two very readable volumes to the Arundels of Lanherne and elsewhere, the Bassets of Tehridy, Admiral Bligh of the *Bounty*, the Boscawens, the Godolphins. Dr. Borlase the antiquary, Davy and Trevithick, the Killigrews and Grenvilles and St. Aubyns, Sir Hussey Vivian, as well as to others, like Ralph Allen of Bath, Bone the engraver, Inledon and Foote and Opie, of whom one seldom thinks as Cornishmen. Nor does he omit Lander the African explorer, and Henry Martyn the devoted missionary. He also claims Lord Exmouth, born though he undoubtedly was at Dover, where his father, Samuel Pellew, commanded a mail-packet. However, the Pellew family had belonged to Breage, and then to Flushing, near Falmouth; and the future admiral spent five or six years at Truro Grammar School. Allen, son of an inkeeper at St. Blazey, was noticed by the Government Inspector while, still a boy, he was helping his grandfather to manage St. Colomb Post Office. He got a postal appointment at Bath, detected a Jacobite plot, invented cross-posts, and made a vast fortune, which he spent in boundless charity. The contrast between the present condition of the Arundel, Killigrew, and Boscawen families is striking. The first dwindled away; the name survives only among labouring people. The Killigrews, once so masterful (see the "Complaynte against John Killigrew of many

of his ill demeners," 1588. He behaved like the Kerry squires of a century and a quarter later are described by Mr. Fronde as doing), came to a sudden end with Anne, who, amid the corruption of Charles II.'s Court, "wore the white flower of a blameless life." But the Boscauwens, though Mr. Tregellas complains that they have only produced one great man, promise to be as lasting as any family in the West. Why, having fixed on such a title, Mr. Tregellas should have omitted Sir John Eliot, the Carews, the Molesworths, the Trelawneys, Dean Prideaux, &c., we cannot tell. He says he chose "those whose names were of sufficient importance, and who were likely to prove interesting to the general reader." Either he has a poor opinion of the "general reader," or else he mistrusts himself. Otherwise he would have felt that Eliot, at any rate, is at least as interesting a personage as half of those whom he has given us. With a little judicious compression he would have found space for more lives, and his narratives would have gained in compactness. Still, though he might have done better, he has done well in bringing together the famous names of West Wales. These outlying lands, far from the heart of the nation, need to have their blood warmed now and then by telling over the bed-roll of their ancient renown and their more recent achievements. Besides, Cornwall really has contributed an exceptionally large proportion of notable men to our national history. It is often so in lands of mixed blood. The Scottish border, the "Pennine Range"—that backbone along which met and mingled Yorkshire, Norseman and Lancashire Celt—and the Irish "Pale," are all cases in point. Is the comparative lack of distinguished names along the Welsh border due to the fact that there the blood did not mingle?

BELLES LETTRES.

The Iliad of Homer, done into English Verse. By ARTHUR S. WAY, M.A. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, & Rivington. 1885.

THOSE who have read Mr. Way's translation of the *Odyssey*, published under the *nom de plume* "Avia," will know what to expect from this rendering of the first six books of the *Iliad*. For the benefit of such as have yet to make his acquaintance, we may say that he is unquestionably the most Homeric of English translators of Homer since Chapman. With admirable good sense he has selected as his vehicle a long swinging verse of six accents, in which iambs and anapaests are about equally mingled, and which rhymes without being cut up into couplets—probably the nearest approach to an equivalent for the swiftly moving various hexameter of Homer which the genius of English versification permits, certainly far to be preferred to either the Spenserian stanza of Mr.

Worsley, or the couplet of Pope, or blank verse. This measure he manages with great skill, reproducing in most cases the pauses of the original, and catching at times somewhat of its matchless energy. His diction, on the whole, has the true epic simplicity, though occasionally a little *souppçon* of affectation is discernible in his archaisms. So far as we have been able to test it, the translation seems remarkably scholarly. The following lines from the second book we quote as giving a fair idea of the average level of the work :—

“Lo, these were the captains and lords of the Danaans battle-throng.
And who was the mightiest of all, then, tell me, Goddess of Song,
Of the men and the steeds that followed the sons of Atreus to war?
The horses of Pheres’ son were the goodliest ones by far,
The beasts that Eumélus drove, fleet flying as birds of the air:
Matched in the hue of their coats and in age and in height they were.
These in Perseia were reared by Apollo the silver-bowed;
Mares were they both, and upon them the terror of battle rode.
Of the heroes, the mightiest man was Aias, Telamon’s son—
While lasted the wrath of Achilles, for like unto him there was none.
Neither any such steeds as Peleides’, the peerless battlement bearers.
But he the while, in the midst of his galleys, the beaked seafarers,
Lay nursing his wrath against King Agamemnon, shepherd of folk,
Atreus’ son : and his men on the strand where the white waves broke,
Were hurling the quoits for their sport, and the spears of the wood-
land war,
And they shot with the bow ; and the steeds, each one by his several
car,
Champing the lotus-stalk and the marish-parsley’s leaf,
Stood ; but the cunningly fashioned chariots of many a chief
Lay in their tents : for the battle-fain captain of old yearned they,
And they roamed up and down through the camp, but not for them
was the fray.

Love’s Moods. By ÆLIAN PRINCE. London : E. W. Allen.

Genius alone could furnish an excuse for the publication of three thousand lines of verse in praise of love, and this plea cannot be set up for this book. We gather that its author has an intense dislike for the feebleness of that tentative phrase, “I think”—it is the sum, the sink of vile opinion; we will therefore indulge in a dogmatism which is unnatural to us, and say we do not think, but are positively certain, that Ælian Prince has written a very absurd book. In the last page of the volume certain explanations are afforded us of the more remarkable vagaries of phrase which it contains; but the primal mystery, more in need of an explanatory note, is why the book was ever written.

Annus Sanctus: Hymns of the Church for the Ecclesiastical Year. Translated from the Sacred Offices by Various Authors, with Modern, Original, and other Hymns, and an Appendix of Earlier Versions. Selected and Arranged

by ORBY SHIPLEY, M.A. Vol. I.—Seasons of the Church : Canonical Hours : and Hymns of Our Lord. London and New York : Burns & Oates. 1884.

We have given the title at length. Some of our readers may possibly desire to make a study of Roman Catholic hymnology. By means of the series of which this is the first volume, they will be able to do so with every advantage. They will, at all events, have the subject presented not only fully, but under the most favourable light. Mr. Orby Shipley remained far too long in the Church of England, doing the work of the Church of Rome with great diligence and daring, and not without success. He is now in his right place in the Church of Rome, and must, one would think, have escaped from some sharp twinges of conscience by ceasing from work which, to the uneducated Protestant apprehension, appeared to be that of a traitor.

The City of the Royal Palm, and other Poems. By FRANK COWAN. Rio de Janeiro : A. J. Lamoureux & Co. 1884.

The only noticeable feature about this pamphlet is that it is published at Rio de Janeiro, and is dedicated to His Majesty the Emperor of Brazil. We trust His Majesty has had less difficulty in reading it than we have. Its only recommendation is its brevity, and its solitary excuse its modesty.

In the Watches of the Night. By MRS. HORACE DOBELL. Vol. V. *Eyes of Darkness, and other Poems.* London : Remington & Co. 1884.

This volume shows considerable power of versification, but Mrs. Dobell writes too much. If her pen were less prolific, she might produce better work.

MISCELLANEOUS.

Monte Carlo and Public Opinion. Edited by a Visitor to the Riviera. London : Rivingtons. 1884.

THE purpose of this book will ensure it a welcome wherever the " gambling-hell " of Monaco is recognized as the pest of Europe. The editor tells us that his work claims " no literary merit." The volume is made up of quotations from Italian, French, English, German and American papers, which set forth the mischief that Monte Carlo is working, and claim the suppression of such a scandal to society. It is no small plea for the cause which the

editor has at heart to see such remarkable unanimity in the condemnation of this legalized gambling. The introduction deals carefully with the claim to independence made for the Prince of Monaco, who draws his principal revenue from the gambling tables of M. Blanc and his successor. In 1865, the Prince placed his customs and their collection in the hands of France on condition that he should be allowed £1,000 a year; all those criminals whose sentences exceed twelve months are sent to French prisons. The rights of France seem therefore substantial enough to justify her interference in suppressing this curse of the Mediterranean. The Prince does what he can to protect his handful of subjects, by making it a penal offence for any inhabitant of Monaco to visit Monte Carlo. But all else are free to go in the way of temptation. Every device is used to entrap the unwary. The editor says that the gardens are probably the most charming spot to be found from one end of the Riviera to the other. The concerts are famous, the reading-rooms are supplied with all the most recent papers, which is in itself no small attraction for visitors to the Mediterranean, who find it so hard to get any papers of recent date. All these attractions are intended to facilitate the approaches to the gambling tables. Respectable people go to hear the music or stroll through the gardens, and thus fall a prey themselves to the seductions of the tables, or lead others, who think it safe to follow their example, into ruin. We trust that this book will prove an arsenal from which many weapons will be drawn for the overthrow of the gigantic curse of Monaco.

The Peace Negotiations of 1782 and 1783. An Address Delivered before the New York Historical Society on its Seventy-third Anniversary, Tuesday, November 27, 1883. By JOHN JAY, late American Minister to Vienna. New York. 1884.

The manner in which the revolted and finally victorious colonies conducted the diplomacy by which their independence was formally defined and established was deserving of all admiration. We hope we shall not offend any Transatlantic reader if we say that in respect of dignity, integrity, and simplicity, as well as acuteness and ability, the first diplomatic essay of the young republic established a standard and precedent, which has never been excelled, and has not always been equalled, in the after history of the great commonwealth. Mr. Jay, the author of this address, is the descendant of one of the original Commissioners of the States, and has therefore found a congenial task in preparing these interesting elucidations, which will claim the attention of all who may desire to study, at first hand, the subject dealt with. A large appendix of documents and illustrative extracts from historical works adds to the value of the address. It is a pleasure to us, let us indulge in adding, to receive such a publication from a Society, some of the leading members

of which, including the President, showed us special courtesy some years ago in their own city. The study of English history is the great delight of the best public men in the States; and the study of American history and institutions is increasingly pursued by thoughtful public men in this country.

Disestablishment and Disendowment—What are They? By

EDWARD A. FREEMAN, D.C.L., LL.D., &c. &c. Second Edition. Macmillan & Co. 1885.

Some months ago a gentleman residing in Accrington, as it was recorded in the *Times* of February 18, addressed to three statesmen an inquiry whether the bishops and clergy of the Church of England were, or were not, State-paid. The three were Mr. Gladstone, the Marquis of Salisbury, and Earl Granville. The answers were as follows:—

Mr. Gladstone's secretary writes: "Sir,—Mr. Gladstone, in reply to your letter, desires me to inform you that the clergy of the Church of England are not State-paid." Lord Salisbury's secretary writes: "Sir,—I am directed by the Marquis of Salisbury to acknowledge the receipt of your letter. In reply I am to say that the bishops receive no grants from the State, but they receive a revenue from ancient endowments given to the Church." Lord Granville's secretary says: "Sir,—In reply to your letter I am desired by Lord Granville to state that tithes existed in England before Acts of Parliament, though the present mode of assessment and payment was settled by the Tithes Commutation Act, 6 and 7 William IV., c. 79, and subsequent statutes. I am to add that you will find a short summary of the origin of tithes, which is very complicated, in Blackstone's *Commentaries* or other text-books of English law, or in most encyclopædias."

Instead of referring our readers to Blackstone, as Lord Granville does, we advise them to procure the cheap but valuable pamphlet of which we have given the title above, and in which our distinguished English historian and Regius Professor of History gives a full and authentic explanation of a subject not less important than it is ancient and obscure, and as to which the impressions which generally prevail, especially among Nonconformists, are utterly erroneous.

Bechuanaland. By A Member of the Cape Legislature.

London: Sampson Low, Marston & Co. 1885.

This is a temperate, well-considered, and well-informed protest against our policy in Bechuanaland. The writer traces carefully the history of the whole question, discusses the claims of rival chiefs, and criticises the expedition under Sir Charles Warren. He considers that expedition a needless expenditure of English money—an expedition made in opposition to public opinion at the Cape, likely to alienate the colonists, and

to prevent the annexation of Bechuanaland to the Cape. Bechuanaland, however, is now definitely annexed to the British Crown; so there is an end of the question.

The Sunshine of Religion. By I. E. PAGE.

Devotional Manuals. Select Letters of Rev. Samuel Rutherford.
The Soul's Communion with her Saviour.

Punchi Nona: a Story of Female Education and Village Life in Ceylon. By the Rev. S. LANGDON.

Than Many Sparrows. By ANNIE E. COURTENAY. 1885.

Won Over: the Story of a Boy's Life. By NELLIE HELLIS.
London: T. Woolmer. 1885.

Working out the analogy between religion and light, Mr. Page's book protests against the gloomy views often entertained of a holy life, and insists upon its essential joyousness. Some of the headings of chapters—*The Sunshine of Life, The Sun of Righteousness, Sunshine between Clouds, Coming into the Light with an Example*—indicate its character. The possibility of a constant certainty of forgiveness and preservation from all sin is earnestly dwelt on. There are also many happy quotations and facts. We should rejoice to hear of class-leaders circulating the work among their members.

We hope that the reprint of Rutherford's classic will secure for it a wide circulation in the Methodist world. Its spirit is too fervid and its language too rapturous for continuous use; but as expressing the moods of highest spiritual aspiration nothing could be better. Used occasionally as intended, Rutherford's letters cannot fail to raise the tone of devotion. The other manual, likewise a reprint of a seventeenth-century work, is couched in more sober, level phraseology, and well expresses the prevailing tone of the best English piety. May it find many friends in its modern dress!

Punchi Nona is an interesting girl trained in the Mission School at Ceylon, and afterwards married to a native minister. The struggle of heathenism for victory in her home is described in a way to arrest the attention of all little people. The book is a child's book, but it will gratify every one who turns over its pages.

Than Many Sparrows is a most interesting and touching story intended to illustrate the providence of God. It is well written, and shows that the late Miss Courtenay had a true gift as a writer for the young.

Won Over is a graceful, well-written story which will win a welcome wherever it goes.

A Dictionary of Music and Musicians. Edited by Sir GEORGE GROVE, D.C.L. London : Macmillan & Co. 1885.

This dictionary has become almost indispensable for musicians. It deals concisely but carefully with all musical topics, and contains articles like that on Verdi, which will interest every reader. That article extends to fifteen pages, and is an entertaining as well as a scholarly sketch of the great composer's life and works. All other subjects are handled in a masterly manner.

The Secret of Ashton-Manor House. By ELIZA KERR.

The Mystery of Grange Drayton. By ELIZA KERR.

Two Snowy Christmas Eves. By ELIZA KERR. Illustrated by William Gunston.

Papers on Sunday School Teaching. By J. H. TOMLIN. 1. The Character of the Work. 2. Qualifications desirable in the Workers.

Ivy Chimneys. By EDITH CORNFORTH.

London : Wesleyan Methodist Sunday School Union. 1884.

Miss Kerr's three books are well printed on good paper, and are made thoroughly attractive for young readers. They are interesting and likely to do good. The writer is fond of strong expressions, especially in *Two Snowy Christmas Eves*. In *Ashton-Manor House*, Mr. Marsh, the soup manufacturer and editor of *Cleanliness* is at first too absurd a character, even for a story-book, whilst it is hard to know how to reconcile Miss Mowbrays' fancied degree at the London University with the fact that ladies have only been allowed to graduate there so recently. *Grange Drayton* has two or three pieces of fine writing which should have been pruned down. Mr. Tomlin's *Papers* are suggestive. They are published in a form which will make it easy to distribute them widely. In the "Qualifications" we find some room for criticism. "The ability to deprive a narrative of book stateliness, and tell it to children in their own words," is an awkward specimen of phraseology. Highly as we prize intellectual fitness we are not prepared to endorse either of the following sentences. "A teacher is practically at the mercy of any scholars who have more sharpness of intellect than himself. They can involve him in difficulties, and as soon as they discover their vantage, they will use it with pleasure." "He must not betray himself to the children, it will only shake their confidence in him." Such statements need to be modified and fenced round if they are to be either correct or useful. *Ivy Chimneys* is a delightful book. Its plea for the waifs of our great cities is so happily conceived and expressed that it will make many friends for these destitute children.

Materials for Object Lessons. By CHARLES McRAE, M.A.

Senior English History. From the Earliest Times to 1884.
For Standards V. and VI.

Shakespeare's King John. With Notes, Examination Papers,
and Plan of Preparation.

Short Narratives for Exercises in Composition. Adapted to the
requirements of the Educational Department. Edited
by an Assistant-Inspector of Schools.

Shakespeare's King Henry V. Abridged with Notes and
Introduction.

Select Poetry for Recitation. Standards V. VI. VII.

London and Edinburgh: W. & R. Chambers. 1885.

The forty-seven *Object Lessons* are intended to help teachers, young teachers especially, in their class work. Clear, full, suggestive, and thoroughly abreast of the times, these notes will facilitate preparation by furnishing valuable material in a compact and attractive form. *The Senior English History* is excellent. Its bold print, concise notes, interesting illustrations, and pleasant reading make it an attractive book. *King John* has found a painstaking editor, who makes this handy edition a model school-book. Teachers will find that all these volumes have been carefully prepared in order to meet the real needs of school life in a practical way.

The Fourth Standard Reader; The Fifth Standard Reader; Short Stories from English History; Algebra for Beginners.
Blackwood's Educational Series. London: Wm. Blackwood & Sons. 1885.

These Readers are marked by all the usual excellencies of the series—good paper and type with pictures which interest young people. Clear notes are given on difficult words, and there are some capital hints and rules for good spelling. The *Stories from English History* are well chosen, well told, and profusely illustrated. The *Algebra* makes the early part of this subject so clear that it will greatly assist both teacher and scholars.

CORNHILL (April, May, June).—The short papers of this magazine are especially interesting. In the June number, "Round about Haida" is a pleasant sketch of a delightful place in Northern Bohemia almost unknown to tourists. "Next-of-Kin Agencies" is a paper that must have cost enormous research. It gives a glimpse into what is a *terra incognita* to most readers.

SUMMARIES OF FOREIGN PERIODICALS.

REVUE DES DEUX MONDES (April 15).—M. Gabriel Charmes contributes a third article on Maritime Reform, entitled "The Defence of the Coasts." He says it is sad to think that, in the midst of the universal efforts of the nations of Europe to prepare themselves for the maritime warfare of the future, France alone remains unmoved. She alone has done nothing for the defence of her coasts and of her commercial ports. It is necessary to begin to work, he adds, at once, because the hour is pressing and the peril great. "Our ports of commerce are open; our populous northern cities are exposed to every blow; Mentone, Nice, Cannes and other cities lie at the mercy of an active foe." He says that France does not possess any adequate provision for torpedo warfare; but that all its resources consist in iron-clads, which would be no use in preserving the coast from such a catastrophe as a torpedo assault. Other countries are evidently conscious of their own weakness, though they may be held up to England as examples of perfect preparation for all the chances of war.

(May 1.)—In his review of current events, M. de Mazade says the fault of M. Jules Ferry—that which caused his ruin—was that he either did not know how, or did not wish, or feel able to free himself from equivocations, to form for himself a serious line of conduct, and to seek his support in the great body of moderate and reasonable public opinion, which is the most firm and unchanging in the country. He sometimes appeared to possess the instinct of gauging the conditions of Government, as when he went to Havre and Rouen, where he seemed disposed to break with Radicalism, and declared that the danger for the Republic arose from the Left. "Yet whilst he spoke against the Radicals, he made them rally to his standard by the baits he offered. Since his fall he has comforted himself by declaring that he has shown how the Republic might possess a firm and resolute government, inflexible in the maintenance of order, stronger than all the factions. He has even maintained that his rule will survive in his successors, who are bound to adopt and carry out his policy."

(May 15).—M. Anatole Leroy-Beaulieu contributes some "Studies, Political and Religious," in which he inquires why modern Liberalism has seen its Eden of peace and justice fade in the distance. Its distinctive characteristic has been the endeavour to resolve all questions in a rational manner, by the help of abstract principles conformably to logic and to the aspirations of human nature. Democracy, though it has sprung from the bosom of Liberalism, has caused its parent no small anxiety, and has been a disturbing force in all her calculations. Liberalism in the political world sought to transfer the axis of government from the traditional powers to the nation represented by its elected representatives; but instead of this we have seen the inauguration of the reign of a new tyranny—that of party. Europe, too, is menaced by all the evils which Liberalism flattered itself that it had suppressed—favouritism, nepotism, official plunder, all seem in danger of coming back again. The spirit of secularization, which has told so heavily upon religion, has almost become synonymous with Dechristianization. To the old religions has succeeded the irreligion of the State. But a reaction has already set in. The importance which religious questions have assumed all over Europe is one of the notable facts of the age. The whole study of these questions shows that to work an abiding change in public manners and public feeling, and to found a truly Liberal government, needs more time, more labour, more hard struggles than our fathers dreamed of. True Liberalism was never more needed than now, when Democracy has risen to such power; for if it does not exert its influence Democracy will become a despotism more ignorant and more harsh than the world has yet seen.

(June 1).—M. Gabriel Charmes' article on "The Religious Question in Bosnia and the Herzegovina," is written to point the contrast between the attitude of Austria towards the different religious bodies under her rule and the spirit which prevails in France. Unhappily, he complains, we are governed by Chambers that seem to regard it as their first duty to struggle against the religious idea in all its forms. An anti-Liberal propaganda is being waged, which threatens to entail some severe retribution in the future. The Italian and Spanish population of Algeria, hostile to

France at best, is in danger of being entirely alienated by such a line of conduct; whilst the grave problems to which the Mohammedan question gives rise are utterly neglected. The policy of Provincial *cafés* directs Colonial enterprises, and new countries and barbarous nations are suffering from the passions and prejudices of French electors. Meanwhile, Austria, the land that used to be a by-word for persecuting zeal and bitter prejudice, has dealt successfully with the most complex religious problems of the day. M. Charmes carefully traces the history of religious life and opinion in these provinces, and describes the organization of the three confessions—the Mohammedan, the Orthodox, and the Roman Catholic. The difficult questions raised by the close neighbourhood of these churches, have been so discreetly dealt with, that all seem to be satisfied. The Mussulman preserves his cherished rights in all personal and family matters; the Christians have obtained the deliverance from the Cadi, which they have long desired. Equal rights and equal protection for all—these great boons it has been the aim of Austria to secure for every province of her empire. The inveterate traditions of Islam have, as far as possible, been reconciled with the requirements of modern civilization.

LA NOUVELLE REVUE (April 1.)—M. Ney's article on "Lesseps and the Origin of the Suez Canal," is an interesting study. The great French engineer spent nineteen years in the French Consular and Diplomatic Service with much distinction, but being sent to Rome as the Government agent in 1849, it suited the Minister of Foreign Affairs to disown him. Lesseps retired in disgust. He was then forty-five. The idea of a Suez Canal had haunted him for twenty years. Ever since he set foot in Egypt, at the age of twenty-five, he had dreamed of it. In 1854, whilst living retired in the country, he received a letter from an old friend, announcing that Mohammed-Said, to whom Lesseps had shown special kindness in his early life, had become Viceroy of Egypt. This soon opened the way for his pet scheme. England threw many difficulties in his path. Two of M. Lesseps' letters are given. The first to Richard Cobden says: "Some people pretend that the project of the Viceroy will encounter opposition in England. I do not believe it. Your statesmen are too enlightened for me to entertain such a thought. What! England alone has more than half the commerce with India and China; she possesses an immense empire in Asia; she is able to reduce by one-third the expenses of her commerce, and to bring the metropolis half as near again, and she will not allow this to be done!" Unhappily he discovered that England was short-sighted. "I have found Lord Palmerston," he wrote, "the same man as in 1840, full of defiance and prejudices against France. He has spoken to me in terms the most contradictory, the most incoherent, and, I venture to say, the most lacking in good sense that one can imagine. . . . Not one of his arguments could be sustained a moment in a serious discussion." All the world knows Lesseps' triumph.

(April 15.)—The article on "Naval War by Ironclad Squadrons," contests the view of Vice-Admiral Peyron, that it would be a great mistake to abandon armed vessels and not to finish those now being built. Its writer, an old naval officer, holds that in future naval war will be a kind of industrial war—consisting in the chase of the enemy's commerce—not a war of squadrons. He urges that some actual experiments should be made on a vessel of war, to see whether it would really resist a self-moving torpedo. If it would not, then he maintains that it is useless to push forward any further vessels on such a plan. The article is another proof of the universal attention now being paid to naval warfare.

(May 1.)—The series of letters on "Society in London" which have been so eagerly expected, begins this month. The sketch of Her Majesty states that she is much changed since the death of the Prince Consort, and holds that her retirement is playing into the hands of those who wish to see a Republican form of government in England. Here is a French criticism of the royal upholstery. "The Queen has scarcely any more good taste in her furniture than in her toilet. Balmoral is frightful to see; from the ground floor to the top of the house, carpets, hangings, decorations are in green and yellow." The writer does not hesitate to accuse Her Majesty of parsimony when Madame Albani visits and sings to her. The first time the Queen presented her with the famous Indian shawl, the next with a modest little brooch, then it was the Memoirs, afterwards the Queen's portrait, last of all nothing. The Prince of Wales is acknowledged to be the most accomplished gentleman in the

three kingdoms. His three daughters, says the writer, have very distinguished manners, are very gracious, and are marvellously well brought up. Of course the highest praise is given to the Princess. The writer says that the Duchess of Edinburgh has had the talent to create a home where she knows how to retain her husband. Some notes on the Court are interesting. Lady Lonsdale's ambition is said to be to create a political *salon*. Lady Dudley's care for her late husband is not forgotten. The Countess is said to understand business like a man. She did not leave her husband an hour after the fatal malady seized him, save once when forced to go to court to pass the night. Then she left him in tears.

(May 15).—"Society in London" describes the household of the Queen and the Prince of Wales, and gives a sketch of each of the members of the Ministry. Innuendo and scandal occupy no small part in these sketches, but there are some smart descriptions. Sir Charles Dilke is called the Gambetta of England; Mr. Chamberlain a Radical Republican of the shade of M. Clémenceau. With him invectives and stunning blows take the place of eloquence. He has no political past, and his fall will perhaps be as sudden as his elevation. He flatters the masses, but his administration has made him many enemies; his Bankruptcy Bill has not been successful; he has outraged the shipowners, who detest him; he is an embarrassment for the Ministry, unpopular among the labourers, and held in suspicion by the Church. This is not flattering. If the writer of these sketches were to be believed, Mrs. Gladstone would be a female ogre, watching over a husband always busy with matters of gallantry. Mr. Gladstone is summed up in two words: excellent Minister in home affairs; wretchedly poor in foreign affairs. "He loves progress, possesses a certain enthusiasm of humanity, is a great partisan of free-trade, of suffrage as widely extended as possible, and of the liberty of election. He is patient and scrupulous, indefatigable in agitation: in that he has many points of resemblance to Gambetta. His eloquence, full of the orator's impulses, is massive, powerful, bitter, and fastens pitilessly on the weak points of his opponent." His popularity with the masses is described, but the critic adds that it has not been without its bad results. "Proud and irritable, even disdainful, too much possessed by the idea of his great importance, he has fallen by degrees into exclusiveness, has become systematic, intolerant," so that, notwithstanding the purity of his patriotic feeling, he has committed many faults. These samples of his work will hardly accredit the French critic to English readers.

(June 1).—The letters on "Society in London," which are completed in this number of *La Nouvelle*, are now on sale in one volume. They form, however, only the first part of the series. The Houses of Parliament, and the great political questions of the day, are discussed in these letters. There is nothing of very special interest. Lord Salisbury is said to be pre-eminently the man of the time—one of the most striking figures of English political life. "One follows him in his struggle against all the tendencies of the epoch with curiosity mingled with respect. In the most elevated sense of the word, he has a kind of Quixotism, or even of knightly ardour, which makes the great Conservative leader a man of another age, but valiant and bold. He struggles manfully against the power of the democracy, though he knows perfectly well that it will vanquish him at last. . . . His great integrity, his scorn for all accommodations, for all compromises, gives him a kind of cynical candour. He sees the peril and denies it; he understands the remedy and rejects it; he prefers to risk everything, rather than to submit to a solution imposed by events. . . . An enemy of all the tendencies of modern society, always on the breach against them, he is the champion of existing institutions, not because he believes them just or reasonable, but simply because they exist; that is his favourite argument. Having a horror of the French Revolution, and holding that England is great because she resists revolutionary ideas, he refuses to see that his country has not been protected from the calamities of modern times by the obstinate conduct which he inculcates, but much rather by the timely concessions made by his predecessors."

UNSERE ZEIT (April).—An article on "The Parisian Journals in 1884," by Paul d'Abrest, gives some interesting facts. *Le Petit Journal* heads the list with a circulation of three quarters of a million. It has attained its high place by the happy instinct with which its directors have laid their hands on the most gifted and popular

writers of the time. Alexander Dumas the elder wrote for it in his last days, but he was only able to write for a short time. At present the paper owes much of its success to the *feuilleton* published in parts from day to day. The famous steam-press-manufacturer, Marinoni, is the chief director of *Le Petit Journal*, but he only guides the general tone of the paper. M. Escoffier is editor. The paper steadily supported M. Ferry's government. *La Lanterne* is the most redoubtable of the Parisian papers. Meyer founded it in 1876 to further his own ends as a speculator. Its attack on the police for their rudeness to the public in the execution of their duties won it enormous influence. The articles enlisted public sympathy, and the paper was able to render no small service to the Parisians. "I will complain to the *Lanterne*" is the threat with which people now protect themselves against police violence. The circulation is 120,000, sometimes 150,000. It is a Radical paper which holds the views of M. Clémenceau. *Figaro* was said to be doomed when Villemessant died in 1879, but the prophets were far astray. It is still anti-Republican, but the violent reactionary counsels in which it indulged so largely have ceased. Its Saturday supplement forms a great attraction to readers. Constant variety is aimed at. Sometimes it is devoted to China, sometimes to Italy; extracts from new books are among its leading features. On Wednesday there is a politico-historical supplement of no less interest. Correspondents in all the great capitals furnish letters which are eagerly read. The *République Française* suffered greatly by Gambetta's death. He was the soul of the paper, though he seldom wrote more than a short sentence here and there. He surrounded himself with a body of men who were entirely devoted to him. Often he went at midnight to the office of the paper after some political meeting or luxurious dinner, such as he loved, and read the paper through in proof, as he lay stretched on the sofa in the director's cabinet. The attention of *Le Temps* to foreign affairs has given it an important place in France. It has a circulation of 30,000, despite its price, and supplies its readers with at least a third more matter than any other French paper. Its three chief workers are all members of the Senate. The article briefly tells the story of the origin of *La Nouvelle Revue*, which may be interesting to readers of these "Summaries." After the death of Buloz, under whose direction the *Revue des Deux Mondes* had enlisted in its service all the talent of France, others sought to win similar success. Madame Edmond Adam (Juliette Lamber) whose political salon was, in 1879, in its full tide of popularity, and who was herself regarded as a modern Egeria, inaugurated the project for *La Nouvelle Revue* in her own house. She only needed to look to her own circle to find suitable literary workers. Capital was soon subscribed. And the new Review has won a large circle of readers, whilst the older and more famous *Revue des Deux Mondes* still enjoys its former prosperity.

DEUTSCHE RUNDSCHAU (April and May).—Herr von Rodenberg's "Pictures from Berlin Life" in April are taken from the north of the city—a vast modern district not yet built over, with few houses more than twenty-five years old. In May he introduces his readers to the Dankeskirche on the "Wedding Platz," erected to commemorate the German's Emperor's escape from two attempts made on his life in 1878 and 1884. The church stands on a little elevation, with the square-like Platz stretched around it. The population of the district has grown rapidly in the last few years. It is not long since the "Platz" was quite a desert, with its sandy soil. The church which commemorates the preservation of the first German Emperor, is built in Roman style with yellow stone and terra-cotta. It forms an attractive object, standing with its lofty tower apart from the surrounding buildings.

(June).—In the political retrospect of the month, there are some comments on our difficulty with Russia. "In the nature of the case, the impression which Europe has formed of the incompetence of English diplomacy will be tenfold stronger in India." The writer predicts that Russian authority in Asia will soon overshadow the whole of Afghanistan; in Europe it is clear that England counts for nothing in questions of policy, and may in future be left out of the calculation. "For the moment," he adds, "that represents a gain; but it will cause a permanent disturbance of the balance of power among the European States, the consequence of which, for those who know the state of things, cannot be doubtful."

NOVA ANTOLOGIA (April 1).—This Review has a thoughtful article on "The

Extension of the Franchise in England," which gives facts and figures that will help Italian readers to understand the great change made in our electorate. Signor Palma says that the grand constitutional problem in England and the subject which presses on all thoughtful people on both sides of the Atlantic is, what will be the results of this formidable concentration of power in the new House of Commons, and how may any possible mischief be averted?

(April 15.)—The notice of Current Events contains a paragraph about the recent visit of the Prince and Princess of Wales to Ireland, which pays due tribute to the courage of the royal visitors, and speaks of the absence of any very serious unpleasantness. The writer adds that the Irish wish to secure a position in the United Kingdom similar to that which the Hungarians have in the Austrian Empire. No one, he holds, claims more than administrative autonomy of a somewhat ample kind. The visit, the reviewer says, has set in clearer light than ever the *prestige* of our ruling dynasty, even in a country which is so profoundly discontented with the Government as Ireland.

NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW (April).—"The Army of the Discontented," by Mr. T. V. Powderly, asks what can be done for the two millions of people in the United States who have no work. Perhaps a quarter of them would not work, but he holds that the rest might be provided for if the workman's day was reduced to eight hours. This would at once give employment to all who are willing to labour, and would cause increased demand for clothing and food, so that the prosperity of the country would be effectually secured. Malcontent Englishmen should note this article. "A Study of Prison Management," by C. D. Warner, deserves careful attention. He says that there is very little difference between the worst and the best regulated State prisons as to the effect produced in reforming convicts. The Reformatory at Elmira, New York, under the superintendency of Mr. Brockway, is trying other means with conspicuous success. To enter it a man must be between sixteen and thirty when tried, and must not have been in any State prison. Any Judge of the State may send such a prisoner to Elmira. Here the education is compulsory. The men rise in grade according to behaviour, diligence and progress—the purpose being to cultivate moral stamina. If a man's conduct seems perfect, he is sent out on parole after employment has been found for him. If he behaves well for six months on parole, he receives his final discharge; if not he is brought back to prison. Eighty per cent. of the cases are a success. Good food, kind treatment, intellectual improvement are the main features of this training.

(May.)—James Payn's article on "Success in Fiction" is pleasant reading. He tells a good story about an application once made to him by the editor of a great political organ to become a leading-article writer. "I expressed my acknowledgments, but ventured to hint that I had not the necessary knowledge, and, in short, nothing particular to say upon the matters in question." "My good sir," said the great man, encouragingly, "we will stuff you like a chicken." "Journalism may succeed, on such a basis," he adds, "but the story-teller who is to make any mark in the world cannot be stuffed." Some wise observations are made on what passes among the crowd for humour. "Even at penny readings, the audiences of which are comparatively select, it is not the best humorist, but the third-rate ones, that are most applauded." Mr. Payn says that he can only recall two novelists who can be said, in any extended sense, to have made conquests of both sexes.

(June.)—Judge Learned contributes an article to this Review on "The Tardiness of Justice." He says that the Supreme Court of the United States is hopelessly in arrears with its work. In New York the Court of Appeals is also falling behind with its business. Any considerable law suit may drag on for five or six years; one year would be a very short time for its termination. Every litigant has this unpleasant prospect before him. There has been increased laxity in requiring parties to be ready when cases are called; this has caused much delay. The excuse for it has been the expense of keeping witnesses waiting day after day. A judge who wishes to lessen his own work may "put a case over." If he does this, he will not now have to try it himself on his next visit, as a judge had to do when a regular circuit used to be appointed him. Now, he simply leaves a difficulty for his

successor. The practice of "referring" causes for trial, has also led to great delay in New York. Lawyers consent to refer cases which ought to be tried before the court or before a jury. The convenience of two or more counsel and of the referee must then be consulted, and heavy expenses are entailed on the defeated party. The extensive right of appeal given by the American system is the most fruitful cause of delay. Many cases are tried several times before they are finally settled, and "these re-trials afford opportunity for that dangerous drilling and preparing of the witnesses, by which, on a second trial, a party's evidence is made to appear better than it did at the first." Judge Learned criticizes briefly the proceedings of the Appellate Courts, and points out various matters which need improvement. The writing of long opinions he gives as another cause of delay. In this respect, he suggests that his brethren on the bench might help to facilitate justice.

QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THE METHODIST EPISCOPAL CHURCH SOUTH (April).—Dr. Marshall's article on "Methodism—Demands and Needs," is written under the glow of gratitude caused by the recent celebration of the Centenary of Methodism in the New World. The writer thinks that the special need of American Methodism is "church and religious information." In every congregation he would like to see a Literary Union formed with its own officers and funds. This Union should be supplied with monthly tracts, thirty or forty pages long, to cost a penny or two, and cover such subjects as baptism, the atonement, evolution, biography. Condensed and interesting matter of this kind would be of great value. Dr. Marshall suggests that the first should be on "What is Methodism?"

MIND IN NATURE (March).—This is the first number of a Chicago Journal intended to gather up current facts about psychical, medical and scientific matters. It will contain a full account of everything of importance which is brought before the American and English Societies for psychical research. The high quality of paper and type are special features of this Magazine. It contains some interesting papers.

CENTURY (April, May, June).—The War Series continues to be a feature of this magazine. General Badeau's article on Grant is excellent, and all the papers are profusely illustrated. Mr. Howells' Florentine Mosaics pleasantly reflect the many changing aspects of the great art city. They give some glimpses of the quieter sides of Florentine life which are of special interest. "The Three Herschels" in the June magazine is a capital sketch of Sir William, Sir John and Caroline Herschel. "How Shall we Help the Negro," is a thoughtful appeal to all friends of the black people of America to do everything they can to raise the standard of morality among them. Congress can do little, but individual influence would greatly assist in this work. The writer of the article is the Protestant Episcopal Bishop of Kentucky. He gives some painful particulars about the religious orgies of the negroes and the low standard of morality even among coloured preachers.

HARPER (April, May, June).—Dr. Russell's long-expected paper on "The Prince of Wales at Sandringham" shows what an interest the Prince and Princess take in all that concerns their Norfolk neighbours and tenantry. "Through London by Canal" gives some bright sketches of the famous water-way that winds along the north of Regent's Park. The paper on "Santa Fé de Bogota," in the magazine for June, is specially good. Some of the shorter stories, like the "Passages from the Diary of a Hong Kong Merchant," are very happy. "A Wild-Goose Chase" by F. D. Millet, gives some graphic sketches from the neighbourhood of Hamburg. The artist and his friends have many pleasant stories to tell of their kind reception among the people. One old lady dressed herself up in the old costume of a former generation, and was greatly delighted when the visitors took her likeness.

HARPER'S YOUNG PEOPLE (April, May, June).—This is a delightful children's magazine. Its papers on natural history are so well written and so full of valuable information that they deserve special praise. Young people will find every variety of pleasant reading in these pages.

THE IMPERIAL REVIEW (Melbourne, April).—This little review contains forty smart articles of about two pages each. It is racy and vigorous, but much too flippant for English readers.

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